Investigation of railroads, holding companies, affiliated companies, and related matters.

Mode of access: Internet.

Investigation of lobbying on utility holding company bills : hearings, Seventy-fourth Congress, first session, on H. Res. 288, a resolution authorizing and directing the Committee on Rules to investigate lobbying activities with respect to utility holding companies.

Hearings held July 9-17, 1935.

Investigation of Railroads, holding companies, and affiliated companies.

Reprint. Originally published: Washington : U.S. G.P.O., 1940. (Report / 76th Congress, 3d session, Senate ; no. 1182)

Investigation of holding companies. Hearing before the Committee on rules, House of Representatives, Seventy-first Congress, third session, on H.J. Res. 517, February 25, 1931.

Mode of access: Internet.

Laws relating to Securities Commission, exchanges, and holding companies, with indices.

Mode of access: Internet.

The role of deposit insurance and bank’s asset size in the 2008 financial crisis

In this paper we analyze the role of deposit insurance in providing the market with liquidity in times of financial turmoil. To do so, we look at the variation in insured and uninsured deposits between 2005Q3 and 2011Q3, controlling for liquidity, solvency and capital adequacy indicators, and find evidence that deposit insurance does provide some confidence in keeping funds in banks in times of turmoil. Additionally we follow an event study methodology to assess the impact of deposit insurance oriented policies on bank holding companies stock market returns, and find a TBTF effect.

Three essays in risk management in financial institutions

The choice to adopt risk-sensitive measurement approaches for operational risks: the case of Advanced Measurement Approach under Basel II New Capital Accord This paper investigates the choice of the operational risk approach under Basel II requirements and whether the adoption of advanced risk measurement approaches allows banks to save capital. Among the three possible approaches for operational risk measurement, the Advanced Measurement Approach (AMA) is the most sophisticated and requires the use of historical loss data, the application of statistical tools, and the engagement of a highly qualified staff. Our results provide evidence that the adoption of AMA is contingent on the availability of bank resources and prior experience in risk-sensitive operational risk measurement practices. Moreover, banks that choose AMA exhibit low requirements for capital and, as a result might gain a competitive advantage compared to banks that opt for less sophisticated approaches. - Internal Risk Controls and their Impact on Bank Solvency Recent cases in financial sector showed the importance of risk management controls on risk taking and firm performance. Despite advances in the design and implementation of risk management mechanisms, there is little research on their impact on behavior and performance of firms. Based on data from a sample of 88 banks covering the period between 2004 and 2010, we provide evidence that internal risk controls impact the solvency of banks. In addition, our results show that the level of internal risk controls leads to a higher degree of solvency in banks with a major shareholder in contrast to widely-held banks. However, the relationship between internal risk controls and bank solvency is negatively affected by BHC growth strategies and external restrictions on bank activities, while the higher regulatory requirements for bank capital moderates positively this relationship. - The Impact of the Sophistication of Risk Measurement Approaches under Basel II on Bank Holding Companies Value Previous research showed the importance of external regulation on banks' behavior. Some inefficient standards may accentuate risk-taking in banks and provoke a financial crisis. Despite the growing literature on the potential effects of Basel II rules, there is little empirical research on the efficiency of risk-sensitive capital measurement approaches and their impact on bank profitability and market valuation. Based on data from a sample of 66 banks covering the period between 2008 and 2010, we provide evidence that prudential ratios computed under Basel II standards predict the value of banks. However, this relation is contingent on the degree of sophistication of risk measurement approaches that banks apply. Capital ratios are effective in predicting bank market valuation when banks adopt the advanced approaches to compute the value of their risk-weighted assets.

Ownership structure and risk at Colombian banks

The separation between ownership and the control of capital in banks generates differences in the preferences for risk among shareholders and the manager. These differences could imply a corporate governance problem in banks with a dispersed ownership, since owners fail to exert control in the allocation of capital. In this paper we examine the relationship between the ownership structure and risk for Colombian banks. Our results suggest that a high ownership concentration leads to higher levels of risk.

The economics of group banking.

Includes bibliographies.

Competitive equity in the financial services industry : hearings before the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, United States Senate, Ninety-eighth Congress, first session, on S. 2181 ... S. 2134 ....

Item 1035-C, 1035-D (microfiche)

Report of the Public Utilities Division to the Securities and Exchange Commission with respect to the holding company system of the Commonwealth & Southern Corporation and its subsidiary companies, as to compliance with section 11(b) of the Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935.

