What if the Next Financial Crisis Hits the Banking Union? A Call for an “If All Else Fails” Clause. European Policy Brief No. 16, September 2013

This Policy Brief argues that the envisaged design of the Banking Union risks not being sufficient to deal with the next large-scale financial crisis. Therefore, an “if all else fails” clause should be approved, stating that the Banking Union members can provide joint last resort financing to deal with a future crisis. An agreement on the clause should be feasible because it is beneficial to all Member States.

What Germany should fear most is its own fear: An analysis of Target2 and current account imbalances. CEPS Working Document No. 368, September 2012

This paper analyzes two claims that have been made about the Target2 payment system. The first one is that this system has been used to support unsustainable current account deficits of Southern European countries. The second one is that the large accumulation of Target2 claims by the Bundesbank represents an unacceptable risk for Germany if the eurozone were to break up. We argue that these claims are unfounded. They also lead to unnecessary fears in Germany that make a solution of the eurozone crisis more difficult. Ultimately, this fear increases the risk of a break-up of the eurozone. Or to paraphrase Franklin Roosevelt, what Germany should fear most is simply its own fear.

The growth effects of EU cohesion policy: a meta-analysis. Bruegel Working Paper 2012/14, October 2012

We run a standard income convergence analysis for the last decade and confirm an already established finding in the growth economics literature. EU countries are converging. Regions in Europe are also converging. But, within countries, regional disparities are on the rise. At the same time, there is probably no reason for EU Cohesion Policy to be concerned with what happens inside countries. Ultimately, our data shows that national governments redistribute well across regions, whether they are fiscally centralised or decentralised. It is difficult to establish if Structural and Cohesion Funds play any role in recent growth convergence patterns in Europe. Generally, macroeconomic simulations produce better results than empirical tests. It is thus possible that Structural Funds do not fully realise their potential either because they are not efficiently allocated or are badly managed or are used for the wrong investments, or a combination of all three. The approach to assess the effectiveness of EU funds should be consistent with the rationale behind the post-1988 EU Cohesion Policy. Standard income convergence analysis is certainly not sufficient and should be accompanied by an assessment of the changes in the efficiency of the capital stock in the recipient countries or regions as well as by a more qualitative assessment. EU funds for competitiveness and employment should be allocated by looking at each region’s capital efficiency to maximise growth generating effects or on a pure competitive.