Relationship between corporate governance initiatives and earnings management

This cross-sectional study investigates the contribution of Australian listed companies’ compliance levels with Australian Corporate Governance Principles and Recommendations (CGPR) towards explaining the level of discretionary accruals. The findings will be of interest to CG regulators, as they contribute empirical evidence of the CGPR collective and individual role on mitigating earnings management practices.

Conceptual framework for earnings management and corporate governance research

This study investigates the theoretical framework for earnings management and corporate governance research along with a focused review of relevant previous research that has investigated the effects of a variety of corporate governance factors and earnings management. Research background has been categorised using Australian corporate governance principles and recommendations issued in August 2007.

Compliance with corporate governance principles: Australian evidence

© 2015 Australasian Accounting Business and Finance Journal and Authors. This study investigates the association between the level of compliance of Australian listed companies with Australian corporate governance principles, in aggregate, and the level of discretionary accruals using the modified Jones model. It is hypothesised that higher levels of compliance would be associated with lower levels of discretionary accruals. Data from a random sample of 214 Australian listed companies for the years 2009 and 2010 were used to test the hypothesis. The results demonstrate a significant negative relationship indicating that companies with higher levels of compliance engage in lower levels of earnings management via discretionary accruals.

Corporate governance convergence and moral relativism

Research question / issue This paper frames the debate on corporate governance convergence in terms of the morality underlying corporate governance models. The claims and arguments of moral relativism are presented to provide theoretical structure to the moral aspects of corporate governance convergence, and ultimately the normative question of whether convergence should occur. Research findings / insights: The morality underlying different models of corporate governance has largely been ignored in the corporate governance convergence literature. A range of moral philosophies and principles that underlie the dominant corporate governance models are identified. This leads to a consideration of the claims and arguments of moral relativism relating to corporate governance. A research agenda around the claims of Descriptive and Metaethical moral relativism, and which ultimately informs the associated normative argument, is then suggested. Theoretical / Academic implications The application of moral relativism to the debate on corporate governance convergence presents a theoretical structure to the analysis and consideration of its moral aspects. This structure lends itself to further research, both empirical and conceptual. Practitioner / Policy implications The claims and arguments of moral relativism provide a means of analysing calls that are made for a culturally or nationally ‘appropriate’ model of corporate governance. This can assist in providing direction for corporate governance reforms and is of particular relevance for developing countries which have inherited Western corporate governance models through colonialism.

Analysis of risk management disclosures by Australian publicly listed companies

In the aftermath of the global financial crisis, effective risk management (RM) and its communication to stakeholders are now considered essential components in corporate governance. However, despite the importance of RM communication, it is still unclear how and to what extent disclosures in financial reports can achieve effective communication of RM activities. The situation is hampered by the paucity of international RM Research that captures institution differences in corporate governance standards. The Australian setting provides an ideal environment in which to examine RM communication because the Australian Securities Exchange (ASX) has since 2007 recommended RM disclosures under its principle-based governance rules. The recommendations are contained in Principle 7 of the Corporate Governance Principles and recommendations (ASX CGPR). Accordingly, to assess the effectiveness of the AXS's RM governance principle, this study examines the nature and extent of RM disclosures reported by major ASX-listed firms. Using a mixed method approach (thematic content analysis and a series of regression analysis) we find widespread divergence in disclosure practices and low conformance with the Principle 7 recommendations. Certain corporate governance mechanisms appear to influence some categories of RM dislcosure but equity risk has surprisingly little explanatory power. These results suggest that the RM disclosures practices observed in the Australian setting may not be meeting the objectives of regulators and the needs of stakeholders.

