The SRM and the dream to resolve banks without public money. CEPS Commentary, 19 December 2013

In his assessment of the compromise agreement reached on the Single Resolution Mechanisn (SRM), Daniel Gros finds that the popular perception that the periphery has the most to gain from the establishment of a unified resolution regime might have gotten it backwards. In reality, he finds that Germany and other surplus countries have a bigger interest in tying the hands of their national resolution authorities, which have a tendency to be too generous.

The Asset Quality Review and Capital Needs: Why re-capitalise banks with public money? CEPS Policy Brief No. 311, 19 December 2013

It is generally assumed that any capital needs discovered by the Asset Quality Review the ECB is scheduled to finish by the end of 2014 should be filled by public funding (= fiscal backstop). This assumption is wrong, however. Banks that do not have enough capital should be asked to obtain it from the market; or be restructured using the procedures and rules recently agreed. The Directorate-General for Competition at the European Commission should be particularly vigilant to ensure that no further state aid flows to an already oversized European banking system. The case for a public backstop was strong when the entire euro area banking system was under stress, but this is no longer the case. Banks with a viable business model can find capital; those without should be closed because any public-sector re-capitalisation would likely mean throwing good money after bad.

Does Money Matter in the Euro area? Evidence from a new Divisia Index. Bruegel Working Paper 2014/12, 6 November 2014

The purpose of this paper is to examine the possible role of money shocks on output and prices in the euro area. Since no Divisia monetary aggregates are available for the euro area, we first create and make available a database on euro-area Divisia monetary aggregates. We plan to update the dataset in the future and keep it publicly available. Using different SVAR models, we find sensible and statistically significant responses to Divisia money shocks, while the responses to simple-sum measures of money and interest rates are not statistically significant, and sometimes even the point estimates are not sensible.

The sovereign debt crisis that isn't: Or, How to turn a lending crisis into a spending crisis and pocket the spread. ACES Cases No. 2014.1

It’s a testament to the power of ideas in politics that the ongoing policy disaster in Europe is still referred to, by academic as well as popular commentators, as the European Sovereign Debt Crisis. That there was a crisis in European sovereign debt markets in 2010 through the middle of 2012 is not in doubt. That is was a crisis of European sovereign debt markets generated by ‘too much spending’ should be very much in doubt. The ongoing European economic crisis is in fact a transmuted private sector banking crisis first exacerbated and then calmed by central bank policy, the costs of which have been asymmetrically distributed across European mass publics.