Access to Electronic Data by Third-Country Law Enforcement Authorities, Challenges to EU Rule of Law and Fundamental Rights. Center for European Policy Studies, 2015

This study examines the challenges posed to European law by third country access to data held by private companies for the purposes of law enforcement. It pays particular attention to the implications for rule of law and fundamental rights of foreign authorities’ direct access to electronic information falling outside pre-established channels of supranational cooperation. A special focus is given to EU-US relations and the practical issues emerging in transatlantic relations covering mutual legal assistance and evidence gathering for law enforcement purposes in criminal proceedings.

The dynamics of leniency application and the knock-on effect of cartel enforcement. Bruegel Working Paper 2016/02, February 2016

The authors study the timing of leniency applications using a novel application of multi-spell discrete-time survival analysis for a sample of cartels prosecuted by the European Commission between 1996 and 2014. The start of a Commission investigation does not affect the rate by which conspirators apply for leniency in the market investigated, but increases the rate of application in separate markets in which a conspirator in the investigated market also engaged in collusion. The revision of the Commission’s leniency programme in 2002 increased the rate of pre-investigation applications. Our results shed light on enforcement efforts against cartels and other forms of

Drug Reformulation Regulatory Gaming in Pharmaceuticals: Enforcement & Innovation Implications

This article examines drug reformulation regulatory gaming as a vehicle for analyzing the way in which European courts and the Commission are currently approaching innovation issues in the pharmaceutical sector. First, the economics literature regarding pharmaceutical innovation is briefly summarized. Next, the phenomenon of regulatory gaming is introduced, followed by an analysis of the two primary theories of harm being used to address drug reformulations as a competition concern. In comparing the recent General Court decision in AstraZeneca to earlier U.S. court cases addressing similar conduct, it is asserted that these approaches differ in significant ways with regards to preservation of innovation incentives as well as on the basis of institutional and evidentiary concerns. Finally, this discussion is then placed into the broader context of the ongoing debate regarding pharmaceutical innovation that first surfaced in the Syfait cases—in particular, the desirability of sector-specific competition law analysis of pharmaceutical innovation.