An analysis of risk management disclosures: Australian evidence

- Purpose Communication of risk management practices are a critical component of good corporate governance. Research to date has been of little benefit in informing regulators internationally. This paper seeks to contribute to the literature by investigating how listed Australian companies in a setting where disclosures are explicitly required by the ASX corporate governance framework, disclose risk management (RM) information in the corporate governance statements within annual reports. - Design/methodology/approach To address our study’s research questions and related hypotheses, we examine the top 300 ASX-listed companies by market capitalisation at 30 June 2010. For these firms, we identify, code and categorise RM disclosures made in the annual reports according to the disclosure categories specified in Australian Stock Exchange Corporate Governance Principles and Recommendations (ASX CGPR). The derived data is then examined using a comprehensive approach comprising thematic content analysis and regression analysis. - Findings The results indicate widespread divergence in disclosure practices and low conformance with the Principle 7 of the ASX CGPR. This result suggests that companies are not disclosing all ‘material business risks’ possibly due to ignorance at the board level, or due to the intentional withholding of sensitive information from financial statement users. The findings also show mixed results across the factors expected to influence disclosure behaviour. Notably, the presence of a risk committee (RC) (in particular, a standalone RC) and technology committee (TC) are found to be associated with improved levels of disclosure. we do not find evidence that company risk measures (as proxied by equity beta and the market-to-book ratio) are significantly associated with greater levels of RM disclosure. Also, contrary to common findings in the disclosure literature, factors such as board independence and expertise, audit committee independence, and the usage of a Big-4 auditor do not seem to impact the level of RM disclosure in the Australian context. - Research limitation/implications The study is limited by the sample and study period selection as the RM disclosures of only the largest (top 300) ASX firms are examined for the fiscal year 2010. Thus, the finding may not be generalisable to smaller firms, or earlier/later years. Also, the findings may have limited applicability in other jurisdictions with different regulatory environments. - Practical implications The study’s findings suggest that insufficient attention has been applied to RM disclosures by listed companies in Australia. These results suggest that the RM disclosures practices observed in the Australian setting may not be meeting the objectives of regulators and the needs of stakeholders. - Originality/value Despite the importance of risk management communication, it is unclear whether disclosures in annual financial reports achieve this communication. The Australian setting provides an ideal environment to examine the nature and extent of risk management communication as the Australian Securities Exchange (ASX) has recommended risk management disclosures follow Principle 7 of its principle-based governance rules since 2007.

The implementation of OECD corporate governance principles in post-crisis Asia

The recent OECD Principles on Corporate Governance provide a framework for the convergence of global corporate governance practice. This paper considers the implementation of these global ‘best-practice’ standards of governance as part of the continuing post-economic-crisis reform throughout Asia. These initiatives have explicitly acknowledged that no single model of governance can exist, and instead have focused on those elements apparently common and, therefore, applicable to all countries. Notwithstanding the existence of these elements, this paper investigates the difficulties involved when attempting to implement general rules across countries at different stages of economic and legal development. While implementation will be hindered by obvious cultural disparities, long-term change in practice requires a cultural shift in the philosophical and financial bases of the firm.

Corporate governance failure and its impact on National Australia Bank's performance

The National Australia Bank (NAB) is the largest financial services institution listed on the Australian stock exchange and is within the 30 most profitable financial services organisation in the world. In January 2004, the bank disclosed to the public that it had identified losses relating to unauthorised trading in foreign currency options amounting to AUD360 million. This foreign exchange debacle was classified as operational risk, the risk of loss resulting from inadequate or failed processes, people, or systems and reiterated the importance of corporate governance for banks. Concurrent issues of National Australia Bank’s AUD4.1 billion loss on US HomeSide loans in 2001, the degree of strength of their risk management practices and lack of auditor independence, were raised by the US Securities and Exchange Commission in 2004, reinforcing the view that corporate governance had not been given the priority it deserved over a number of years. This paper will assess and critically analyse the impact of corporate governance failure by management and Board of Directors on NAB’s performance over the years 2001-2005.

Corporate governance failure and its impact on National Australia Bank's performance

The National Australia Bank (NAB) is the largest financial services institution listed on the Australian stock exchange and is within the 30 most profitable financial services organisation in the world. In January 2004, the bank disclosed to the public that it had identified losses relating to unauthorised trading in foreign currency options amounting to AUD360 million. Thisforeign exchange debacle was classified as operational risk, the risk of loss resulting from inadequate or failed processes, people, or systems and reiterated the importance of corporate governance for banks. Concurrent issues of National Australia Bank's AUD4.1 billion loss on US HomeSide loans in 2001, the degree of strength of their risk management practices and lack of auditor independence, were raised by the US Securities and Exchange Commission in 2004, reinforcing the view that corporate governance had not been given the priority it deserved over a number of years. This paper will assess and critically analyse the impact of corporate governance failure by management and Board of Directors on NAB's performance over the years 2001-2005.

