From Survival to Revival: The Riga Summit 2015 and the revised ENP. Egmont Security policy Brief No. 65, July 2015

With the European Parliament’s July report on the revision of the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) calling on the Commission to ‘go back to basics’, this article argues that such a move would be counter-productive and that instead, the ENP needs to move towards the future and break away with the historical elusiveness of this overarching policy. The Riga Summit serves as an illustration of what will not suffice if the EU is to strengthen or even maintain its role in its neighbourhoods. The revision of the ENP is described as 3Dimensional process which needs to yield a concrete and forward-looking new ENP. The recommendations put forth herein map out what a truly revised ENP would entail.

Brexit – lessons from four referenda on the European Union (EU) in Denmark. EU Centre, Policy Brief No. 8, June 2015

From 1972 to 1993 Denmark staged four referenda on the EU. Two of them in particular hold valuable lessons for Britain seeking new terms - in June 1992 on the Treaty on European Union (Maastricht Treaty), the Danes voted “NO” with a slim majority; this was followed by another vote on the treaty in May 1993 on the Edinburgh Agreement with a “YES” vote. Joergen Oerstroem Moeller was directly involved in all four referenda and served 1989-1997 as State-Secretary in the Royal Danish Foreign Ministry. The result of a referendum may and often will be decided by policy decisions shaping the electorates’ perception long before the voting takes place. The majority votes according to instinct and intuition and is often guided by emotions. The Danish case highlights the importance of defining clearly specific exceptions, working hard to explain the case (at home and abroad), establishing good-will, and conveying that exceptions are in principle temporary and do not require treaty changes. The objectives laid out at the start of the process must be achievable. The member state in question should not manoeuvre itself into humiliating back-pedalling at the final negotiation round: if so it arouses suspicion among the electorate that it is being manipulated and deceived. During the campaign media attention will primarily focus on dissent and scepticism presenting the establishment with the tedious task of confuting accusations of all kinds. The YES camp will be pushed into the defensive by the NO camp setting the agenda. Time and effort and political capital needed to be invested for the positive outcome.

A Convergence Process in Household Credit in Central and Eastern Europe. ECRI Commentary No. 16, 30 October 2015

The liberalisation of Eastern Europe’s market during the 1990s and the 2004 EU enlargement have had a great impact on the economies of Central and Eastern Europe (CEE). Indeed, prior to these events, the financial system and household credit markets in CEE were underdeveloped. Nonetheless, it appeared to numerous economists that the development of the CEE financial system and credit markets was following an intensely positive trend, raising the question of sustainability. Many variables impact the level and growth rate of credit; several economists point out that a convergence process might be one of the most important. Using a descriptive statistics approach, it seems likely that a convergence process began during the 1990s, when the CEE countries opened their economies. However, it also seems that the main driver of this household credit convergence process is the GDP per capita convergence process. Indeed, credit to households and GDP per capita have followed broadly similar tendencies over the last 20 years and it has been shown in the literature that they appear to influence each other. The consistency of this potential convergence process is also confirmed by the breakdown of household credit by type and maturity. There is a tendency towards similar household credit markets in Europe. However, it seems that this potential convergence process was slowed down by the financial crisis. Fortunately, the crisis also stabilised the share of loans in foreign currency in CEE countries. This might add more stability to credit markets in Eastern Europe.

The limitations of policy coordination in the euro area under the European Semester. Bruegel Policy Contribution 2015/19, November 2015

The European Semester is a yearly process of the European Union to improve economic policy coordination and ensure the implementation of the EU’s economic rules. Each Semester concludes with recommendations for the euro area as a whole and for each EU member state. We show that implementation of recommendations was poor at the beginning of the Semester in 2011, and has deteriorated since. The European Semester is not particularly effective at enforcing even the EU’s fiscal and macroeconomic imbalance rules. We find that euro-area recommendations with tangible economic goals are not well reflected in the recommendations issued to member states. Finally, we review various proposals to improve the efficiency of the European Semester and conclude that while certain steps could be helpful, policy coordination will likely continue to have major limitations.

