Life after Bali: renewing the world trade negotiating agenda. Bruegel Policy Contribution 2013/17, December 2013

The crisis has contributed to a slowdown in global trade volumes, with trade virtually stagnant in the twelve months to July 2013. In this context, fruitful negotiations in the World Trade Organisation’s 9th Ministerial Conference in Bali are crucial to sustain the institution’s credibility and prove that multilateral negotiations can still deliver success. WTO trade talks are the only ongoing trade liberalisation process that has development at its core. The Doha mini-package under consideration at Bali is a collection of watered-down but deliverable elements of a deal comprising agriculture, trade facilitation and special and differential treatment/less developed country concessions. Post-Bali, the WTO should aim to reverse the current disenchantment with multilateral trade negotiations. This means formulating a relevant trade negotiating agenda with an understanding of global value chains at its core. However, the transition to the new agenda requires a closure of the ongoing Round. The easiest way to conclude the Doha Round would be to select another discrete set of deliverables that fulfills the development commitment of the Doha Development Agenda, thus paving the way for a new Round.

The long-term EU budget: size or flexibility? Bruegel Policy Contribution 2012/20, November 2012

The EU is in the process of negotiating its 2014-20 financial framework. Failure to reach an agreement would imply a delay in the preparation of the strategic plans each member state puts together to explain how it will use Structural and Cohesion Funds. Even if solutions are found – for example annual renewals of the budget based on the previous year's figures – there will be political and institutional costs. EU leaders have too often and too forcefully advocated the use of the EU budget for growth to be able to drop the idea without consequences. • The overwhelming attention paid to the size of the budget is misplaced. EU leaders should instead aim to make the EU budget more flexible, safeguard it from future political power struggles, and reinforce assessment of the impact of EU funded growth policies. • To improve flexibility a commitment device should be created that places the EU budget above continuous political disagreement. We suggest the creation of a European Growth Fund, on the basis of which the European Commission should be allowed to borrow on capital markets to anticipate pre-allocated EU expenditure, such as Structural and Cohesion Funds. Markets would thus be a factor in EU budget policymaking, with a potentially disciplining effect. Attaching conditionality to this type of disbursement appears legitimate, as capital delivered in this way is a form of assistance.

Doha/COP 18: gateway to a new climate change agreement. CEPS Commentary, 13 December 2012

Drawing on his recent experience in the climate negotiations in Doha as an advisor and negotiator on a wide variety of issues, Andrei Marcu offers his assessment of the progress achieved in the two weeks of intensive talks. In spite of modest results, he describes the talks as an important and necessary step in the revolution, first ignited at the Montreal negotiations in 2005, that rejected the top-down Kyoto Protocol model in favour of a bottom-up climate change regime. In his view, the decisions taken in Doha enable the start of a new negotiating process aimed at delivering a new global climate agreement.

The Mercosur-EU preferential trade agreement. A view from Europe. CEPS Working Document No. 377, February 2013

This paper first aims at assessing the economic and political importance of Mercosur for the EU’s interests in the short and medium run – say for the one or two coming decades or so. As Mercosur’s size is largely determined by Brazil’s size, this paper focuses on Brazil – although the paper assumes that, from Brazil’s perspective, a Brazil–EU preferential trade agreement (PTA) is a non-starter. It then aims at positioning the Mercosur–EU (MEU) PTA in the context of the EU’s current trade policy. In particular, it tries to assess, once one takes into account all the crucial goals to be met by the EU, whether the EU is likely to find the time and the resources necessary for dealing properly with a MEU PTA; this effort is notably complicated by the very divergent views on the role of trade between Brazil on the one hand, and Argentina and Venezuela, on the other hand. Finally, the paper examines the PTA options that can be seen as reasonably feasible. It suggests that, unless there are dramatic changes in Mercosur’s present trajectory, the goal of negotiating a fully-fledged MEU PTA should be set aside for some time – at least a decade or so. This does not mean leaving the negotiating table, but rather focusing on negotiating topics that remain attractive to both sides in the current context, and manageable and flexible enough to overcome the broad general problems confronted by Mercosur and the EU.

Emergent Brazil and the Curse of the ‘Hen’s Flight’. CEPS Working Document No. 379, 27 February 2013