Corporate governance, accounting and finance: a review

We review accounting and finance research on corporate governance (CG). In the course of our review, we focus on a particularly vexing issue, namely endogeneity in the relationships between CG and other matters of concern to accounting and finance scholars, and suggest ways to deal with it. Given the advent of large commercial CG databases, we also stress the importance of how CG is measured and in particular, the construction of CG indices, which should be sensitive to local institutional arrangements, and the need to capture both internal and external aspects of governance. The ‘stickiness’ of CG characteristics provides an additional challenge to CG scholars. Better theory is required, for example, to explain whether various CG practices substitute for each other or are complements. While a multidisciplinary approach to developing better theory is never without its difficulties, it could enrich the current body of knowledge in CG. Despite the vastness of the existing CG literature, these issues do suggest a number of avenues for future research.

Corporate governance mechanisms and earnings management in transitional countries – evidence from Chinese listed firms

The objective of this thesis is to investigate whether the corporate governance practices adopted by Chinese listed firms are associated with the quality of earnings information. Based on a review of agency and institutional theory, this study develops hypotheses that predict the monitoring effectiveness of the board and the audit committee. Using a combination of univariate and multivariate analyses, the association between corporate governance mechanisms and earnings management are tested from 2004 to 2008. Through analysing the empirical results, a number of findings are summarised as below. First, board independence is weakened by the introduction of government officials as independent directors on the boards. Government officials acting as independent directors, claim that they meet the definition of independent director set by the regulation. However, they have some connection with the State, which is the controlling shareholder in listed SOEs affiliated companies. Consequently, the effect of the independent director’s expertise in constraining earnings management is mitigated as demonstrated by an insignificant association between board expertise and earnings management. An alternative explanation for the inefficiency of board independence may point to the pre-selection of independent directors by the powerful CEO. It is argued that a CEO can manipulate the board composition and choose the "desirable" independent directors to monitor themselves. Second, a number of internal mechanisms, such as board size, board activities, and the separation of the roles of the CEO and chair are found to be significantly associated with discretionary accruals. This result suggests that there are advantages in having a large and active board in the Chinese setting. This can offset the disadvantages associated with large boards, such as increased bureaucracy, and hence, increase the constraining effects of a large and resourceful board. Third, factor analysis identifies two factors: CEO power and board power. CEO power is the factor which consists of CEO duality and turnover, and board power is composed of board size and board activity. The results of CEO power show that if a Chinese listed company has CEO duality and turnover at the same time, it is more likely to have a high level of earnings management. The significant and negative relationship between board power and accruals indicate that large boards with frequent meetings can be associated with low level of earnings management. Overall, the factor analysis suggests that certain governance mechanisms complement each other to become more efficient monitors of opportunistic earnings management. A combination of board characteristics can increase the negative association with earnings management. Fourth, the insignificant results between audit committees and earnings management in Chinese listed firms suggests that the Chinese regulator should strengthen the audit committee functions. This thesis calls for listed firms to disclose more information on audit committee composition and activities, which can facilitate future research on the Chinese audit committee’s monitoring role. Fifth, the interactive results between State ownership and board characteristics show that dominant State ownership has a moderating effect on board monitoring power as the State totally controls 42% of the issued shares. The high percentage of State ownership makes it difficult for the non-controlling institutional shareholders to challenge the State’s dominant status. As a result, the association between non-controlling institutional ownership and earnings management is insignificant in most situations. Lastly, firms audited by the international Big4 have lower abnormal accruals than firms audited by domestic Chinese audit firms. In addition, the inverse U-shape relationship between audit tenure and earnings quality demonstrates the changing effects of audit quality after a certain period of appointment. Furthermore, this thesis finds that listing in Hong Kong Stock Exchanges can be an alternative governance mechanism to discipline Chinese firms to follow strict Hong Kong listing requirements. Management of Hong Kong listed companies are exposed to the scrutiny of international investors and Hong Kong regulators. This in turn reduces their chances of conducting self-interested earnings manipulation. This study is designed to fill the gap in governance literature in China that is related to earnings management. Previous research on corporate governance mechanisms and earnings management in China is not conclusive. The current research builds on previous literature and provides some meaningful implications for practitioners, regulators, academic, and international investors who have investment interests in a transitional country. The findings of this study contribute to corporate governance and earnings management literature in the context of the transitional economy of China. The use of alternative measures for earnings management yields similar results compared with the accruals models and produces additional findings.

