12 resultados para Ought to
em Archive of European Integration
Resumo:
A deep, comprehensive and ambitious TTIP should not undermine or otherwise negatively affect the WTO and its signatories. Among other things, this means that trade diversion ought to be minimised and positive spillovers stimulated. The present CEPS Special Report provides some elementary quantification, which helps to understand the economic incentives for third countries to seek regulatory alignment with TTIP results, where relevant, and for which TTIP should be ‘open’. It focuses on ‘indirect’ spillovers and employs a rather aggregate economic approach. We find that, of three groups of countries that are important for trade with the EU and the US, the ‘closest’ neighbours (NAFTA, EEA, Switzerland and Turkey) exhibit powerful incentives to align so as to benefit from positive spillovers. This is less clear for two other groups. Of the (seven) ‘biggest traders’ (in manufactured goods, for which spillovers matter most), China turns out to have the greatest interest in alignment in selected sectors, followed by Israel, Japan and South Korea. Whereas the latter three either have or are negotiating FTAs with the US and the EU, precisely China has none and remains outside TPP as well. In terms of sectors, the chemical sector followed by electronic equipment are by far the most important, with agro-products and fish as a good third (SPS issues). However, in chemicals and electrical equipment, the TTIP negotiations so far, and recent US/EU regulatory cooperation, do not indicate an ambitious approach, which could reduce regulatory barriers to market access drastically.
Resumo:
The initial ‘framing’ (in the summer of 2012) of the ‘genuine EMU’ for the wider public suggested to design an entire series of ‘unions’. So many ‘unions’ are neither necessary nor desirable – only some are and their design matters. The paper critically discusses first the negative fall-out of the crisis for EMU, and subsequently assesses the fiscal and the banking unions as accomplished so far, without going into highly specific technical details. The assessment is moderately positive, although there is ample scope for further improvement and a risk for short-term turbulence once the ECB has finished its tests and reviews. What about the parade of other ’unions’ such as economic union, social union and political union? The macro-economic imbalances procedure (MIP) and possibly the ESRB have overcome the pre-crisis disregard of macro competitiveness. The three components of ‘economic union’ (single market, economic policy coordination and budgetary disciplines) have all been strengthened. The last two ‘unions’, on the other hand, would imply a fundamental change in the conferral of powers to the EU/ Eurozone, with drastic and possibly very serious long-run implications, including a break-up of the Union, if such proposals would be pushed through. The cure is worse than the disease. Whereas social union is perhaps easier to dismiss as a ‘misfit’ in the EU, the recent popularity of suggesting a ‘political union’ is seen as worrisome. Probably, nobody knows what a ‘political union’ is, or, at best, it is a highly elastic notion: it might be thought necessary for reasons of domestic economic reforms in EU countries, for a larger common budget, for some EU tax power, for (greater) risk pooling, for ‘symmetric’ macro-economic adjustment and for some ultimate control of the ECB in times of crisis. Taking each one of these arguments separately, a range of more typical EU solutions might be found without suggesting a ‘political union’. Just as ‘fiscal capacity’ was long an all-or-nothing taboo for shifting bank resolution to the EU level, now solved with a modest common Fund and carefully confined but centralised powers, the author suggests that other carefully targeted responses can be designed for the various aspects where seen as indispensable, including the political say of a lender-of-last-resort function of the ECB. Hence, neither a social nor a political union worthy of the name ought to be pursued. Yet, political legitimacy matters, both with national parliaments and the grassroots. National parliaments will have to play a larger role.
