9 resultados para Welfare cost of inflation

em Digital Commons at Florida International University


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For the last three decades, the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) has been a dominant model to calculate expected return. In early 1990% Fama and French (1992) developed the Fama and French Three Factor model by adding two additional factors to the CAPM. However even with these present models, it has been found that estimates of the expected return are not accurate (Elton, 1999; Fama &French, 1997). Botosan (1997) introduced a new approach to estimate the expected return. This approach employs an equity valuation model to calculate the internal rate of return (IRR) which is often called, 'implied cost of equity capital" as a proxy of the expected return. This approach has been gaining in popularity among researchers. A critical review of the literature will help inform hospitality researchers regarding the issue and encourage them to implement the new approach into their own studies.

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Carefully reading employment applications and checking out all references and prior-employment records is vital to hotel managers and personnel directors today. Many legal suits are the result of employees who, hired quickly because of an immediate need, commit some crime in relation to guest rooms or property.

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This dissertation discusses the relationship between inflation, currency substitution and dollarization that has taken place in Argentina for the past several decades.^ First, it is shown that when consumers are able to hold only domestic monetary balances (without capital mobility) an increase in the rate of inflation will produce a balance of payments deficit. We then look at the same issue but with heterogeneous consumers, this heterogeneity being generated by non-proportional lump-sum transfers.^ Second, we discussed some necessary assumptions related to currency substitution models and concluded that there was no a-priori conclusion on whether currencies should be assumed to be "cooperant" or "non-cooperant" in utility. That is to say, whether individuals held different currencies together or one instead of the other.^ Third, we went into discussing the issue of currency substitution as being a constraint on governments' inflationary objectives rather than a choice of those governments to avoid hyperinflations. We showed that imperfect substitutability between currencies does not "reduce the scope for rational (hyper)inflationary processes" as it had been previously argued. It will ultimately depend on the parametrization used and not on the intrinsic characteristics of imperfect substitutability between currencies.^ We further showed that in Argentina, individuals have been able to endogenize the money supply by holding foreign monetary balances. We argued that the decision to hold foreign monetary balances by individuals is always a second best due to the trade-off between holding foreign monetary balances and consumption. For some levels of income, consumption, and foreign inflation, individuals would prefer to hold domestic monetary balances rather than foreign ones.^ We then modeled the distinction between dollarization and currency substitution. We concluded that although dollarization is necessary for currency substitution to take place, the decision to use foreign monetary balances for transactions purposes is largely independent from the dollarization process.^ Finally, we concluded that Argentina should not fully dollarize its economy because dollarization is always a second best to using a domestic currency. Further, we argued that a fixed exchange system would be better than a flexible exchange rate or a "crawling-peg" system because of the characteristics of the political system and the possibilities of "mass praetorianism" to develop, which is intricately linked to "populist" solutions. ^

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This dissertation analyzes the obstacles against further cooperation in international economic relations. The first essay explains the gradual nature of trade liberalization. I show that existence of asymmetric information between governments provides a sufficient reason for gradualism to exist. Governments prefer starting small to reduce the cost of partner’s betrayal when there is sufficient degree of information asymmetry regarding the partner’s type. Learning about partner’s incentive structure enhances expectations, encouraging governments to increase their current level of cooperation. Specifically, the uninformed government’s subjective belief for the trading partner being good is improved as the partner acts cooperatively. This updated belief, in turn, lowers the subjective probability of future betrayal, enabling further progress in cooperation. The second essay analyzes the relationship between two countries facing two policy dilemmas in an environment with two way goods and capital flows. When issues are independent and countries are symmetric, signing separate agreements for tariffs (Free Trade Agreements-FTA) and for taxes (Tax Treaties-TT) provides the identical level of enforcement as signing a linked agreement. However, linkage can still improve the joint welfare by transferring the slack enforcement power in a case of asymmetric issues or countries. I report non-results in two cases where the policy issues are interconnected due to technological spillover effect of FDI. Moreover, I show that linking the agreements actually reduces enforcement when agreements are linked under a limited punishment rule and policy variables are strategic substitutes. The third essay investigates the welfare/enforcement consequences of linking trade and environmental agreements. In the standard literature, linking the agreements generate non-trivial results only when there is structural relation between the issues. I focus on institutional design of the linkage and show that even if environmental aspects of international trade are negligible linking the agreements might still have some interesting welfare implications under current GATT Rules. Specifically, when traded goods are substitutes in consumption, linking the environmental agreement with trade agreement under the Withdrawal of Equivalent Concession Rule (Article XXVIII) will reduce the enforcement. However, enforcement in environmental issue increases when the same rule is implemented in the absence of linkage.