Corporate ownership, corporate governance reform and timeliness of earnings : Malaysian evidence

This paper provides the first evidence showing that ownership concentration and the identity of the largest shareholder matter to the timeliness of corporate earnings, measured by a stock price-based timeliness metric and the reporting lag. Using panel data of 1276 Malaysian firms from 1996 to 2009, we find a non-linear relationship between concentrated ownership, measured by the largest shareholding in a firm, and the reporting lag but not the timeliness of price discovery. Although firms with government as the largest shareholder and political connections have a significantly shorter reporting lag, only the former are timelier in price discovery. Firms with family and foreigners as the largest shareholder however are less timely in price discovery. While the reporting lag is shorter in the period after the integration of the Malaysian Code of Corporate Governance (MCCG) into Bursa listing rules, its impact on the timeliness of price discovery is mostly immaterial.

Essays on corporate governance, stakeholders, and restructuring

This dissertation consists of an introductory section and three theoretical essays analyzing the interaction of corporate governance and restructuring. The essays adopt an incomplete contracts approach and analyze the role of different institutional designs to facilitate the alignment of the objectives of shareholders and management (or employees) over the magnitude of corporate restructuring. The first essay analyzes how a firm's choice of production technology affects the employees' human capital investment. In the essay, the owners of the firm can choose between a specific and a general technology that both require a costly human capital investment by the employees. The specific technology is initially superior in using the human capital of employees but, in contrast to the general technology, it is not compatible with future innovations. As a result, anticipated changes in the specific technology diminish the ex ante incentives of the employees to invest in human capital unless the shareholders grant the employees specific governance mechanisms (a right of veto, severance pay) so as to protect their investments. The results of the first essay indicate that the level of protection that the shareholders are willing to offer falls short of the socially desirable one. Furthermore, when restructuring opportunities become more abundant, it becomes more attractive both socially and from the viewpoint of the shareholders to initially adopt the general technology. The second essay analyzes how the allocation of authority within the firm interacts with the owners' choice of business strategy when the ability of the owners to monitor the project proposals of the management is biased in favor of the status quo strategy. The essay shows that a bias in the monitoring ability will affect not only the allocation of authority within the firm but also the choice of business strategy. Especially, when delegation has positive managerial incentive effects, delegation turns out to be more attractive under the new business strategy because the improved managerial incentives are a way for the owners to compensate their own reduced information gathering ability. This effect, however, simultaneously makes the owners hesitant to switch the strategy since it would involve a more frequent loss of control over the project choice. Consequently, the owners' lack of knowledge of the new business strategy may lead to a suboptimal choice of strategy. The third essay analyzes the implications of CEO succession process for the ideal board structure. In this essay, the presence of the departing CEO on the board facilitates the ability of the board to find a matching successor and to counsel him. However, the ex-CEO's presence may simultaneously also weaken the ability of the board to restructure since the predecessor may use the opportunity to distort the successor's project choice. The results of the essay suggest that the extent of restructuring gains, the firm's ability to hire good outside directors and the importance of board's advisory role affect at which point and for how long the shareholders may want to nominate the predecessor to the board.

Corporate Governance Mechanisms and Firm Performance:Evidence from Finland

This paper examines the association between corporate governance attributes and firm performance of Finnish firms during 1990 – 2000. The empirical results suggest that corporate governance matters for firm performance. First, univariate test results indicate that firms characterized by a high (efficient) level of corporate governance have delivered greater stock returns, are higher valued based on the measure of Tobin’s Q, and exhibit higher ratios of cash flow to assets, on average, in comparison to their counterparts characterized by a low (inefficient) level of corporate governance. Second, controlling for a number of well-known determinants of stock returns, we find evidence that firms categorized by inefficient corporate governance have delivered inferior returns to shareholders during the investigation period. Finally, after controlling for several common determinants of firm value, we find that firms characterized by efficient corporate governance have been valued higher during the investigation period, measured by Tobin’s Q.