Resumo:
The EU began railway reform in earnest around the turn of the century. Two ‘railway packages’ have meanwhile been adopted amounting to a series of directives and a third package has been proposed. A range of complementary initiatives has been undertaken or is underway. This BEEP Briefing inspects the main economic aspects of EU rail reform. After highlighting the dramatic loss of market share of rail since the 1960s, the case for reform is argued to rest on three arguments: the need for greater competitiveness of rail, promoting the (market driven) diversion of road haulage to rail as a step towards sustainable mobility in Europe, and an end to the disproportional claims on public budgets of Member States. The core of the paper deals respectively with market failures in rail and in the internal market for rail services; the complex economic issues underlying vertical separation (unbundling) and pricing options; and the methods, potential and problems of introducing competition in rail freight and in passenger services. Market failures in the rail sector are several (natural monopoly, economies of density, safety and asymmetries of information), exacerbated by no less than 7 technical and legal barriers precluding the practical operation of an internal rail market. The EU choice to opt for vertical unbundling (with benefits similar in nature as in other network industries e.g. preventing opaque cross-subsidisation and greater cost revelation) risks the emergence of considerable coordination costs. The adoption of marginal cost pricing is problematic on economic grounds (drawbacks include arbitrary cost allocation rules in the presence of large economies of scope and relatively large common costs; a non-optimal incentive system, holding back the growth of freight services; possibly anti-competitive effects of two-part tariffs). Without further detailed harmonisation, it may also lead to many different systems in Member States, causing even greater distortions. Insofar as freight could develop into a competitive market, a combination of Ramsey pricing (given the incentive for service providers to keep market share) and price ceilings based on stand-alone costs might be superior in terms of competition, market growth and regulatory oversight. The incipient cooperative approach for path coordination and allocation is welcome but likely to be seriously insufficient. The arguments to introduce competition, notably in freight, are valuable and many e.g. optimal cross-border services, quality differentiation as well as general quality improvement, larger scale for cost recovery and a decrease of rent seeking. Nevertheless, it is not correct to argue for the introduction of competition in rail tout court. It depends on the size of the market and on removing a host of barriers; it requires careful PSO definition and costing; also, coordination failures ought to be pre-empted. On the other hand, reform and competition cannot and should not be assessed in a static perspective. Conduct and cost structures will change with reform. Infrastructure and investment in technology are known to generate enormous potential for cost savings, especially when coupled with the EU interoperability programme. All this dynamism may well help to induce entry and further enlarge the (net) welfare gains from EU railway reform. The paper ends with a few pointers for the way forward in EU rail reform.
Resumo:
The social dimension of the internal market or of the EU more generally has recently been under quite fundamental attack. Calls for 'Europe' to be 'more social' have been heard repeatedly. Witness the polarized debates about the services directive, the anxieties concerning several ECJ cases about what limitations of the free movement of workers (posted or not) are justified or the assertion of a 'neo-liberal agenda' in Brussels disregarding or eroding the social dimension. This BEEP Briefing paper takes an analytical approach to these issues and to the possible 'framing' involved. Such an analysis reveals a very different picture than the negative framing in such debates has it: there is nothing particular 'a-social' about the internal market or the EU at large. This overall conclusion is reached following five steps. First, several 'preliminaries' of the social dimension have to be kept in mind (including the two-tier regulatory & expenditure structure of what is too loosely called 'social Europe' ) and this is only too rarely done or at best in partial, hence misleading, ways. Second, the social acquis at EU and Member States' levels is spelled out, broken down into four aspects (social spending; labour market regulation; industrial relations; free movements & establishment). Assessing the EU acquis in the light of the two levels of powers shows clearly that it is the combination of the two levels which matters. Member States and e.g. labour unions do not want the EU level to become deeply involved ( with some exceptions) and the actual impact of free movement and establishment is throttled by far-reaching host-country control and the requirement of a 'high level of social protection' in the treaty. Third, six anxieties about the social dimension of the internal market are discussed and few arguments are found which are attributable to the EU or its weakening social dimension. Fourth, another six anxieties are discussed emerging from the socio-economic context of the social dimension of the EU at large. The analysis demonstrates that, even if these anxieties ought to be taken serious, the EU is hardly or not the culprit. Fifth, all this is complemented by a number of other facts or arguments strengthening the case that the EU social dimension is fine.
