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Resumo:
This dissertation contains three essays on mechanism design. The common goal of these essays is to assist in the solution of different resource allocation problems where asymmetric information creates obstacles to the efficient allocation of resources. In each essay, we present a mechanism that satisfactorily solves the resource allocation problem and study some of its properties. In our first essay, ”Combinatorial Assignment under Dichotomous Preferences”, we present a class of problems akin to time scheduling without a pre-existing time grid, and propose a mechanism that is efficient, strategy-proof and envy-free. Our second essay, ”Monitoring Costs and the Management of Common-Pool Resources”, studies what can happen to an existing mechanism — the individual tradable quotas (ITQ) mechanism, also known as the cap-and-trade mechanism — when quota enforcement is imperfect and costly. Our third essay, ”Vessel Buyback”, coauthored with John O. Ledyard, presents an auction design that can be used to buy back excess capital in overcapitalized industries.