The Path towards 1.5 degrees Celsius. CEPS Policy Brief No. 336, 3 December 2015

In less than one year, the country-led exercise in preparing Intended Nationally Determined Contributions (INDCs) has accomplished what the top-down approach characteristic of the UNFCCC has not been able to achieve in over 21 years of negotiations, namely to produce a sound agreement to reduce climate change. As such, the UNFCCC should adopt a new process similar to that used in developing the INDCs, in which Parties to the Convention would mobilise their national efforts, but on a wider scale and under certain agreed binding conditions. To ensure a comprehensive engagement, this Policy Brief recommends the introduction of a four-tier system in which the most developed nations called upon to take the lead, but with the very least developed nations also contributing to the intended UN objective.

Completing the Banking Union: Deposit Insurance. CEPS Policy Brief No. 335, 3 December 2015

It is generally agreed that a Banking Union should have common or ‘single’ institutions responsible for carrying out three basic functions: supervision, resolution and deposit insurance. So far, however, agreement has been reached in the EU on only the first two of these functions. The Commission has now presented its proposal on how to complete the Banking Union with a European Deposit Insurance Scheme (EDIS). It is an innovative and courageous proposal. It is courageous because it will clearly be very controversial in a number of member states (especially Germany) and it is innovative because it proposes a three-stage process, starting with re-insurance, then switching to co-insurance and finally to full direct insurance of deposits via a ‘single’ Deposit Insurance Fund (DIF). This final stage should be reached in 2024, which is also the date at which the Single Resolution Fund (SRF) will become the only source of financing for bank resolution. The Commission’s proposal calls for integrating the decision-making for EDIS into the decision-making entity for the SRF, namely the existing Single Resolution Board (SRB). This makes sense if one views resolution and deposit insurance as two highly interlinked dimensions of dealing with banks in trouble. In this view the two dimensions should be bundled into one institution – and one suspects that over time the two funds (the SRF and the DIF) could be merged into one. This Policy Brief argues that re-insurance should not be considered as a transitory phase, but could also provide a solution for the long run. ‘Experience rating’ could be used to ensure a proper pricing of risk and to protect the interests of the depositors in countries with safer banking systems. Moreover, EDIS should have a decision-making structure separate from and independent of the SRM, since it has mainly a macroeconomic function.

The bumpy road. Difficult reform process in Ukraine. OSW Commentary, Number 192|30.11.2015

The post-Maidan Ukrainian government found itself forced to launch a comprehensive state reform process due to both the deep crisis in all the key areas of the state’s operation and the enormous demand for change among the Ukrainian public. The promise to carry out structural reforms based on the European model became a key point in Kyiv’s political rhetoric. However, one year after the formation of the second cabinet led by Arseniy Yatsenyuk (2 December 2014) and one and a half years since the inauguration of Petro Poroshenko as president (7 June 2014), it is clear that the reform process in Ukraine is moving at a snail’s pace and is far from fulfilling its post-Maidan declarations. It has also provoked increasing frustration among the public due to the lack of expected effects.

The EU’s Decision-Making Process Changes in the Constitutive Treaties

Since the beginning of its existence in the form of communities, the European Union’s decision-making process underwent constant evolution. There were continuous adjustments that transformed a pure intergovernmental process into one having rather federal features. Based on the hypothesis that changes have occurred at the decision level in regards to the actors, procedures, influence and ways of taking decisions in order for the new realities, needs and will at the European level to be properly addressed, this paper aims to present the reforms performed through the adoption of new treaties and the modification of the existing ones. The reality is that in order for the European dream and integration to go on and also for further development of the European Union, finally becoming an entity far beyond the founders expectations, decision makers had to constantly and carefully adapt the decision-making process. The purpose of this paper will be achieved by conducting a research based on the qualitative method, analyzing the related researches on this topic and the consolidated versions of the treaties. Thus, we will finally validate our research hypothesis that there was an evolution in what the EU’s decision-making process and decision procedures are concerned.

Nagorno-Karabakh and the arc of crises on Europe's borders. EPC Policy Brief, 3 February 2016

For more than two decades, Azerbaijan and Armenia have been locked in a stalemate over the Nagorno-Karabakh. The protracted conflict remains the biggest impediment to security, stability and prosperity in the South Caucasus. The EU has put itself on the sidelines of the conflict resolution process, allowing the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) Minsk Group (MG), of which Russia, France and the US are co-chairs, to take centre stage. In this Policy Brief, Amanda Paul and Dennis Sammut argue that the EU should play a more active role in the conflict resolution process, taking the lead with innovative initiatives and using its soft power skills and experience. A recent review of the European Neighbourhood Policy recognises that protracted conflicts continue to hamper development in the region. This new approach now needs to be given substance, before the conflict further escalates and becomes another crisis on Europe’s border the already burdened Union cannot cope with.