Resumo:
The government debt crisis, erupted in the Eurozone in 2009, nearly led to the collapse of European monetary union. Now that this has been averted, the question is what should be done to make the Eurozone sustainable in the long run. The survival of the Eurozone hinges on the capacity of its leaders to improve the eurozone's governance. With the exception of Greece, the root cause of the government debt crisis has little to do with the poor performance of the SGP, rather, with unsustainable debt accumulation by private actors. Also, the method of convergence implicit in the SGP has not worked well – macroeconomic divergences have stubbornly remained for nearly a decade and several countries experienced boom and bust dynamics. Although strong declines in real interest rates may explain part of the story (but e.g. Italy did not experience boom & bust), self-fulfilling waves of optimism and pessimism which might be called 'animal spirits' and are of mainly national origin, seem a good candidate for explanation. These national animal spirits endogenously trigger credit expansion and contraction. It follows that (national) movements of credit ought to be under much firmer control and this is up to the monetary authorities, including the ECB. Critical recommendations for better governance of the Eurozone should therefore combine credible measures to maintain fiscal discipline over the medium term with such instruments as minimum reserve requirements to control the growth of bank credit as well as minimum reserve requirements in different national banking systems. Finally, the idea of adding more sanctions to the SGP may be ill-conceived since, in future, it might pre-empt national governments to come to the rescue of banks (under credible threats of contagion) and/or prevent a downward spiral in economic activity.
Resumo:
This paper examines the effect of the decoupling of farm direct payments upon the off-farm labour supply decisions of farmers in both Ireland and Italy, using panel data from the Farm Business Survey (REA) and FADN database covering the period from 2002 to 2009 to model these decisions. Drawing from the conceptual agricultural household model, the authors hypothesise that the decoupling of direct payments led to an increase in off-farm labour activity despite some competing factors. This hypothesis rests largely upon the argument that the effects of changes in relative wages have dominated other factors. At a micro level, the decoupling-induced decline in the farm wage relative to the non-farm wage ought to have provoked a greater incentive for off-farm labour supply. The main known competing argument is that decoupling introduced a new source of non-labour income i.e. a wealth effect. This may in turn have suppressed or eliminated the likelihood of increased off-farm labour supply for some farmers. For the purposes of comparative analysis, the Italian model utilises the data from the REA database instead of the FADN as the latter has a less than satisfactory coverage of labour issues. Both models are developed at a national level. The paper draws from the literature on female labour supply and uses a sample selection corrected ordinary least squares model to examine both the decisions of off-farm work participation and the decisions regarding the amount of time spent working off-farm. The preliminary results indicate that decoupling has not had a significant impact on off-farm labour supply in the case of Ireland but there appears to be a significantly negative relationship in the Italian case. It still remains the case in both countries that the wealth of the farmer is negatively correlated with the likelihood of off-farm employment.
Resumo:
Introduction. The idea that “merit” should be the guiding principle of judicial selections is a universal principle, unlikely to be contested in whatever legal system. What differs considerably across legal cultures, however, is the way in which “merit” is defined. For deeper cultural and historical reasons, the current definition of “merit” in the process of judicial selections in the Czech Republic, at least in the way it is implemented in the institutional settings, is an odd mongrel. The old technocratic Austrian judicial heritage has in some aspects merged with, in others was altered or destroyed, by the Communist past. After 1989, some aspects of the judicial organisation were amended, with the most problematic elements removed. Furthermore, several old as well as new provisions relating to the judiciary were struck down by the Constitutional Court. However, apart from these rather haphazard interventions, there has been neither a sustained discussion as to how a new judicial architecture and system of judicial appointments ought to look like nor much of broader, conceptual reform in this regard. Thus, some twenty five years after the Velvet Revolution of 1989, the guiding principles for judicial selection and appointments are still a debate to be had.
Resumo:
After four rounds of the European Semester process of EU economic coordination, Belgium has done relatively little to comply with EU recommendations. This brief substantiates and confirms this claim after clarifying the meaning of these recommendations. While the challenges underlined by the European Commission still lie ahead, Belgium’s ownership of the recommendations for reforms has been low. Not only do coordination processes remain bureaucratic and technocratic, but many of the recommendations’ concerns – external competitiveness, social security reforms, market reforms – are not traditionally defended by the political left in Belgium. The controversy surrounding the recommendations for national structural reforms owes much to their supply-side orientation, which contrasts with the inability of the EU to pursue demand-side policies. But despite this disequilibrium, the recommendations highlight relevant issues that ought to be addressed, and indicate where scope for national debate exists.
