Heterodox Autonomy Doctrine: realism and purposes, and its relevance

The Autonomy Doctrine, elaborated by Juan Carlos Puig, is a realist point of view of International Relations. It is an analysis, from the periphery, about the structure of world power, and a roadmap (from a theoretical point of view) for the longing process of autonomization-regarding hegemonic power-for a country whose ruling class would decide to overcome dependency. The elements its author took into account when analyzing its own context are explained in this text and, afterwards, are reflected over its relevance nowadays. For that purpose, it is necessary to answer certain questions, such as which are the concepts and categories that may explain its relevance, its applicability to regional integration and cooperation models and projects, and what would be the analytical method to compare reality versus ideas, among others. The methodological proposal to analyze the relevance of Puig's doctrine is to compare it to different visions of regionalism that are currently in effect in Latin America.

Peripheral Realism Revisited

Abstract In this article we summarize the precepts of Peripheral Realism, its place in the intellectual history of International Relations Theory, its contributions to interpreting Latin American international politics and its insights for the future. After revising the intellectual merits and tenets of the theory in the four initial sections, we show how it predicted the behavior of Latin American states under unipolarity. Finally, we review its implications for a world where China may hold economic primacy.

Models, truth and realism: assessing Bas van Fraassen's views on scientific representation

This paper is devoted to an analysis of some aspects of Bas van Fraassen's views on representation. While I agree with most of his claims, I disagree on the following three issues. Firstly, I contend that some isomorphism (or at least homomorphism) between the representor and what is represented is a universal necessary condition for the success of any representation, even in the case of misrepresentation. Secondly, I argue that the so-called "semantic" or "model-theoretic" construal of theories does not give proper due to the role played by true propositions in successful representing practices. Thirdly, I attempt to show that the force of van Fraassen's pragmatic - and antirealist - "dissolution" of the "loss of reality objection" loses its bite when we realize that our cognitive contact with real phenomena is achieved not by representing but by expressing true propositions about them.

UN Security Council decision-making: testing the bribery hypothesis

Liberal-Institutionalism and Structural Realism expectations about international organizations are confronted by looking at if and how US-controlled international aid is granted, and particularly if it is related or not to political affinity and to United Nations Security Council (UNSC) non-permanent membership. A preliminary assessment suggests that these relations only hold for the period of the Cold War, and, even then, only when UNSC non-permanent membership is in years in which the Security Council was deemed very important.

TRANSFERTS DE QUANTITE DE MOUVEMENT AU-DESSUS ET A L'INTERIEUR DE LA VEGETATION

The aborptlon of momentum by the vegetation Is studied In this work through an analytical approach which also provides the appropriate formulations to describe wind velocity and drffusivities profiles above and Inside the space occupied by the foliage elements. A first comparison between the observed and calculated profiles of wind volocity for Amazonian forest (Réserva Pucke, Manaus - AM) is presented to test the realism of the model.

Truth, laws and the progress of science

In this paper I analyze the difficult question of the truth of mature scientific theories by tackling the problem of the truth of laws. After introducing the main philosophical positions in the field of scientific realism, I discuss and then counter the two main arguments against realism, namely the pessimistic meta-induction and the abstract and idealized character of scientific laws. I conclude by defending the view that well-confirmed physical theories are true only relatively to certain values of the variables that appear in the laws.

Caution and necessity

In this paper I examine Crispin Wright's modal anti-realism as based on the availability of a certain attitude of Caution towards judgements of necessity. I think that Wright's account should be attractive in several ways for modal theorists with an anti-realist bend. However, the attitude of Caution to which it appeals has attracted some controversy. Wright himself has later come to doubt whether Caution is ultimately coherent. Here I first address Wright's worries concerning the coherence of Caution and show that they are unfounded. But then I argue that although the attitude of Caution is coherent, it cannot provide a suitable basis for a non-eliminativist account of necessity. I offer two different objections against Caution. (1) I argue that Wright's appeal to Caution, if successful, would show not only that modal judgement is non-objective but also that it is dispensable. Thus, I claim that appeal to Caution would seem to serve more as a threat against a non-eliminativist account of necessity, rather than as a potential adequate basis for it. However, (2) I argue that Wright's appeal to Caution is unsuccessful, for there is no genuine Caution: Caution is a mere verbal attitude.