"File no. 59-8."

Regulating financial conglomerates

We investigate the optimal regulation of financial conglomerates which combinea bank and a non-bank financial institution. The conglomerate s risk-taking incentivesdepend upon the level of market discipline it faces, which in turn isdetermined by the conglomerate s liability strucure. We examine optimal capitalrequirements for standalone institutions, for integrated financial conglomerates,and for financial conglomerates that are structured as holding companies.For a given risk profile, integrated conglomerates have a lower probability offailure than either their standalone or decentralised equivalent. However, whenrisk profiles are endogenously selected conglomeration may extend the reachof the deposit insurance safety net and hence provide incentives for increasedrisk-taking. As a result, integrated conglomerates may optimally attract highercapital requirements. In contrast, decentralised conglomerates are able to holdassets in the socially most efficient place. Their optimal capital requirementsencourage this. Hence, the practice of regulatory arbitrage , or of transferingassets from one balance sheet to another, is welfare-increasing. We discuss thepolicy implications of our finding in the context not only of the present debateon the regulation of financial conglomerates but also in the light of existingUS bank holding company regulation.

Vantagens e desvantagens da estrutura de holding na administração pública: um estudo de caso do Ministério da Defesa

Esse estudo buscou identificar vantagens e desvantagens da estrutura de holding na Administração Pública a partir da análise da constituição e organização do Ministério da Defesa. Realizamos um estudo de caso e, para a preparação do mesmo, partimos de referenciais teóricos que nos permitissem entender a estrutura de holding e controladas, a administração privada, a pública e a diferença entre elas. Foram realizadas doze entrevistas em duas etapas. A primeira abrangeu consultas a especialistas sobre holdings, e a segunda, pessoas com conhecimento sobre o Ministério da Defesa e Forças Armadas. As respostas das entrevistas foram analisadas tomando como base o que foi apresentado no Referencial Teórico. De forma geral, os entrevistados apresentaram como vantagens de uma holding na administração pública: facilitar maior integração e diálogo entre as partes; centralizar o poder norteando o rumo da organização; facilitar o desempenho estratégico e a visão; fomentar a governança; intensificar o diálogo, pensamento conjunto e atuação sistêmica; identificar maior poder de barganha e representatividade política; gerar maior eficácia por conta do entendimento entre as partes e melhor aproveitamento dos recursos; permitir a tradução de objetivos em diretrizes; aumentar a possibilidade de reduzir as desigualdades quando não pensa só no lucro; e buscar o benefício público. Como desvantagens foram citados o aumento de problemas no compartilhamento entre as controladas; a intensificação da possibilidade de choques de culturas diferentes; a possibilidade de cada gestor se voltar mais para sua organização quando os recursos são limitados; o maior esvaziamento da discussão de assuntos importantes na controlada; brecha para a ocorrência de retrabalho; possibilidade de atrasos na entrega das compras, que agora são centralizadas; maior exposição à politização e influência política; insuficiência de mecanismos de controle de desempenho; limitação das decisões e da gestão pelo que é estabelecido pela lei; existência de Forças políticas atuando e negociando; inexistência de carreiras civis em certas áreas aumentando essa exposição; falta de blindagem política e ingerência política; capacitação e estruturação não satisfatórios.

Características e tributação das sociedades " holding" no Brasil

A presente monografia tem por objetivo servir de introdução ao estudo sistemático de um tipo de sociedade cada vez mais difundida nacional e internacionalmente: a "holding". Assim, ao invés de optarmos por um estudo teórico mais profundo dos aspectos jurídicos do instituto, preferimos uma aproximação mais prática, que permitisse a aplicação dos conceitos expostos na área da administração de empresas. Esta diretriz decorreu naturalmente da área de concentração a que se vincula a monografia, qual seja, Direito Aplicado à Administração.

Bank bonus compromise bodes ill for the Single Supervisory Mechanism. CEPS Commentary, 8 March 2013

The European Parliament has probably won a Pyrrhic victory with its position on bank bonuses, argues CEPS CEO Karel Lannoo in this new Commentary. In return, EU member states got what they wanted with the new Capital Requirements Directive (CRD IV): no binding leverage ratio; mortgage risk weightings and capital add-ons to be determined by member states; and no obligatory consolidated capital position for bank-insurance companies. In other words, Banking Union will start out with capital rules that are more like Emmental cheese than a single rulebook. This is a huge encumbrance for a well-functioning Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM), and makes a single resolution mechanism impossible.