The impact of CEO compensation and CEO horizon on a firm's discretionary research and development expenditures

Agency costs are said to arise as a result of the separation of ownership from control inherent in the corporate form of ownership. One such agency problem concerns the potential variance between the time horizons of principal shareholders and agent managers. Agency theory suggests that these costs can be alleviated or controlled through performance-based Chief Executive Officer (CEO) contracting. However, components of a CEO's compensation contract can exacerbate or mitigate agency-related problems (Antle and Smith, 1985). According to the horizon hypothesis, a self-serving CEO reduces discretionary research and development (R&D) expenditures to increase earnings and earnings-based bonus compensation. Agency theorists contend that a CEO's market-based compensation component can mitigate horizon problems. This study seeks to determine whether there is a relationship between CEO earnings- and market-based compensation components and R&D expenditures in the largest United States industrial firms from 1987 to 1993.^ Consistent with the horizon hypothesis, results provide evidence of a negative and statistically significant relationship between CEO cash compensation (i.e., salary and bonus) and the firm's R&D expenditures. Consistent with the expectations of agency theory, results provide evidence of a positive and statistically significant relationship between market-based CEO compensation and R&D.^ Further results of this study provide evidence of a positive and statistically significant relationship between CEO tenure and the firm's R&D expenditures. Although there is a negative relationship between CEO age and the firm's R&D, it was not statistically significant at the 0.5 level. ^

Consequences of financial restatements for auditors and top executives

This dissertation consists of three essays and investigates issues related to the impact of financial restatements on auditor change, shareholder actions, and executive turnover in the post-Sarbanes Oxley Act (SOX) period. For the first essay, we examined auditor change at 569 restatement firms and 5,605 control firms for 2004. We found that restatement announcements significantly increased the likelihood of auditor resignation and dismissal in the post-SOX period. The second essay examines shareholder voting on auditor ratifications in 2006 following restatement announcements by SEC registrants in 2005. The proportion of votes not supporting auditor ratification is low even in the presence of a restatement. However, we find that shareholders are more likely to vote against auditor ratification after a restatement when compared to votes at (a) films without restatements, or (b) restating firms in the preceding period. The third essay examines the consequences of financial restatements on the turnover of chief financial officers (CFO). We find that restatement announcements do significantly increase the likelihood of CFO turnover no matter whether the departure is voluntary or forced in nature. Also, the significant relationship is present even after controlling for the effect of CEO turnover.

Essays on corporate reputation: Antecedents and consequences

This dissertation studied the determinants and consequences of corporate reputation. It explored how firm-, industry-, and country-level factors influence the general public’s assessment of a firm’s reputation and how this reputation assessment impacted the firm’s strategic actions and organizational outcomes. The three empirical essays are grounded on separate theoretical paradigms in strategy, organizational theory, and corporate governance. The first essay used signaling theory to investigate firm-, industry-, and country-level determinants of individual-level corporate reputation assessments. Using a hierarchical linear model, it tested the theory based on individual evaluations of the largest companies across countries. Results indicated that variables at multiple analysis levels simultaneously impact individual level reputation assessments. Interactions were also found between industry- and country-level factors. Results confirmed the multi-level nature of signaling influences on reputation assessments. Building on a stakeholder-power approach to corporate governance, the second essay studied how differences in the power and preferences of three stakeholder groups—shareholders, creditors, and workers—across countries influence the general public’s reputation assessments of corporations. Examining the largest companies across countries, the study found that while the influence of stock market return is stronger in societies where shareholders have more power, social performance has a more significant role in shaping reputation evaluations in societies with stronger labor rights. Unexpectedly, when creditors have greater power, the influence of financial stability on reputation assessment becomes weaker. Exploring the consequences of reputation, the third essay investigated the specific effects of intangible assets on strategic actions and organizational outcomes. Particularly, it individually studied the impacts of acquirer acquisition experience, corporate reputation, and approach toward social responsibilities as well as their combined effect on market reactions to acquisition announcements. Using an event study of acquisition announcements, it confirmed the significant impacts of both action-specific (acquisition experience) and general (reputation and social performance) intangible assets on market expectations of acquisition outcomes. Moreover, the analysis demonstrated that reputation magnifies the impact of acquisition experience on market response to acquisition announcements. In conclusion, this dissertation tried to advance and extend the application of management and organizational theories by explaining the mechanisms underlying antecedents and consequences of corporate reputation.

