824 resultados para Competition in prices
Resumo:
Patents for several blockbuster biological products are expected to expire soon. The Food and Drug Administration is examining whether biologies can and should be treated like pharmaceuticals with regard to generics. In contrast with pharmaceuticals, which are manufactured through chemical synthesis, biologies are manufactured through fermentation, a process that is more variable and costly. Regulators might require extensive clinical testing of generic biologies to demonstrate equivalence to the branded product. The focus of the debate on generic biologies has been on legal and health concerns, but there are important economic implications. We combine a theoretical model of generic biologies with regression estimates from generic pharmaceuticals to estimate market entry and prices in the generic biologic market. We find that generic biologies will have high fixed costs from clinical testing and from manufacturing, so there will be less entry than would be expected for generic pharmaceuticals. With fewer generic competitors, generic biologies will be relatively close in price to branded biologies. Policy makers should be prudent in estimating financial benefits of generic biologies for consumers and payers. We also examine possible government strategies to promote generic competition. Copyright © 2007 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
Resumo:
We study competition in two sided markets with common network externality rather than with the standard inter-group e¤ects. This type of externality occurs when both groups bene t, possibly with di¤erent intensities, from an increase in the size of one group and from a decrease in the size of the other. We explain why common externality is relevant for the health and education sectors. We focus on the symmetric equilibrium and show that when the externality itself satis es an homogeneity condition then platforms pro ts and price structure have some speci c properties. Our results reveal how the rents coming from network externalities are shifted by platforms from one side to other, according to the homogeneity degree. In the speci c but realistic case where the common network externality is homogeneous of degree zero, platform s pro t do not depend on the intensity of the (common) network externality. This is in sharp contrast to conventional results stating that the presence of network externalities in a two-sided market structure increases the intensity of competition when the externality is positive (and decreases it when the externality is negative). Prices are a¤ected but in such a way that platforms only transfer rents from consumers to providers.
Resumo:
Many jurisdictions have developed mature infrastructures, both administratively and legislatively, to promote competition. Substantial funds have been expended to monitor activities that are anticompetitive and many jurisdictions also have adopted a form of "Cartel Leniency Program", first developed by the US Federal Trade Commission, to assist in cartel detection. Further, some jurisdictions are now criminalizing cartel behaviour so that cartel participants can be held criminally liable with substantial custodial penalties imposed. Notwithstanding these multijurisdictional approaches, a new form of possibly anticompetitive behaviour is looming. Synergistic monopolies („synopolies‟) involve not competitors within a horizontal market but complimentors within separate vertical markets. Where two complimentary corporations are monopolists in their own market they can, through various technologies, assist each other to expand their respective monopolies thus creating a barrier to new entrants and/or blocking existing participants from further participation in that market. The nature of the technologies involved means that it is easy for this potentially anti-competitive activity to enter and affect the global marketplace. Competition regulators need to be aware of this potential for abuse and ensure that their respective competition frameworks appropriately address this activity. This paper discusses how new technologies can be used to create a synopoly.
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Using an OLG-model with endogenous growth and public capital we show, that an international capital tax competition leads to inefficiently low tax rates, and as a consequence to lower welfare levels and growth rates. Each national government has an incentive to reduce the capital income tax rates in its effort to ensure that this policy measure increases the domestic private capital stock, domestic income and domestic economic growth. This effort is justified as long as only one country applies this policy. However, if all countries follow this path then all of them will be made worse off in the long run.
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Typically only a limited number of consortiums are able to competitively bid for Public Private Partnership (PPP) projects. Consequently, this may lead to oligopoly pricing constraints and ineffective competition, thus engendering ex ante market failure. In addressing this issue, this paper aims to determine the optimal number of bidders required to ensure a healthy level of competition is available to procure major infrastructure projects. The theories of Structure-Conduct-Performance (SCP) paradigm; Game Theory and Auction Theory and Transaction Cost Economics are reviewed and discussed and used to produce an optimal level of competition for major infrastructure procurement, that prevents market failure ex ante (lack of competition) and market failure ex post (due to asymmetric lock-in).
Resumo:
Genetic and physiological studies often comprise genotypes diverse in vigour, size and flowering time. This can make the phenotyping of complex traits challenging, particularly those associated with canopy development, biomass and yield, as the environment of one genotype can be influenced by a neighbouring genotype. Limited seed and space may encourage field assessment in single, spaced rows or in small, unbordered plots, whereas the convenience of a controlled environment or greenhouse makes pot studies tempting. However, the relevance of such growing conditions to commercial field-grown crops is unclear and often doubtful. Competition for water, light and nutrients necessary for canopy growth will be variable where immediate neighbours are genetically different, particularly under stress conditions, where competition for resources and influence on productivity is greatest. Small hills and rod-rows maximise the potential for intergenotypic competition that is not relevant to a crop’s performance in monocultures. Response to resource availability will typically vary among diverse genotypes to alter genotype ranking and reduce heritability for all growth-related traits, with the possible exception of harvest index. Validation of pot experiments to performance in canopies in the field is essential, whereas the planting of multirow plots and the simple exclusion of plot borders at harvest will increase experimental precision and confidence in genotype performance in target environments.