The ‘Emergent Brazil’ growth model is reaching its limits. Its main engines have been slowing significantly since the beginning of the global financial and economic crisis. Even its much-praised predictable macroeconomic policy has been eroded by political interference. Inflationary pressures are growing and GDP performance is anaemic. As ominous, Brazil cannot compensate for its domestic deficiencies with an export drive. Commodity exports are suffering with the world economic slow-down and the manufacturing industries’ competitiveness is in sharp decline. Brazil has put all its trade negotiation eggs into the South American and WTO baskets, and now its export market share is threatened by the Doha Round paralysis, the Latin American Alianza del Pacífico, and the US-led initiatives for a Trans-Pacific Partnership and a trade and investment agreement with the EU. Paradoxically, this alarming situation opens a window of opportunity. There is a mounting national consensus on the need to tackle head-on the country’s and its industries’ lack of competitiveness. That means finding a solution to the much-decried ‘Brazil Cost’ and stimulating private-sector investment. It also entails an aggressive trade-negotiating stance in order to secure better access to foreign markets and to foster more competition in the domestic one. The most promising near-term goal would be the conclusion of the EU–Mercosur trade talks. A scenario to overcome the paralysis of these negotiations could trail two parallel paths: bilateral EU–Brazil agreements on ‘anything but trade’ combined with a sequencing of the EU–Mercosur talks where each member of the South American bloc could adopt faster or slower liberalisation commitments and schedules.

Transforming Power Relationships: Leadership, Risk, and Hope. IHS Political Science Series No. 135, May 2013

Chronic communal conflicts resemble the prisoner’s dilemma. Both communities prefer peace to war. But neither trusts the other, viewing the other’s gain as its own loss, so potentially shared interests often go unrealized. Achieving positive-sum outcomes from apparently zero-sum struggles requires a kind of riskembracing leadership. To succeed leaders must: a) see power relations as potentially positive-sum; b) strengthen negotiating adversaries instead of weakening them; and c) demonstrate hope for a positive future and take great personal risks to achieve it. Such leadership is exemplified by Nelson Mandela and F.W. de Klerk in the South African democratic transition. To illuminate the strategic dilemmas Mandela and de Klerk faced, we examine the work of Robert Axelrod, Thomas Schelling, and Josep Colomer, who highlight important dimensions of the problem but underplay the role of risk-embracing leadership. Finally we discuss leadership successes and failures in the Northern Ireland settlement and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

Strategic planning tools for European negotiators to defend their national interests in the Council of the European Union. EIPA Working Paper 2013/W/02

Summary. Negotiating in the Council of the European Union poses some challenges that are common to most international negotiations but there are other dimensions that are a lot more specific. In order to understand better the specific nature of negotiations on a European level and to develop some practical guidelines for European negotiators, it is important to situate European negotiations in the more general context of the theory on international relations and to remember that European negotiations are governed by the general principles which characterise the negotiation theory. This working document has three objectives; after having reminded ourselves of the fundamental principles that govern European negotiations, it aims to provide a general foundation, which in turn will be useful for preparing most negotiations within the Council. A series of practical recommendations will then be made in order to contribute to the strategic thinking of the negotiator responsible for defending the interests of his or her Member State within the Council.

Next steps toward a final deal with Iran. CEPS Policy Brief No. 316, 14 February 2014

On January 20th, the International Atomic Energy Agency confirmed that Iran had been implementing its commitments as part of the Joint Plan of Action (JPA) agreed with the so-called ‘E3+3’ in Geneva (also known as P5+1) on 24 November 2013. The forging of this interim deal, the successful start to its implementation and the temporary sanctions relief represent resounding success for international diplomacy but they should not be allowed to conceal the underlying issues. Reaching agreement on the JPA was achieved at the cost of clarity over what is to follow and it was decided to eschew a structured agreement in favour of a two-step process. The stated aim of the negotiating parties remains that of starting the implementation of a comprehensive solution by November 2014. If agreement is not reached on a comprehensive solution by the expiry of the JPA by July 20th, the action plan can be renewed by mutual consent. The latter might well be the likeliest outcome of the forthcoming negotiations. Apart from the large gap between the E3+3 and Iranian positions on the substance of a final deal, several domestic policy constraints will likely define the parameters of what is achievable in the future. This CEPS Policy Brief argues that the best hope for success lies in continued engagement and consistent incremental progress in the negotiations, with structured concessions on both sides. This should occur, however, not in a two- but a three-step framework based on lengthening Iran’s ‘breakout’ period while re-engaging with the country both politically and economically. The EU is in a unique position to lead this process. Having greater flexibility than either the US or Iran, its main tasks will be that of maintaining the negotiating momentum and broadening dialogue with Iran.

EU-Turkey Relations: Turning vicious circles into virtuous ones. CEPS Policy Brief No. 317, 26 March 2014

The coming weeks and months will be decisive for the general tenor of politics in Turkey. The country faces local elections this March, presidential elections in August and general elections next June, while top-level political scandals compound the deterioration in the state of democracy and rule of law. At the same time, stagnation in Turkey’s accession process continues to sour relations with the EU. In this new Policy Brief, Steven Blockmans puts forward a number of recommendations to help drive the EU accession process forward, namely the early opening of negotiation chapters 23 (judiciary and fundamental rights) and 24 (justice, freedom and security), in line with the EU’s so-called New Approach. In that way reform could not just be assured on paper, but a track record in implementation could be established throughout the process. To achieve this, member states, and Cyprus in particular, need to be persuaded to end their opposition to formulating benchmarks for the opening of accession negotiating chapters 23 and 24.

