The autonomy of the EU legal order and the law-making activities of international organizations. Some examples regarding the Council most recent practice. Research Papers in Law 03/2012

[Introduction.] It is generally believed that while the principle of the autonomy of the EU legal order, in the sense of constitutional and institutional autonomy that is to say what concerns the autonomous decision-making of the EU, has been clearly strengthened by the most recent jurisprudence of the Court of Justice (eg. Moxplant3, Intertanko or the Kadi/Al Baraakat judgements or the Opinion 1/2009 of the CJEU etc.) as well as, in my opinion, in many aspects by the Treaty of Lisbon, it is still valid to add that the principle of a favourable approach, stemming from the Court jurisprudence, for the enhanced openness of the EU legal order to international law has remained equally important for the EU4. On the other hand, it should be also seen that in a globalized world, and following the increased role of the EU as an international actor, its indispensable and crucial role concerning the creation of world (legal) order in many policy fields ( for example let's think about the G20 issues, the global economic and financial crisis, the role of the EU in promoting and protecting human rights worldwide, the implementation of the multilateral or regional conventional law, developed in the framework the UN (e.g. in the field of agriculture or environment etc) or what concerns the Kyoto process on climate change or the conservation of marine biological resources at international level etc), it seems reasonable and justified to submit that the influence, for example, of the law-making activities of the main stakeholder international organizations in the mentioned policy-areas on the EU (especially on the development of its constantly evolving legal order) or vice-versa the influence of the EU law-making practice on these international organizations is significant, in many aspects mutually interdependent and more and more remarkable. This tendency of the 21st century doesn't mean, however, in my view, that the notion of the autonomy of the EU legal order would have been weakened by this increasing interaction between international law and EU law over the passed years. This contribution is going to demonstrate and prove these departuring points by giving some concrete examples from the most recent practice of the Council (all occuring either in the second half of 2009 or after the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty), and which relate to two very important policy areas in the EU, namely the protection of human rights and the Common Fishery Policy.

Reflections on the institutional balance, the Community Method and the interplay between jurisdictions after Lisbon. Research Papers in Law, 04/2012

[Introduction.] Over the last two years, not only inside but also outside the framework of the EU treaties, far reaching measures have been taken at the highest political level in order to address the financial and economic crisis in Europe and in particular the sovereign debt crisis in the Euro area. This has triggered debates forecasting the “renationalisation of European politics.” Herman Van Rompuy, the President of the European Council, countered the prediction that Europe is doomed because of such a renationalisation: “If national politics have a prominent place in our Union, why would this not strengthen it?” He took the view that not a renationalisation of European politics was at stake, but an Europeanization of national politics emphasising that post war Europe was never developed in contradiction with nation states.1 Indeed, the European project is based on a mobilisation of bundled, national forces which are of vital importance to a democratically structured and robust Union that is capable of acting in a globalised world. To that end, the Treaty of Lisbon created a legal basis. The new legal framework redefines the balance between the Union institutions and confirms the central role of the Community method in the EU legislative and judiciary process. This contribution critically discusses the development of the EU's institutional balance after the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon, with a particular emphasis on the use of the Community Method and the current interplay between national constitutional courts and the Court of Justice. This interplay has to date been characterised by suspicion and mistrust, rather than by a genuine dialogue between the pertinent judicial actors.

Poland and Greece - two contrasting EU enlargement experiences. ZEI Discussion Paper C213, 2012

The aim of this contribution is a comparative analysis of the challenges Poland and Greece (and more broadly – CEE-10 and GIPS countries) had to face in the past as latecomers to the European Union and are facing now, in the aftermath of the world financial and economic crisis of 2008-09. The main underlying message conveyed in this text is two-fold. Firstly, the author is going to argue that the breadth and complexity of the challenges Poland and other CEE-10 countries had to face while entering the road of systemic transformation was by far greater compared to past and in particular – current problems of Greece (and the remaining GIPS countries) in the aftermath of the global financial and economic crisis of 2008-09. Secondly, a resilience of Poland and other CEE-10 economies, relative to Greece and other GIPS, to the recent crisis was due to a comparatively higher level of institutional development of the former group at the time of their EU accession and at present. The ensuing discussion is organized as follows. Section 2 below provides comparative background information on the two reference groups. In Section 3 we discuss the most salient features of the design of the command economy and its legacy, as a key determinant of the initial conditions of systemic transformation. Next, in Section 4 we overview the basic indicators of growth performance and institutional reforms in CEE-10 countries between 1990 and 2011. Section 5 offers a picture of economic growth and real economic convergence in Greece and the remaining GIPS countries. In Section 6 we embark on comparative analysis of the institutional quality of Greece and Poland against a broader background of GIPS, CEE-10 and the remaining EU member countries. Section 7 concludes with a summary of major findings.