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Individual movement is very versatile and inevitable in ecology. In this thesis, I investigate two kinds of movement body condition dependent dispersal and small-range foraging movements resulting in quasi-local competition and their causes and consequences on the individual, population and metapopulation level. Body condition dependent dispersal is a widely evident but barely understood phenomenon. In nature, diverse relationships between body condition and dispersal are observed. I develop the first models that study the evolution of dispersal strategies that depend on individual body condition. In a patchy environment where patches differ in environmental conditions, individuals born in rich (e.g. nutritious) patches are on average stronger than their conspecifics that are born in poorer patches. Body condition (strength) determines competitive ability such that stronger individuals win competition with higher probability than weak individuals. Individuals compete for patches such that kin competition selects for dispersal. I determine the evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS) for different ecological scenarios. My models offer explanations for both dispersal of strong individuals and dispersal of weak individuals. Moreover, I find that within-family dispersal behaviour is not always reflected on the population level. This supports the fact that no consistent pattern is detected in data on body condition dependent dispersal. It also encourages the refining of empirical investigations. Quasi-local competition defines interactions between adjacent populations where one population negatively affects the growth of the other population. I model a metapopulation in a homogeneous environment where adults of different subpopulations compete for resources by spending part of their foraging time in the neighbouring patches, while their juveniles only feed on the resource in their natal patch. I show that spatial patterns (different population densities in the patches) are stable only if one age class depletes the resource very much but mainly the other age group depends on it.
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A vast amount of public services and goods are contracted through procurement auctions. Therefore it is very important to design these auctions in an optimal way. Typically, we are interested in two different objectives. The first objective is efficiency. Efficiency means that the contract is awarded to the bidder that values it the most, which in the procurement setting means the bidder that has the lowest cost of providing a service with a given quality. The second objective is to maximize public revenue. Maximizing public revenue means minimizing the costs of procurement. Both of these goals are important from the welfare point of view. In this thesis, I analyze field data from procurement auctions and show how empirical analysis can be used to help design the auctions to maximize public revenue. In particular, I concentrate on how competition, which means the number of bidders, should be taken into account in the design of auctions. In the first chapter, the main policy question is whether the auctioneer should spend resources to induce more competition. The information paradigm is essential in analyzing the effects of competition. We talk of a private values information paradigm when the bidders know their valuations exactly. In a common value information paradigm, the information about the value of the object is dispersed among the bidders. With private values more competition always increases the public revenue but with common values the effect of competition is uncertain. I study the effects of competition in the City of Helsinki bus transit market by conducting tests for common values. I also extend an existing test by allowing bidder asymmetry. The information paradigm seems to be that of common values. The bus companies that have garages close to the contracted routes are influenced more by the common value elements than those whose garages are further away. Therefore, attracting more bidders does not necessarily lower procurement costs, and thus the City should not implement costly policies to induce more competition. In the second chapter, I ask how the auctioneer can increase its revenue by changing contract characteristics like contract sizes and durations. I find that the City of Helsinki should shorten the contract duration in the bus transit auctions because that would decrease the importance of common value components and cheaply increase entry which now would have a more beneficial impact on the public revenue. Typically, cartels decrease the public revenue in a significant way. In the third chapter, I propose a new statistical method for detecting collusion and compare it with an existing test. I argue that my test is robust to unobserved heterogeneity unlike the existing test. I apply both methods to procurement auctions that contract snow removal in schools of Helsinki. According to these tests, the bidding behavior of two of the bidders seems consistent with a contract allocation scheme.
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This paper investigates the persistent pattern in the Helsinki Exchanges. The persistent pattern is analyzed using a time and a price approach. It is hypothesized that arrival times are related to movements in prices. Thus, the arrival times are defined as durations and formulated as an Autoregressive Conditional Duration (ACD) model as in Engle and Russell (1998). The prices are defined as price changes and formulated as a GARCH process including duration measures. The research question follows from market microstructure predictions about price intensities defined as time between price changes. The microstructure theory states that long transaction durations might be associated with both no news and bad news. Accordingly, short durations would be related to high volatility and long durations to low volatility. As a result, the spread will tend to be larger under intensive moments. The main findings of this study are 1) arrival times are positively autocorrelated and 2) long durations are associated with low volatility in the market.
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We have investigated ultraviolet (UV) photorefractive effect of lithium niobate doubly doped with Ce and Cu. It is found the diffraction efficiency shows oscillating behavior Under UV-1ight-recording. A model in which electrons and holes can be excited from impurity centers in the UV region is proposed to study the oscillatory behavior of the diffraction efficiency. Oil the basis of the material equations and the coupled-wave equations, we found that the oscillatory behavior is due to the oscillation of the relative spatial phase shift Phi. And the electron-hole competition may cause the oscillation of the relative spatial phase shift. A switch point from electron grating to hole grating is chosen to realize nonvolatile readout by a red light with high sensitivity (0.4 cm/J). (c) 2005 Elsevier GmbH. All rights reserved.