A success story for the EU and seasonal workers’ rights without reinventing the wheel. EPC Policy Brief, 28 March 2014

Despite the economic crisis with resulting high unemployment, EU economies face vacancies across the skill spectrum. At the low end there is a structural need when it comes to seasonal work. The Seasonal Workers Directive was launched at the same time as the Inter-Corporate Transferees (ICTs) Directive in 2010 – as part of the Commission’s 2005 Policy Plan on Legal Migration – and initially appeared to be more troublesome, with the stigma of ‘migrants stealing local jobs’ haunting it. However, without the provisions for intra-EU mobility that have plagued the ICTs Directive, the Seasonal Workers Directive became less problematic despite the fact that seasonal workers are more numerous than intra-corporate transferees. This Policy Brief looks at how negotiating parties ensured a focus not only on the needs of the European labour market, but also saw an opportunity to bring added value to seasonal workers’ rights, through equal treatment to EU nationals. It assesses the final outcome of three and a half years of intra-EU negotiation, looking at the rights gained for seasonal migrants, the level of harmonization achieved, and the future of migration policy with the strategic guidelines for the area of freedom, security and justice in mind.

The Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership: A long hard road to multilateralism? EPC Commentary, 26 September 2014

The seventh round of the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) negotiations between the European Union and the United States will take place in Washington on 29 September. If concluded successfully, the TTIP would become the world’s largest free trade pact. The EU and the US account for nearly half of the world’s GDP and 30% of world trade with exchanges of goods and services worth around €723 billion a year and €1.8 billion a day. The Partnership, unprecedented in its scope and ambition, has generated great expectations which will be hard to meet in reality. It could however have a beneficial effect on trade multilateralism, provided that it is the result of an open negotiating process.

Economic Incentives for Indirect TTIP Spillovers. CEPS Special Report No. 94/October 2014 [TTIP Series No. 2]

A deep, comprehensive and ambitious TTIP should not undermine or otherwise negatively affect the WTO and its signatories. Among other things, this means that trade diversion ought to be minimised and positive spillovers stimulated. The present CEPS Special Report provides some elementary quantification, which helps to understand the economic incentives for third countries to seek regulatory alignment with TTIP results, where relevant, and for which TTIP should be ‘open’. It focuses on ‘indirect’ spillovers and employs a rather aggregate economic approach. We find that, of three groups of countries that are important for trade with the EU and the US, the ‘closest’ neighbours (NAFTA, EEA, Switzerland and Turkey) exhibit powerful incentives to align so as to benefit from positive spillovers. This is less clear for two other groups. Of the (seven) ‘biggest traders’ (in manufactured goods, for which spillovers matter most), China turns out to have the greatest interest in alignment in selected sectors, followed by Israel, Japan and South Korea. Whereas the latter three either have or are negotiating FTAs with the US and the EU, precisely China has none and remains outside TPP as well. In terms of sectors, the chemical sector followed by electronic equipment are by far the most important, with agro-products and fish as a good third (SPS issues). However, in chemicals and electrical equipment, the TTIP negotiations so far, and recent US/EU regulatory cooperation, do not indicate an ambitious approach, which could reduce regulatory barriers to market access drastically.

Germany's energy transformation: difficult beginnings. OSW Report, March 2013

Initiated in May 2011, several months after the Fukushima nuclear disaster, Germany’s energy transformation (Energiewende) has been presented as an irrevocable plan, and – due to the speed of change required – it represents a new quality in Germany’s energy strategy. Its main objectives include: nuclear energy being phased out by 2022, the development of renewable energy sources (OZE), the expansion of transmission networks, the construction of new conventional power plants and an improvement in energy efficiency.The cornerstone of the strategy is the development of renewable energy. Under Germany's amended renewable energy law, the proportion of renewable energy in electricity generation is supposed to increase steadily from the current level of around 20% to approximately 38% in 2020. In 2030, renewable energy is expected to account for 50% of electricity generation. This is expected to increase to 65% in 2040 and to as much as 80% in 2050. The impact of the Energiewende is not limited to the sphere of energy supplies. In the medium and long term, it will change not only to the way the German economy operates, but also the functioning of German society and the state. Facing difficulties with the expansion of transmission networks, the excessive cost of building wind farms, and problems with the stability of electricity supplies, especially during particularly cold winters, the federal government has so far tended to centralise power and limit the independence of the German federal states with regard to their respective energy policies, justifying this with the need for greater co-ordination. The Energiewende may also become the beginning of a "third industrial revolution", i.e. a transition to a green economy and a society based on sustainable development. This will require a new "social contract" that will redefine the relations between the state, society and the economy. Negotiating such a contract will be one of the greatest challenges for German policy in the coming years.