Vindicating Analyticity: Critical notice of Truth in Virtue of Meaning, by Gillian Russell

European Community's Seventh Framework Programme FP7/2007-2013 under grant agreement no. 238128

Educar nas virtudes:programa de intervenção para alunos do 1º ciclo de ensino básico

Tese de doutoramento, Psicologia (Psicologia da Educação), Universidade de Lisboa, Faculdade de Psicologia, 2014

Motivos de beleza e amor no cancioneiro popular português e sérvio

Tese de doutoramento, Linguística (Linguística Aplicada), Universidade de Lisboa, Faculdade de Letras, 2014

O conceito de Klugheit em Kant

This paper aims to analyze Kant’s concept of Klugheit and how it relates to morality. For Kant, this concept does not belong to the field of morality as it is, according to him, an interested act, therefore only capable of hypothetical imperatives. In this sense, prudence generates at most one’s own happiness, but not necessarily goodness. On the other hand, we reason that prudence plays an important role in promoting man’s moral improvement towards the exercise of virtue. Prudence only holds good, therefore, if understood from a Kantian anthropological point of view.