A stable Libya would close the door to Daesh. CEPS Policy Brief No. 340, March 2016

Since the fall of the Gaddafi regime in 2011, everything has seemed to conspire against the transition process in Libya. The idea of a stabilisation force has met political resistance in most European countries, because there is little appetite for long-term interventions that carry a high risk of casualties. This author argues that, among other initiatives, ground forces are nevertheless a necessary component of stabilisation in this fragile country. He makes four recommendations to guide the engagement of external actors.

The European Union’s growing innovation divide. Bruegel Policy Contribution Issue 2016/08 April 2016

There is a significant divide between the European Union countries with the greatest capacity to innovate, and those with the least capacity to innovate. The difficult convergence process has been proceeding only very slowly and unevenly, and more recently seems to have come to a halt. A particular weak spot for the EU is corporate investment in research; in this area, the intra-EU divide is growing. As the business sector is responsible for the persistent R&D intensity gap between the EU and the United States and Asia, the persistent failure of lagging EU countries to catch up in this area provides much of the explanation for the EU’s weak performance compared to other economies. The evidence shows that the deployment of public budgets and the mix of policies employed by EU member states have tended to aggravate the intra-EU divide. The EU needs to better understand its growing internal innovation divide if it is to achieve its ambition of becoming a world innovation leader.

The EU-China Bilateral Investment Agreement: Between High Hopes and Real Challenges. Security Policy Brief No. 68, February 2016

In 2012, negotiations over an EU–China bilateral investment agreement were launched to fully tap into the potential of bilateral investments. This policy brief gives an overview of the current negotiation process and argues that the high hopes advanced politically and economically in the agreement must be weighed against the many challenges and obstacles the negotiations face, regarding current events in EU–China relations, in global trade and investment regimes, and the limits of EU competencies. Strategically, the agreement could be important, as it offers the potential to strengthen the EU’s global economic relevance. This brief concludes that there is much to gain if the EU follows a coordinated approach and remains mindful of these (potential) obstacles.

European elections: from ‘second-order’ elections to ‘first-order supranational’ elections: How can a ‘first-order supranational’ European election be created?. European Policy Brief No. 35, April 2015

Starting from the idea that European elections cannot be considered as purely second order elections, the author gathers some proposals in order to encourage a more effective electoral process. According to the author, if political leaders adopt these reforms, it could transform gradually the European elections into genuine ‘first-order supranational elections’.

The EU’s Self-Defeating Aid Policy towards Palestine. CEPS Policy Brief No. 343/May 2016

Motivated by the dual aims of strengthening the Middle East Peace Process and contributing to Palestinian state-building, the European Union and its member states have been the biggest donors of financial assistance to the Palestinians. This CEPS Policy Brief finds, however, that these efforts have not achieved the desired change, as the EU failed to develop a coherent strategy to address Israel’s violations of international humanitarian law and it has accepted practices that undermine its political objectives. Hence, the author, Brigitte Herremans, argues that the aid has not contributed to a strong Palestinian government that can contribute to the security of both Palestinian and Israeli civilians. She calls upon the EU and its member states to take more measures to ensure that aid is received by people in need and that illegal practices on the part of Israel do not hamper its effectiveness.

Diplomatic parade or last struggle against fatalism? - Making sense of the Paris ministerial meeting on the Middle East Peace Process. EPC Commentary, 16 June 2016

On 3 June, the French government convened an international meeting in Paris, gathering 28 high-level delegations from all around the world, from Norway to Japan, in order to discuss the state of play and future prospects of the enduring Israel-Palestine conflict. The first ministerial meeting of the “Initiative for the Peace in the Middle East”, as it was labelled by the Quai d’Orsay, provided an important political signal, and a potential diplomatic format, to help revive the long-stalled peace process. Yet, its concrete deliverables remain beset by considerable uncertainty.