Is Independence Possible in an Interdependent World? Scotland vs. the UK's Participation in the European Economy. Bruges European Economic Policy (BEEP) Briefing 30/2013

Many commentators have criticised the strategy used to finance regional governments such as the Scottish Parliament – both the block grant system and the limited amount of fiscal autonomy devised in the Scotland Act of 2012. This lecture sets out to identify what level of autonomy or independence would best suit a regional economy in a currency union, and also the institutional changes needed to sustain those arrangements. Our argument is developed along three lines. First, we set out the advantages of a fiscal federalism framework and the institutions needed to support it, but which the Euro-zone currently lacks. The second is to elaborate a model of fiscal federalism where comprehensive powers of taxation and spending are devolved (an independent Scotland and the UK remain constituent members of the EU and European economy). Third, we evaluate the main arguments for the breakup of nations or economic unions with Scotland and the UK as leading examples. We note that greater autonomy may not result in increases in long run economic growth rate, but it does imply that enhancing the fiscal competence and responsibility of regional governments would result in productivity gains and hence higher levels of GDP per head. That means the population is permanently richer than before, even if ultimately their incomes continue to grow at the same rate. It turns out that these improvements can be achieved through devolved tax powers, but not through devolved spending powers or shared taxes.

The Italian Parliament and the EU: a slow and gradual Europeanization. ACES Working Papers, August 2009

In this paper we discussed how the literature traces a growing involvement of the national parliaments in EU policy-making. Three phases can be distinguished: limited or no involvement was the trend until the 1980s; after the Single Act (SEA, 1987), national parliaments started to be interested in European affairs and to set up specialized committees; following the Maastricht Treaty (TUE, 1992), the involvement of national parliaments in EU affairs became a response to the question of "democratic deficit" in the EU (Norton, 1995). The growing number of policies dealt with at the EU level, the consequently increased influence of EU law in national legislations, the new powers of the Union: all of these worked together to push national legislators to seek a scrutiny role in the drafting of EU legislation. According to Laprat (1995: 1), once the TUE was formally approved, a more parliamentary climate prevailed. In more recent years, national parliaments have distinguished themselves for their increased role in the scrutiny of EU legislation (Raunio and Hix, 200I: !52); more specialized MPs sit in the committees on EU affairs; the amount of work for EU specialists has increased. Also, parliamentary scrutiny, initially only optional and ex post, is now increasingly ex ante and/or mandatory (Maurer and Wessels, 2001: 425-475).

Citizenship Deprivation: A Normative Analysis. Liberty and Security in Europe No. 82, 19 March 2015

Most critical analyses assess citizenship-deprivation policies against international human rights and domestic rule of law standards, such as prevention of statelessness, non-arbitrariness with regard to justifications and judicial remedies, or non-discrimination between different categories of citizens. This report considers instead from a political theory perspective how deprivation policies reflect specific conceptions of political community. We distinguish four normative conceptions of the grounds of membership in a political community that apply to decisions on acquisition and loss of citizenship status: i) a ‘State discretion’ view, according to which governments should be as free as possible in pursuing State interests when determining citizenship status; ii) an ‘individual choice’ view, according to which individuals should be as free as possible in choosing their citizenship status; iii) an ‘ascriptive community’ view, according to which both State and individual choices should be minimised through automatic determination of membership based on objective criteria such as the circumstances of birth; and iv) a ‘genuine link’ view, according to which the ties of individuals to particular States determine their claims to inclusion and against deprivation while providing at the same time objections against including individuals without genuine links. We argue that most citizenship laws combine these four normative views in different ways, but that from a democratic perspective the ‘genuine link’ view is normatively preferable to the others. The report subsequently examines five general grounds for citizenship withdrawal – threats to public security, non-compliance with citizenship duties, flawed acquisition, derivative loss and loss of genuine links – and considers how the four normative views apply to withdrawal provision motivated by these concerns. The final section of the report examines whether EU citizenship provides additional reasons for protection against Member States’ powers of citizenship deprivation. We suggest that, in addition to fundamental rights protection through EU law and protection of free movement rights, three further arguments could be invoked: toleration of dual citizenship in a political union, prevention of unequal conditions for loss among EU citizens, and the salience of genuine links to the EU itself rather than merely to one of its Member States.

Did Egypt's Parliamentary Election just trump citizens’ rights? Arab Citizenship Review No. 12, 19 November 2015

Since the Muslim Brotherhood rule was toppled in July 2013, the regime of President Abd al-Fattah al-Sisi has strived to consolidate his one-man rule; he painted the political opposition and civil society as traitors and foreign agents and exploited the fight against terrorism to suppress freedom of expression, justify a crackdown on the press, eclipse justice in courtrooms, throw thousands in prison, and tighten his grip on police forces. The regime has postponed parliamentary elections for some time, while it marginalised and weakened the non-Islamist political parties that helped Sisi take power. He did so by promoting electoral lists with candidates who are loyal to the president, to ensure control over the new assembly and by obstructing any political alliance that could form an opposition. At the same time, the security apparatus has been given free rein to control the public sphere and engineer the electoral process. This may ultimately lead to a parliament that includes no advocates for rights and liberties, which is particularly significant since the incoming assembly will review the huge amount of legislation that President Sisi has issued in the absence of a parliament. In addition, shortly before elections, President Sisi raised questions about the constitution, calling for it to be amended to reduce the powers of the parliament and increase those of the president. It is thus clear that Sisi seeks not only to consolidate his regime, without political opposition, but to free his rule of any effective oversight from society or parliament.

More Union for the EU’s IPO Market. ECMI Commentary No. 41/23 March 2016

n his assessment of the latest draft prospectus Regulation, published on 30 November 2015, Karel Lannoo argues in this ECMI Commentary that the text goes somewhat further than the European Commission has previously entertained, but it falls short of creating a European market. In his view, the Commission is hostage to its own (or member states’) unwillingness to expand the powers of the European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA) to become an EU-wide listing authority. In short, the Union that the EU wants to create for capital markets still seems a distant ambition.