eu spotlight 2012/07, December 2012: At long last, the EU takes on its banks

The agreement on establishing a common banking authority is paving the way for a banking union. The decision was reached by the finance ministers only hours before last December’s EU summit. After making headway on sovereign debt by deciding on a fiscal union one year beforehand in December 2011, the EU is by now also addressing the banking crisis and we know at least who is going to supervise who and what.

Can Europe recover without credit? Bruegel Policy Contribution 2013/03, 15 February 2013

• Data from 135 countries covering five decades suggests that creditless recoveries, in which the stock of real credit does not return to the pre-crisis level for three years after the GDP trough, are not rare and are characterised by remarkable real GDP growth rates: 4.7 percent per year in middle-income countries and 3.2 percent per year in high-income countries. • However, the implications of these historical episodes for the current European situation are limited, for two main reasons: • First, creditless recoveries are much less common in high-income countries, than in low-income countries which are financially undeveloped. European economies heavily depend on bank loans and research suggests that loan supply played a major role in the recent weak credit performance of Europe. There are reasons to believe that, despite various efforts, normal lending has not yet been restored.Limited loan supply could be disruptive for the European economic recovery andthere has been only a minor substitution of bank loans with debt securities. • Second, creditless recoveries were associated with significant real exchange rate depreciation, which has hardly occurred so far in most of Europe. This stylised fact suggests that it might be difficult to re-establish economic growth in the absence of sizeable real exchange rate depreciation, if credit growth does not return.

The Europe barometer points to stormy weather. CEPS Commentary, 15 February 2013

Against the current background of a sharp decline in public support for the EU and an emerging reinforced centre to manage the euro crisis, this commentary finds that the only way Europe’s leaders can hope to keep the fragile equilibrium afloat is to summon up the courage to go forward with concrete proposals for political union.

Should non-euro area countries join the single supervisory mechanism? Bruegel Policy Contribution 2013/06, 13 March 2013

Irrespective of the euro crisis, a European banking union makes sense, including for non-euro area countries, because of the extent of European Union financial integration. The Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM) is the first element of the banking union. From the point of view of non-euro countries, the draft SSM regulation as amended by the EU Council includes strong safeguards relating to decision-making, accountability, attention to financial stability in small countries and the applicability of national macro-prudential measures. Non-euro countries will also have the right to leave the SSM and thereby exempt themselves from a supervisory decision. The SSM by itself cannot bring the full benefits of the banking union, but would foster financial integration, improve the supervision of cross-border banks, ensure greater consistency of supervisory practices, increase the quality of supervision,avoid competitive distortions and provide ample supervisory information. While the decision to join the SSM is made difficult by the uncertainty about other elements of the banking union, including the possible burden sharing, we conclude that non-euro EU members should stand ready to join the SSM and be prepared for the negotiations of the other elements of the banking union.

Bank bonus compromise bodes ill for the Single Supervisory Mechanism. CEPS Commentary, 8 March 2013

The European Parliament has probably won a Pyrrhic victory with its position on bank bonuses, argues CEPS CEO Karel Lannoo in this new Commentary. In return, EU member states got what they wanted with the new Capital Requirements Directive (CRD IV): no binding leverage ratio; mortgage risk weightings and capital add-ons to be determined by member states; and no obligatory consolidated capital position for bank-insurance companies. In other words, Banking Union will start out with capital rules that are more like Emmental cheese than a single rulebook. This is a huge encumbrance for a well-functioning Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM), and makes a single resolution mechanism impossible.

Cyprus ... A Test Case for Future European Banking Policy. CEPS Commentary, 21 March 2013

In this CEPS Commentary, the former Irish Prime Minister calls the precedents being set in the Cypriot banking case “troubling” and reflective of a lack of clarity and consistency of thought by both the eurozone Finance Ministers and the European Commission. He welcomes the rejection of the deal by the Cypriot Parliament as it now gives eurozone policy-makers a chance to think again about the underlying philosophy of their approach to the financial crisis.