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This dissertation examines the effect of regulations, resource and referral agencies, and subsidies on price and quality of care in child care centers. This research is based on a carefully developed conceptual framework that incorporates the factors affecting the demand and supply of child care. The first step in developing this framework is sketching out the structural equations. The structural equations help us understand the underlying behavior of individuals and firms making a decision. The exogenous variables are vector of attributes relating to family characteristics, child characteristics, regulations, subsidy, community characteristics and prices of inputs. Based on the structural equations, reduced form equations are estimated to find the effect of each of the exogenous variables on each of the endogenous variables. Reduced form equations help us answer public policy questions. The sample for this study is from the 1990 Profile of Child Care Settings (PCCS) data in which 2,089 center based programs were interviewed.^ Child/Staff Ratio (Group Level). Results indicate that among subsidies, only the state subsidy per child in poverty has a significant effect on the child/staff ratio at the group level. Presence of resource and referral agencies also increase the child/staff ratio at the group level. Also when the maximum center group size regulation for 25-36 months becomes more stringent, the child/staff ratio at the group level decreases.^ Child/Staff Ratio (Center Level). When the regulations for the maximum child/staff ratio for age groups 13-24 months and 37-60 months become lax, the child/staff ratio for the center increases. As the regulation for maximum group size for infants becomes stringent, the child/staff ratio decreases. An interesting finding is that as the regulations for maximum group size for age groups 13-24 months and 25-36 months become stringent, the child/staff ratio for the center increases. Another significant finding is that when a center is located in a rural area the child/staff ratio is significantly lower.^ Center Weighted Average Hourly Fees. Maximum group size regulations for age groups 25-36 months and 37-60 months have a negative effect on center hourly fee. Maximum child staff regulations for age groups 13-24 months and 37-60 months have a negative effect on center hourly fee. Maximum child staff regulations for age groups 0-12 months and 25-36 months have a positive effect on center hourly fee. Findings also indicate that the center average hourly price is lower when there is a resource and referral agency present. Cost adjusted prekindergarten funds and JOBS child care subsidies have a negative effect on average hourly fee. Cost adjusted social services block grant and state subsidy per child in poverty have a positive effect on the average hourly price. A major finding of this dissertation is the interaction of subsidy and regulatory variables.^ Another major finding is that child/staff ratio at the group level is lower when there is an interaction between geographic location and nature of center sponsorship. ^

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This dissertation discusses the relationship between inflation, currency substitution and dollarization that has taken place in Argentina for the past several decades. First, it is shown that when consumers are able to hold only domestic monetary balances (without capital mobility) an increase in the rate of inflation will produce a balance of payments deficit. We then look at the same issue but with heterogeneous consumers, this heterogeneity being generated by non-proportional lump-sum transfers. Second, we discussed some necessary assumptions related to currency substitution models and concluded that there was no a-priori conclusion on whether currencies should be assumed to be "cooperant" or "non-cooperant" in utility. That is to say, whether individuals held different currencies together or one instead of the other. Third, we went into discussing the issue of currency substitution as being a constraint on governments inflationary objectives rather than a choice of those governments to avoid hyperinflations. We showed that imperfect substitutability between currencies does not "reduce the scope for rational (hyper)inflationary processes" as it had been previously argued. It will ultimately depend on the parametrization used and not on the intrinsic characteristics of imperfect substitutability between currencies. We further showed that in Argentina, individuals have been able to endogenize the money supply by holding foreign monetary balances. We argued that the decision to hold foreign monetary balances by individuals is always a second best due to the trade-off between holding foreign monetary balances and consumption. For some levels of income, consumption, and foreign inflation, individuals would prefer to hold domestic monetary balances rather than foreign ones. We then modeled the distinction between dollarization and currency substitution. We concluded that although dollarization is necessary for currency substitution to take place, the decision to use foreign monetary balances for transactions purposes is largely independent from the dollarization process. Finally, we concluded that Argentina should not fully dollarize its economy because dollarization is always a second best to using a domestic currency. Further, we argued that a fixed exchange system would be better than a flexible exchange rate or a "crawling-peg" system because of the characteristics of the political system and the possibilities of "mass praetorianism" to develop, which is intricately linked to "populist" solutions.