S Corporations Can Benefit Many Closely-Held Hospitality Firms

In his discussion - S Corporations Can Benefit Many Closely-Held Hospitality Firms - by John M. Tarras, Assistant Professor, School of Hotel, Restaurant & Institutional Management at Michigan State University, Assistant Professor Tarras initially offers: “Organization as an S corporation has many advantages for hospitality firms since passage of the Tax Reform Act of 1986. The author discusses those advantages and lists the disadvantages as well.” In the opening paragraphs Tarras alludes to the relationship between hospitality firms, S corporations, and the Tax Reform Act of 1986, and then defines what an S corporation is. “An S corporation is a form of business entity that combines many of the tax advantages of partnerships with the legal attributes of a corporation, including limited liability for its shareholders. Its name is obtained from a subchapter of the Internal Revenue Code. Except for tax purposes, the S corporation is treated in the same manner as any regular corporation. Like a partnership, income and losses for an S corporation are generally passed through directly to shareholders for inclusion on their individual returns. An S corporation thus avoids the double tax problem facing regular corporations.” There are certain criteria to be met and caveats to be avoided in qualifying for S corporation status. Tarras lists and cites these for you. “Due to the complicated nature of S corporations, the election may be inadvertently terminated if the eligibility requirements are violated,” Tarras expands and cites. As the article suggests at the outset, there are advantages and disadvantages to S corporation status; the author outlines some examples for you. “Traditionally, the S corporation has been used by hospitality firms wishing to avoid the "double tax" problem of a regular corporation,” Tarras informs you. “Regular corporations are taxed once at the corporate level, and again at the shareholder level when income is distributed to shareholders in the form of dividends.” Tarras advises you as to why an S corporation is an advantage in this situation. “Since the S corporation generally is not subject to any corporate taxes, it generally makes no difference whether distributions to shareholders of S corporations are characterized as compensation or dividends,” thus the double tax is avoided. This is just one such positive illustration. Assistant Professor Tarras wants you to know: “Perhaps the most important reason to consider the S corporation has to do with the downward revision of tax rates for both individuals and corporations.” He highlights a case study for you. Some of the disadvantages of S corporation affiliation are the caveats alluded to earlier. They include, “the limitation of an S corporation of 35 shareholders,” Tarras cites. “Also, there are limits as to who may own stock in an S corporation.” These are but two of the limitations of an S corporation. Tarras closes with a further glimpse of the down-sides of an S corporation.

Planning Buy-Sell Agreements In The Hospitality Industry

In the article - Planning Buy-Sell Agreements In The Hospitality Industry - by John M. Tarras, Assistant Professor, School of Hotel, Restaurant and Institutional Management at Michigan State University, the author initially observes: “The vast majority of hospitality firms (restaurants, hotels, etc.) would be considered closely-held corporations. As such, they have unique planning problems compared to large, publicly-traded hospitality firms. One area of special concern to the closely-held hospitality firm is the planning and adoption of a buy-sell agreement.” The above thesis statement outlines the heart of the article; the buy-sell agreement in regard to smaller [closely held, as Tarras calls them] corporations. The theory is narrow and pro-active, spanning the gap between personal-to-corporate stock manipulations. “The primary purpose of a buy-sell agreement is to contribute to the orderly transfer of a shareholder's stock in a hospitality firm upon some future incident [typically retirement, withdrawal of a shareholder, disability, or death], as Tarras defines the concept. “The hospitality firm or the other shareholders would be committed to purchase the departing shareholder's stock at an agreed upon price and method, and to ensure that ample cash will be obtainable for such an impending sale. The buy-sell agreement provides a market for the shareholder or the shareholder's estate for the sale of otherwise illiquid stock,” the author further provides as canons of buy-sell agreements. In defining the buy-sell agreement with restrictive clauses, Tarras demonstrates, “…many closely-held hospitality firms desire to limit ownership to those individuals, either family or principal corporate employees, who are essential to the well-being of the firm.” Tarras says, another element of the buy-sell agreement is to furnish the departing shareholder with liquidity. “…there typically is some form of cash down payment with the remainder denoted by an interest-bearing promissory note [usually 5 to 15 years],” he informs. “The departing shareholders may require that the hospitality firm pledge the assets of the firm and that the remaining shareholders personally guarantee the promissory note.” “…the most frequent reason for establishing buy-sell agreements is for estate planning purposes,” Tarras says. There are tax advantages and liabilities for both the seller and buyer of stock via the buy-sell agreement, and the author enumerates many of these. One, big advantage of the buy-sell agreement is that it provides for the running of the company with a minimum of disruption through the stock-cash transition process, Tarras offers.

