7 resultados para Indirectly Measurable Variable

em Archive of European Integration


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Measuring human capital has been a significant challenge for economists because the main variable of interest is intangible and not directly observable. In the Middle Eastern and Northern African region the task is further complicated by the general scarcity of comparable and reliable data. This study overcomes these challenges by relying on a unique international survey that covers most of the region and by deriving a market-based measure that uses returns to education and various labour market factors as guidance. The results show that private returns to schooling are relatively low in most southern Mediterranean countries (SMC). Israel and Turkey are clear outliers, surpassing even the EU-MED averages. In Algeria and Jordan, the returns are almost flat, implying that earnings do not respond significantly to education levels. Despite high attainment levels, Greece, Spain and Portugal also perform badly; only marginally surpassing some of the bottom-ranked SMC, providing evidence of problems in absorption capacity. The baseline scenarios for 2030 show substantial sensitivity to current estimates on returns to education. In particular, improving attainment levels can produce measurable gains in the future only when the returns to education are already high. Such is the case for Egypt, Morocco and Turkey, which substantially improve their human capital stocks under the baseline scenarios, surpassing several EU-MED countries with little or no room for improvement.

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Bonuses – which are often used to mitigate principal-agent problems and to encourage employees to work harder – have increased tremendously in the financial sector during the last decade, and have often been seen as a contributing factor to the financial crisis of 2008. The recent European Union (EU) action to adopt a policy that restricts bonuses paid to bankers may seem promising at first, but this does not address the real issues behind variable rewards. Compensation policies should be changed to encourage responsible risk-taking and decision-making through the implementation of broader performance metrics, forfeitable holdbacks and hybrid bonds. Furthermore, a change in organisational culture is needed to improve ethical behaviour leading to a re-balancing of stakeholders’ interests in the financial sector.

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To shift to a low-carbon economy, the EU has been encouraging the deployment of variable renewable energy sources (VRE). However, VRE lack of competitiveness and their technical specificities have substantially raised the cost of the transition. Economic evaluations show that VRE life-cycle costs of electricity generation are still today higher than those of conventional thermal power plants. Member States have consequently adopted dedicated policies to support them. In addition, Ueckerdt et al. (2013) show that when integrated to the power system, VRE induce supplementary not-accounted-for costs. This paper first exposes the rationale of EU renewables goals, the EU targets and current deployment. It then explains why the LCOE metric is not appropriate to compute VRE costs by describing integration costs, their magnitude and their implications. Finally, it analyses the consequences for the power system and policy options. The paper shows that the EU has greatly underestimated VRE direct and indirect costs and that policymakers have failed to take into account the burden caused by renewable energy and the return of State support policies. Indeed, induced market distortions have been shattering the whole power system and have undermined competition in the Internal Energy Market. EU policymakers can nonetheless take full account of this negative trend and reverse it by relying on competition rules, setting-up a framework to collect robust EU-wide data, redesigning the architecture of the electricity system and relying on EU regulators.