European Union and its member states as a collective actor in WTO decision-making process. ACES Cases No. 2010.3

This paper will outline and analyze the decision-making process in WTO matters. First, the players of the decision-making process -- the Council of the European Union (Council), the Trade Policy Committee, the Commission, and the European Parliament -- will be examined. Then the distinction will be made between decision-making in initiating WTO disputes and decision-making conducting trade agreement negotiations in the WTO. Then, decision-making practices in WTO matters will be assessed against constitutional principles of transparency, accountability, and legitimacy. After this assessment, conclusions will be drawn.

The EU’s Decision-Making Process Changes in the Constitutive Treaties

Since the beginning of its existence in the form of communities, the European Union’s decision-making process underwent constant evolution. There were continuous adjustments that transformed a pure intergovernmental process into one having rather federal features. Based on the hypothesis that changes have occurred at the decision level in regards to the actors, procedures, influence and ways of taking decisions in order for the new realities, needs and will at the European level to be properly addressed, this paper aims to present the reforms performed through the adoption of new treaties and the modification of the existing ones. The reality is that in order for the European dream and integration to go on and also for further development of the European Union, finally becoming an entity far beyond the founders expectations, decision makers had to constantly and carefully adapt the decision-making process. The purpose of this paper will be achieved by conducting a research based on the qualitative method, analyzing the related researches on this topic and the consolidated versions of the treaties. Thus, we will finally validate our research hypothesis that there was an evolution in what the EU’s decision-making process and decision procedures are concerned.

Mid-term Evaluation of the 2009-14 European Parliament: Legislative activity and decision-making dynamics. CEPS Special Report, 23 July 2012

This special report analyses legislative activity in the European Union and coalition formation in the European Parliament (EP) during the first half of the 7th legislative term, 2009-14. Co-decision is now the ordinary legislative procedure, not by name only: it was deployed on 90% of new proposals in 2010 and 86% in 2011, which suggests that the EP is now more influential than ever. There are differences in the degree of empowerment across committees, however. This report looks at the legislative workload of selected committees as an indicator of change in their influence, identifying which of them won and which lost out in terms of the quantity and type of legislation they tackle.

The European Court of Justice and process-oriented review. Research Paper in Law, 01/2012

Structuralism is a theory of U.S. constitutional adjudication according to which courts should seek to improve the decision-making process of the political branches of government so as to render it more democratic.1 In words of John Hart Ely, courts should exercise their judicial-review powers as a ‘representation-reinforcing’ mechanism.2 Structuralism advocates that courts must eliminate the elements of the political decision-making process that are at odds with the structure set out by the authors of the U.S. Constitution. The advantage of this approach, U.S. scholars posit, lies in the fact that it does not require courts to second-guess the policy decisions adopted by the political branches of government. Instead, they limit themselves to enforcing the constitutional structure within which those decisions must be adopted. Of course, this theory of constitutional adjudication, like all theories, has its shortcomings. For example, detractors of structuralism argue that it is difficult, if not impossible, to draw the dividing line between ‘substantive’ and ‘structural’ matters.3 In particular, they claim that, when identifying the ‘structure’ set out by the authors of the U.S. Constitution, courts necessarily base their determinations not on purely structural principles, but on a set of substantive values, evaluating concepts such as democracy, liberty and equality. 4 Without claiming that structuralism should be embraced by the ECJ as the leading theory of judicial review, the purpose of my contribution is to explore how recent case-law reveals that the ECJ has also striven to develop guiding principles which aim to improve the way in which the political institutions of the EU adopt their decisions. In those cases, the ECJ decided not to second-guess the appropriateness of the policy choices made by the EU legislator. Instead, it preferred to examine whether, in reaching an outcome, the EU political institutions had followed the procedural steps mandated by the authors of the Treaties. Stated simply, I argue that judicial deference in relation to ‘substantive outcomes’ has been counterbalanced by a strict ‘process review’. To that effect, I would like to discuss three recent rulings of the ECJ, delivered after the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon, where an EU policy measure was challenged indirectly, i.e. via the preliminary reference procedure, namely Vodafone, Volker und Markus Schecke and Test-Achats.5 Whilst in the former case the ECJ ruled that the questions raised by the referring court disclosed no factor of such a kind as to affect the validity of the challenged act, in the latter cases the challenged provisions of an EU act were declared invalid.

Bridging qualified majority and unanimity decision-making in the EU. IHS Political Science Series No. 132, February 2013

The EU has tried to bridge decision making by qualified majority and unanimity over the years by expanding qualified majorities (consensus) or by making unanimities easier to achieve. I call this decision-making procedure q-“unanimity” and trace its history from the Luxembourg compromise to the Lisbon Treaty, and to more recent agreements. I analyze the most recent and explicit mechanism of this bridging (article 31 (2) of the Lisbon Treaty) and identify one specific means by which the transformation of qualified majorities to unanimities is achieved: the reduction of precision or scope of the decision, so that different behaviors can be covered by it. I provide empirical evidence of such a mechanism by analyzing legislative decisions. Finally, I argue that this bridging is a ubiquitous feature of EU institutions, used in Treaties as well as in legislative decision-making.

Improving decision-making in the EU. CHALLENGE EUROPE Issue 22 - Challenges and new beginnings: Priorities for the EU's new leadership, September 2014.

The multiple crises the European Union (EU) has experienced in recent years have fundamentally altered decision-making and, more broadly, governance in the EU. Pre-crisis systems and processes were not adequate to react to such critical and systemic challenges, but the speed of the crisis meant that new governance mechanisms have been superimposed on existing processes and structures rather than seeing a fundamental reform of decision-making. Consequently, not all changes have been fully successful. Given the institutional changes this year and the ongoing development of the EMU governance framework, now presents a good opportunity to reform EU decision-making.