Student's cross-perception of the economic crises in the European Union and in Southeast Asia. EU Centre in Singapore Working Paper No. 11, December 2012

The financial crisis of 1997-1998 in Southeast Asia and the European Union’s financial crisis of 2008 followed by the sovereign debt crisis represented major policy events in the regions and beyond. The crises triggered policy adjustments with implications on economic and other policies. This paper aims at evaluating the perception of university students in the European Union (EU) and Southeast Asia on the management of these crises. It strives to confirm several ex ante assumptions about the relationship between students’ background, their policy orientation and their knowledge of the European Union and ASEAN policies. It also provides an analysis of the students’ evaluation of the geopolitical importance of the global regions and the EU and ASEAN policies. The paper is based on opinion surveys conducted during the first part of 2012 at four universities, two in the EU and two in ASEAN countries. In the eyes of EU and ASEAN students, the EU crisis is not being managed appropriately. The citizens of the EU surveyed were even significantly more critical of the EU’s anti-crisis measures than any other surveyed group. Their ASEAN counterparts were generally more positive in their evaluations.

eu spotlight 2012/07, December 2012: At long last, the EU takes on its banks

The agreement on establishing a common banking authority is paving the way for a banking union. The decision was reached by the finance ministers only hours before last December’s EU summit. After making headway on sovereign debt by deciding on a fiscal union one year beforehand in December 2011, the EU is by now also addressing the banking crisis and we know at least who is going to supervise who and what.

Can Europe recover without credit? Bruegel Policy Contribution 2013/03, 15 February 2013

• Data from 135 countries covering five decades suggests that creditless recoveries, in which the stock of real credit does not return to the pre-crisis level for three years after the GDP trough, are not rare and are characterised by remarkable real GDP growth rates: 4.7 percent per year in middle-income countries and 3.2 percent per year in high-income countries. • However, the implications of these historical episodes for the current European situation are limited, for two main reasons: • First, creditless recoveries are much less common in high-income countries, than in low-income countries which are financially undeveloped. European economies heavily depend on bank loans and research suggests that loan supply played a major role in the recent weak credit performance of Europe. There are reasons to believe that, despite various efforts, normal lending has not yet been restored.Limited loan supply could be disruptive for the European economic recovery andthere has been only a minor substitution of bank loans with debt securities. • Second, creditless recoveries were associated with significant real exchange rate depreciation, which has hardly occurred so far in most of Europe. This stylised fact suggests that it might be difficult to re-establish economic growth in the absence of sizeable real exchange rate depreciation, if credit growth does not return.

The Europe barometer points to stormy weather. CEPS Commentary, 15 February 2013

Against the current background of a sharp decline in public support for the EU and an emerging reinforced centre to manage the euro crisis, this commentary finds that the only way Europe’s leaders can hope to keep the fragile equilibrium afloat is to summon up the courage to go forward with concrete proposals for political union.

Should non-euro area countries join the single supervisory mechanism? Bruegel Policy Contribution 2013/06, 13 March 2013

Irrespective of the euro crisis, a European banking union makes sense, including for non-euro area countries, because of the extent of European Union financial integration. The Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM) is the first element of the banking union. From the point of view of non-euro countries, the draft SSM regulation as amended by the EU Council includes strong safeguards relating to decision-making, accountability, attention to financial stability in small countries and the applicability of national macro-prudential measures. Non-euro countries will also have the right to leave the SSM and thereby exempt themselves from a supervisory decision. The SSM by itself cannot bring the full benefits of the banking union, but would foster financial integration, improve the supervision of cross-border banks, ensure greater consistency of supervisory practices, increase the quality of supervision,avoid competitive distortions and provide ample supervisory information. While the decision to join the SSM is made difficult by the uncertainty about other elements of the banking union, including the possible burden sharing, we conclude that non-euro EU members should stand ready to join the SSM and be prepared for the negotiations of the other elements of the banking union.