Understanding Annual Reports of Hospitality Firms

In her discussion - Understanding Annual Reports of Hospitality Firms - by Elisa S. Moncarz, Associate Professor, School of Hospitality Management, Florida International University, Associate Professor Moncarz initially offers: “Management bears full responsibility for the reporting function of annual reports prepared by publicly-held companies designed to provide interested parties with information that is useful in making business and economic decisions. In Part I the author reviews the content of annual reports of firms in the hospitality industry, while looking at recent developments affecting annual reports. Part 11, in a subsequent issue, will comprise an in-depth examination of the annual report of an actual firm in the hospitality industry, focusing on suggested guidelines and recommendations for how to use annual reports as an aid to the decision-making process in the hospitality industry.” This article is to be considered a primer on reading and understanding annual reports, as well as a glimpse into the dynamics that affect them. In defining what an annual report is, Associate Professor Moncarz informs you with citation, “Annual reports are required by the Securities Exchange Commission (SEC) ¹ for all companies with securities sold to the general public. These reports, which must be issued within 90 days after the close of the calendar (or fiscal) year, comprise a primary source of information about these companies,” she further reports. “Indeed, the official version of the company's history is summed up yearly in its annual report by providing full information of the company's operations over the period as well as what the company is gearing up to accomplish in the next year,” Professor Moncarz closes the definition. Why should thus happen over and above SEC requirements? The financial component is an important one; the author offers her informed view: “The major objective of financial statement reporting is to provide information that is useful to present and potential investors, creditors, and other financial statement users in making rational investment, credit, and similar decisions. Thus, financial statements represent the primary (and most reliable) source of knowledge about a particular firm in the hospitality industry.” The above two paragraphs crystallize the requirement and the objective of annual reports. “A typical annual report of a hospitality firm contains a number of standard features which may be broken down into the following three sections…” General, financial data, and supplementary data are variously bounded and circumscribed for you. As a marketing device and feel-good initiative, the annual report is a useful tool for a hospitality corporation that is in-the-black, and focused on the future, says the author. She cites the Marriott Corporation’s 1985 annual report as an example. Of course, an annual report can also be a harbinger of bad news for shareholders as well. Notes/footnotes and disclosure are key elements to the credibility of any annual report; Professor Moncarz discusses these concepts at length. “Given the likelihood that the hospitality industry will continue to face an uncertain economic environment for some time, financial statement users should become more demanding in their need for information that will help assure the firm's survival and evaluate its ability to generate earnings, increase the firm's investment value, and provide for its future growth,” Professor Moncarz says. “Accordingly, understanding annual reports in the hospitality industry should become even more critical.”

Three essays on dual-class stock structure

Dual-class stock structure is characterized by the separation of voting rights and cash flow rights. The departure from a common "one share-one vote" configuration creates ideal conditions for conflicts of interest and agency problems between controlling insiders (the holders of voting rights) and remaining shareholders. The owners of voting rights have the opportunity to extract private benefits and act in their personal interest; as a result, dual-class firms are often perceived to have low transparency and high information asymmetry. This dissertation investigates the quality of information and the information environment of firms with two classes of stock. The first essay examines the quality of information by studying accruals in dual-class firms in comparison to firms with only one class of stock. The results suggest that the quality of accruals is better in dual-class firms than in single-class firms. In addition, the difference in the quality of accruals between firms that abolish their dual-class share structure by unification and singe-class firms disappears in the post-unification period. The second essay investigates the earnings informativeness of dual-class firms by examining the explanatory power of earnings for returns. The results indicate that the earnings informativeness is lower for dual-class firms as compared to single-class firms. Earnings informativeness improves in firms that unify their shares. The third essay compares the level of information asymmetry between dual-class firms and single-class firms. It is documented that the information environment for dual-class firms is worse than for single-class firms. Also, the finding suggests that the difference in information environment between dual-class firms and single-class firms disappears after dual-class stock unification.

Three Essays on Dual-Class Stock Structure

Dual-class stock structure is characterized by the separation of voting rights and cash flow rights. The departure from a common “one share-one vote” configuration creates ideal conditions for conflicts of interest and agency problems between controlling insiders (the holders of voting rights) and remaining shareholders. The owners of voting rights have the opportunity to extract private benefits and act in their personal interest; as a result, dual-class firms are often perceived to have low transparency and high information asymmetry. This dissertation investigates the quality of information and the information environment of firms with two classes of stock. The first essay examines the quality of information by studying accruals in dual-class firms in comparison to firms with only one class of stock. The results suggest that the quality of accruals is better in dual-class firms than in single-class firms. In addition, the difference in the quality of accruals between firms that abolish their dual-class share structure by unification and singe-class firms disappears in the post-unification period. The second essay investigates the earnings informativeness of dual-class firms by examining the explanatory power of earnings for returns. The results indicate that the earnings informativeness is lower for dual-class firms as compared to single-class firms. Earnings informativeness improves in firms that unify their shares. The third essay compares the level of information asymmetry between dual-class firms and single-class firms. It is documented that the information environment for dual-class firms is worse than for single-class firms. Also, the finding suggests that the difference in information environment between dual-class firms and single-class firms disappears after dual-class stock unification.