Europe's growth problem (and what to do about it). Bruegel Policy Brief 2013/03, April 2013

The issue: The European Union's pre-crisis growth performance was disappointing enough, but the performance has been even more dismal since the onset of the crisis. Weak growth is undermining private and public deleveraging,and is fuelling continued banking fragility. Persistently high unemployment is eroding skills, discouraging labour market participation and undermining the EU’s long-term growth potential. Low overall growth is making it much tougher for the hard-hit economies in southern Europe to recover competitiveness and regain control of their public finances. Stagnation would reduce the attractiveness of Europe for investment. Under these conditions, Europe's social models are bound to prove unsustainable. Policy Challenge: The European Union's weak long-term growth potential and unsatisfactory recovery from the crisis represent a major policy challenge. Over and above the structural reform agenda, which vitally important, bold policy action is needed. The priority is to get bank credit going. Banking problems need to be assessed properly and bank resolution and recapitalisation should be pursued. Second, fostering the reallocation of factors to the most productive firms and the sectors that contribute to aggregate rebalancing is vital. Addressing intra-euro area competitiveness divergence is essential to support growth in southern Europe. Third, the speed of fiscal adjustment needs to be appropriate and EU funds should be front loaded to countries in deep recession, while the European Investment Bank should increase investment.

Portugal. In economics, we call it conflict of interest! CEPS Commentary, 12 April 2013

Faced with limited options for coming up with the funds needed to pay off the next instalment on its bailout loan, Portugal is advised in this Commentary by economist Leonor Coutinho to trim the number of public sector employees, in combination with an increase in public sector working hours, among the lowest in Europe. In her view, these measures will have the best long-term implications both in terms of fiscal sustainability and of labour productivity, and may finally allow the country to resume the catching-up process that has been stalled since the start of EMU.

The meaning of Cyprus; moving toward banking union. CEPS Commentary, 8 April 2013

While acknowledging that Cyprus is too small to matter for global financial markets, this Commentary finds that its case could turn out to become a very important precedent for the way European policy-makers deal with future banking problems and the plans for a ‘banking union’.

The new bail-in doctrine: A recipe for banking crises and depression in the eurozone. CEPS Commentary

This Commentary argues that the failure to recognise shared responsibility for the banking crisis in Cyprus has led to the imposition of a bail-in template that increases the risk of banking crises and economic depression in the eurozone.

Communication as a policy tool: Important lessons from Cyprus. CEPS Commentary, 28 March 2013

After a week in which Cypriot politicians reassured people that their deposits were safe, followed by the announcement of a bank levy on savings, then a rush to withdraw cash amid general confusion and anxiety, Cypriot Senior Researcher Leonor Coutinho argues that in the case of a banking crisis it is vital for policy-makers to treat communication as an important component of the policy toolkit.

Banking Union with a Sovereign Virus. The self-serving regulatory treatment of sovereign debt in the euro area. CEPS Policy Brief No. 289, 27 March 2013

In many eurozone countries, domestic banks often hold more than 20% of domestic public debt, which is an unsatisfactory situation given that banks are highly leveraged and that sovereign debt is inherently subject to default risk within the euro area. This paper by Daniel Gros finds, however, that the relative concentration of public debt on bank balance sheets is not just a result of the euro crisis, for there are strong additional incentives for banks in some countries to increase their sovereign. His contribution discusses a number of these regulatory incentives – the most important of which is specific to the euro area – and explores ways in which euro area banks can be weaned from massive investments in government bonds.

Implementing the AIFMD: Success or failure? ECMI Commentary No. 34, 28 March 2013

This commentary considers the implementation of the Alternative Investment Fund Managers Directive (AIFMD) by the European Commission. The AIFMD creates an internal market for asset management and as an endeavour to develop market-based finance is an important piece of legislation for the European economy. The author, Mirzha de Manuel Aramendía, considers the implementation of some of the provisions that raised concern among industry participants. He finds that, on balance, a practical and flexible approach to implementation has been followed that should help secure the success of the framework, which at present is still uncertain. The commentary also considers the remuneration guidelines adopted recently by the European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA). It encourages EU and national authorities to commit to the success of the AIFMD framework, as part of a broader effort to develop capital markets and reduce the historical reliance of the European economy on bank finance.

spotlight europe #2013/03 – March 2013: The European Union and Russia at a Crossroads

The European Union and Russia are strategic partners – through their geographic situation, their common history, through social and economic obligations. Currently, the EU’s relations with Russia are under pressure for innovation. The EU’s ability to manoeuvre is hindered by the financial crisis, which has developed into a crisis of the Union’s political integration. For that reason, the EU’s relations with Russia depend on the Union’s ability to overcome the crisis and undertake reforms.

The austerity debate is beside the point for Europe. CEPS Commentary, 8 May 2013

In surveying the heated debate in the eurozone about austerity and the cost of high public debt, this CEPS Commentary suggests that the influential paper by Carmen Reinhard and Kenneth Rogoff misses the key point that public debt owed to foreigners is different from debt owed to residents.