Bank bonus compromise bodes ill for the Single Supervisory Mechanism. CEPS Commentary, 8 March 2013

The European Parliament has probably won a Pyrrhic victory with its position on bank bonuses, argues CEPS CEO Karel Lannoo in this new Commentary. In return, EU member states got what they wanted with the new Capital Requirements Directive (CRD IV): no binding leverage ratio; mortgage risk weightings and capital add-ons to be determined by member states; and no obligatory consolidated capital position for bank-insurance companies. In other words, Banking Union will start out with capital rules that are more like Emmental cheese than a single rulebook. This is a huge encumbrance for a well-functioning Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM), and makes a single resolution mechanism impossible.

Cyprus ... A Test Case for Future European Banking Policy. CEPS Commentary, 21 March 2013

In this CEPS Commentary, the former Irish Prime Minister calls the precedents being set in the Cypriot banking case “troubling” and reflective of a lack of clarity and consistency of thought by both the eurozone Finance Ministers and the European Commission. He welcomes the rejection of the deal by the Cypriot Parliament as it now gives eurozone policy-makers a chance to think again about the underlying philosophy of their approach to the financial crisis.

Europe's growth problem (and what to do about it). Bruegel Policy Brief 2013/03, April 2013

The issue: The European Union's pre-crisis growth performance was disappointing enough, but the performance has been even more dismal since the onset of the crisis. Weak growth is undermining private and public deleveraging,and is fuelling continued banking fragility. Persistently high unemployment is eroding skills, discouraging labour market participation and undermining the EU’s long-term growth potential. Low overall growth is making it much tougher for the hard-hit economies in southern Europe to recover competitiveness and regain control of their public finances. Stagnation would reduce the attractiveness of Europe for investment. Under these conditions, Europe's social models are bound to prove unsustainable. Policy Challenge: The European Union's weak long-term growth potential and unsatisfactory recovery from the crisis represent a major policy challenge. Over and above the structural reform agenda, which vitally important, bold policy action is needed. The priority is to get bank credit going. Banking problems need to be assessed properly and bank resolution and recapitalisation should be pursued. Second, fostering the reallocation of factors to the most productive firms and the sectors that contribute to aggregate rebalancing is vital. Addressing intra-euro area competitiveness divergence is essential to support growth in southern Europe. Third, the speed of fiscal adjustment needs to be appropriate and EU funds should be front loaded to countries in deep recession, while the European Investment Bank should increase investment.

Portugal. In economics, we call it conflict of interest! CEPS Commentary, 12 April 2013

Faced with limited options for coming up with the funds needed to pay off the next instalment on its bailout loan, Portugal is advised in this Commentary by economist Leonor Coutinho to trim the number of public sector employees, in combination with an increase in public sector working hours, among the lowest in Europe. In her view, these measures will have the best long-term implications both in terms of fiscal sustainability and of labour productivity, and may finally allow the country to resume the catching-up process that has been stalled since the start of EMU.

The meaning of Cyprus; moving toward banking union. CEPS Commentary, 8 April 2013

While acknowledging that Cyprus is too small to matter for global financial markets, this Commentary finds that its case could turn out to become a very important precedent for the way European policy-makers deal with future banking problems and the plans for a ‘banking union’.

The new bail-in doctrine: A recipe for banking crises and depression in the eurozone. CEPS Commentary

This Commentary argues that the failure to recognise shared responsibility for the banking crisis in Cyprus has led to the imposition of a bail-in template that increases the risk of banking crises and economic depression in the eurozone.

Communication as a policy tool: Important lessons from Cyprus. CEPS Commentary, 28 March 2013

After a week in which Cypriot politicians reassured people that their deposits were safe, followed by the announcement of a bank levy on savings, then a rush to withdraw cash amid general confusion and anxiety, Cypriot Senior Researcher Leonor Coutinho argues that in the case of a banking crisis it is vital for policy-makers to treat communication as an important component of the policy toolkit.