European Criminal Law and General Principles of Union Law. Research Papers in Law, 5/2005

From the Introduction. The European Court of Justice, partly followed in this by the European legislator, has regulated Community law and policy through a set of general principles of law. For the Community legal order in the first pillar, general legal principles have developed from functional policy areas such as the internal market, the customs union, the monetary union, the common agricultural policy, the European competition policy, etc., which are of great importance for the quality and legitimacy of Community law. The principles in question are not so much general legal principles of an institutional character, such as the priority of Community law, direct effect or Community loyalty, but rather principles of law which shape the fundamental rights and basic rights of the citizen. I refer to the principle of legality, of nulla poena, the inviolability of the home, the nemo tenetur principle, due process, the rights of the defence, etc. Many of these legal principles have been elevated to primary Community law status by the European Court of Justice, often as a result of preliminary questions. Nevertheless, a considerable number of them have also been elaborated in the context of contentious proceedings before the Court of Justice, such as in the framework of European competition law and European public servants law.

Britain’s Political Earthquake: What aftershocks for Europe and the UK? CEPS Commentary, 11 May 2015

In the wake of last week’s elections in Britain, Michael Emerson examines in this CEPS Commentary the implications of the astonishing results for the EU and the UK and outlines a possible reform package that David Cameron might present to the EU institutions and other member states to fulfil his pledge to achieve a “reformed EU”. He also urges the Prime Minister to consider adding a constructive component to his reform package, namely positioning the UK to act once again as a leading proponent of a more effective European foreign, security and defence policy.

REACH: A killer whale for SMEs? CEPS Policy Brief No. 307, 9 December 2013

REACH is a very demanding system for any business either large or small, yet right from the start one of the more serious concerns was whether and how SMEs could cope with the Regulation. After all, some 27,600 companies in EU chemistry are SMEs (95% of all firms). Seven years down the line, many of these fears are materialising. Assuming no significant changes are introduced to REACH, this paper suggests the following recommendations: Above all, we strongly encourage SMEs to start early and develop a strategy for REACH compliance well before 2018. Address the potential competition law implications of current SIEF arrangements, e.g. through a Guidance document from DG Competition by 2014 (in time for 2018) Facilitate the exchange of information along the value chain by adopting pragmatic approach to the content and format of Safety Data Sheets. More can be done on the IT front as well, for instance by developing tools that generate compliant Safety Data Sheets. Improve the communication of REACH and its intended goals, that is, the health and environmental benefits, to the wider public. SMEs regret the unawareness of the public in the light of the enormous efforts they have to undertake. In the event of a later review of REACH, the logic should be risk-based rather than hazard-based.

Commitments or prohibition? The EU antitrust dilemma. Bruegel Policy Brief 2014/01, 31 January 2014

The issue: Excluding cartels, most investigations into suspected infringements of European Union competition law are resolved with ‘commitment decisions’. The European Commission drops the case in exchange for a commitment from the company under investigation to implement measures to stop the presumed anti-competitive behaviour. Commitment decisions are considered speedier than formal sanctions (prohibition decisions) in restoring normal competitive market conditions. They have a cost, however: commitments are voluntary and are unlikely to be subject to judicial review. This reduces the European Commission’s incentive to build a robust case. Because commitment decisions do not establish any legal precedent, they provide for little guidance on the interpretation of the law. Policy challenge: The European Commission relies increasingly on commitment decisions. More transparency on the substance of allegations, and the establishment of a higher number of legal precedents, are however necessary. This applies in particular to cases that tackle antitrust issues in new areas, such as markets for digital goods, in which companies might find it difficult to assess if a certain behaviour constitutes a violation of competition rules. To ensure greater transparency and mitigate some of the drawbacks of commitment decisions, while retaining their main benefits, the full detail of the objections addressed by the European Commission to defendants should be published.

Antitrust, regulatory capture and economic integration. Bruegel Policy Contribution ISSUE 2015/11, JULY 2015

There is growing worldwide concern about bias in the enforcement of competition law in favour of domestic firms. Even seemingly neutral antitrust laws can lead discrimination if they are enforced selectively. - Authors investigate the distortions that national competition authorities generate when they pursue non-competition goals in favour of domestic firms, and discuss ways to address this negative policy development in a globalised world. - The distortions identified in the paper would dissipate if governments agreed that the sole objective of competition law ought to be the protection of consumer welfare that competition-law institutions ought to be protected against capture. - A realistic and effective way to prompt international convergence towards independent enforcement of competition laws is through the inclusion of competition clauses in bilateral trade agreements and the development of dispute-resolution mechanisms.

Drug Reformulation Regulatory Gaming in Pharmaceuticals: Enforcement & Innovation Implications

This article examines drug reformulation regulatory gaming as a vehicle for analyzing the way in which European courts and the Commission are currently approaching innovation issues in the pharmaceutical sector. First, the economics literature regarding pharmaceutical innovation is briefly summarized. Next, the phenomenon of regulatory gaming is introduced, followed by an analysis of the two primary theories of harm being used to address drug reformulations as a competition concern. In comparing the recent General Court decision in AstraZeneca to earlier U.S. court cases addressing similar conduct, it is asserted that these approaches differ in significant ways with regards to preservation of innovation incentives as well as on the basis of institutional and evidentiary concerns. Finally, this discussion is then placed into the broader context of the ongoing debate regarding pharmaceutical innovation that first surfaced in the Syfait cases—in particular, the desirability of sector-specific competition law analysis of pharmaceutical innovation.

Reform der EU-Wettbewerbsregeln für Technologietransfer-Verträge: Einfahrt in den sicheren Hafen? = Reform of EU competition rules on technology transfer agreements: entry into the safe harbor? Research Paper in Law 2/2004

No abstract.