Bridging qualified majority and unanimity decision-making in the EU. IHS Political Science Series No. 132, February 2013

The EU has tried to bridge decision making by qualified majority and unanimity over the years by expanding qualified majorities (consensus) or by making unanimities easier to achieve. I call this decision-making procedure q-“unanimity” and trace its history from the Luxembourg compromise to the Lisbon Treaty, and to more recent agreements. I analyze the most recent and explicit mechanism of this bridging (article 31 (2) of the Lisbon Treaty) and identify one specific means by which the transformation of qualified majorities to unanimities is achieved: the reduction of precision or scope of the decision, so that different behaviors can be covered by it. I provide empirical evidence of such a mechanism by analyzing legislative decisions. Finally, I argue that this bridging is a ubiquitous feature of EU institutions, used in Treaties as well as in legislative decision-making.

The EU’s Decision-Making Process Changes in the Constitutive Treaties

Since the beginning of its existence in the form of communities, the European Union’s decision-making process underwent constant evolution. There were continuous adjustments that transformed a pure intergovernmental process into one having rather federal features. Based on the hypothesis that changes have occurred at the decision level in regards to the actors, procedures, influence and ways of taking decisions in order for the new realities, needs and will at the European level to be properly addressed, this paper aims to present the reforms performed through the adoption of new treaties and the modification of the existing ones. The reality is that in order for the European dream and integration to go on and also for further development of the European Union, finally becoming an entity far beyond the founders expectations, decision makers had to constantly and carefully adapt the decision-making process. The purpose of this paper will be achieved by conducting a research based on the qualitative method, analyzing the related researches on this topic and the consolidated versions of the treaties. Thus, we will finally validate our research hypothesis that there was an evolution in what the EU’s decision-making process and decision procedures are concerned.

Mid-term Evaluation of the 2009-14 European Parliament: Legislative activity and decision-making dynamics. CEPS Special Report, 23 July 2012

This special report analyses legislative activity in the European Union and coalition formation in the European Parliament (EP) during the first half of the 7th legislative term, 2009-14. Co-decision is now the ordinary legislative procedure, not by name only: it was deployed on 90% of new proposals in 2010 and 86% in 2011, which suggests that the EP is now more influential than ever. There are differences in the degree of empowerment across committees, however. This report looks at the legislative workload of selected committees as an indicator of change in their influence, identifying which of them won and which lost out in terms of the quantity and type of legislation they tackle.