Cardiff: Birthplace of a new Transatlantic Narrative? Egmont Security Policy Brief No. 57, July 2014
Resumo:
Cardiff has the potential to turn into a “great meeting”, if the focus is on forging a new and attractive narrative to underpin a solid transatlantic security relationship, in which NATO finds its place. But Europeans must become serious on defence – and not only because the US asks for it. Otherwise, the EU and for sure the European States will become strategic bystanders and even objects of great power competition. That would be a real game-changer. That is why, in Cardiff, “we” ought to be ambitious enough to deal with the real issues, including the relationship between NATO and the CSDP.
Resumo:
There is growing worldwide concern about bias in the enforcement of competition law in favour of domestic firms. Even seemingly neutral antitrust laws can lead discrimination if they are enforced selectively. - Authors investigate the distortions that national competition authorities generate when they pursue non-competition goals in favour of domestic firms, and discuss ways to address this negative policy development in a globalised world. - The distortions identified in the paper would dissipate if governments agreed that the sole objective of competition law ought to be the protection of consumer welfare that competition-law institutions ought to be protected against capture. - A realistic and effective way to prompt international convergence towards independent enforcement of competition laws is through the inclusion of competition clauses in bilateral trade agreements and the development of dispute-resolution mechanisms.
Resumo:
To date, the negotiations over chemicals in the Translatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) have not shown sufficient ambition. The talks have focused too much on the differences in the two ‘systems’, rather than on the actual levels of health and environmental protection for substances regulated by both the US and the EU. Given the accomplishments within the OECD and the UN Globally Harmonised System of Classification and Labelling of Chemicals (GHS), the question is whether TTIP can be any more ambitious in the area of chemicals? We find that there is no detailed or systematic knowledge about how the two levels of protection in chemicals compare, although caricatures and stereotypes abound. This is partly due to an obsessive focus on a single US federal law, the Toxic Subtances Control Act (TSCA), whereas in practice US protection depends on many statutes and regulations, as well as on voluntary withdrawals (under pressure from the Environmental Protection Agency) and severe common law liability. This paper makes the economic case for firmly addressing the regulatory barriers, discusses the EU’s proposals, finds that the European Parliament’s Resolution on TTIP of July 2015 lacks a rationale (for chemicals), argues that both TSCA and REACH ought to be improved (based on ‘better regulation’), discusses the link with a global regime, advocates significant improvement of market access where equivalence of health and environmental objectives is agreed and, finally, proposes to lower the costs for companies selling in both markets by allowing them to opt into the other party’s more stringent rules, thereby avoiding duplication while racing-to-the-top. The ‘living agreement’ on chemicals ought to be led by a new TTIP institution authorised to establish the level of health and environmental protection on both sides of the Atlantic for substances regulated on both sides. These findings will lay the foundation for a highly beneficial lowering of trading costs without in any way affecting the level of protection. Indeed, this is exactly what TTIP is, or should be, all about.This paper is the 10th in a series produced in the context of the “TTIP in the Balance” project, jointly organised by CEPS and the Center for Transatlantic Relations (CTR) in Washington, D.C. It is published simultaneously on the CEPS (www.ceps.eu) and CTR websites (http://transatlantic.sais-jhu.edu).
Resumo:
Although the Minsk process brought about a de-escalation of the conflict in Eastern Ukraine, not all of its 13 points have been implemented, including a ceasefire and withdrawal of heavy weaponry. In the absence of a military option, economic sanctions have become the core instrument of the EU and the US, to respond to Russia’s aggression. At the end of June 2016, when EU Heads of State and Government meet to discuss the extension of sanctions against Russia, they should bear in mind that Russia did not implement the commitments it took upon itself in the framework of the Minsk agreements. Given the persistent deadlock in the Ukraine crisis, the leaders of the EU ought to agree to prolong the sanctions against Russia, push for the renegotiation of the Minsk II agreement and widen the ‘Normandy format’ to include the US and bolster reforms in Ukraine.