Evaluating Hotel Marketing Effectiveness: The Audit

Hotel management is increasingly looking for ways to evaluate marketing effectiveness. A system is needed to assess objectives, strategies, and performance. The Marketing Audit provides a workable, worthwhile tool for managers to assess current performances and long-range goals.

Travel Marketing: Industry Relationships and Benefits

In the discussion - Travel Marketing: Industry Relationships and Benefits - by Andrew Vladimir, Visiting Assistant Professor, School of Hospitality Management at Florida International University, the author initially states: “A symbiotic relationship exists among the various segments of the travel and tourism industry. The author has solicited the thinking of 37experts and leaders in the field in a book dealing with these relationships and how they can be developed to benefit the industry. This article provides some salient points from those contributors.” This article could be considered a primer on networking for the hospitality industry. It has everything to do with marketing and the relationships between varied systems in the field of travel and tourism. Vladimir points to instances of success and failure in marketing for the industry at large. And there are points of view from thirty-seven contributing sources here. “Miami Beach remains a fitting example of a leisure product that has been unable to get its act together,” Vladimir shares a view. “There are some first class hotels, a few good restaurants, alluring beaches, and a splendid convention center, but there is no synergism between them, no real affinity, and so while visitors admire the Fontainebleau Hilton and enjoy the food at Joe's Stone Crabs, the reputation of Miami Beach as a resort remains sullied,” the author makes a point. In describing cohesiveness between exclusive systems, Vladimir says, “If each system can get a better understanding of the inner workings of neighboring related systems, each will ultimately be more successful in achieving its goals.” The article is suggesting that exclusive systems aren’t really exclusive at all; or at least they shouldn’t be. In a word – competition – drives the market, and in order for a property to stay afloat, aggressive marketing integrated with all attendant resources is crucial. “Tisch [Preston Robert Tisch, currently – at the time of this writing - the Postmaster General of the United States and formerly president of Lowe’s Hotels and the New York Visitors and Convention Bureau], in talking about the need for aggressive marketing says: “Never...ever...take anything for granted. Never...not for a moment...think that any product or any place will survive strictly on its own merits.” Vladimir not only sources several knowledgeable representatives in the field of hospitality and tourism, but he also links elements as disparate as real estate, car rental, cruise and airlines, travel agencies and traveler profiles to illustrate his points on marketing integration. In closing, Vladimir quotes the Honorable Donna Tuttle, Undersecretary of Commerce for Travel and Tourism, “Uniting the components of this industry in an effective marketing coalition that can compete on an equal footing with often publicly-owned foreign tourism conglomerates and multi-national consortia must be a high priority as the United States struggles to maintain and expand its share of a rapidly changing global market.”

Essays on Competition in the Pharmaceutical Industry

Chapter 1: Patents and Entry Competition in the Pharmaceutical Industry: The Role of Marketing Exclusivity Effective patent length for innovation drugs is severely curtailed because of extensive efficacy and safety tests required for FDA approval, raising concern over adequacy of incentives for new drug development. The Hatch-Waxman Act extends patent length for new drugs by five years, but also promotes generic entry by simplifying approval procedures and granting 180-day marketing exclusivity to a first generic entrant before the patent expires. In this paper we present a dynamic model to examine the effect of marketing exclusivity. We find that marketing exclusivity may be redundant and its removal may increase generic firms' profits and social welfare. Chapter 2: Why Authorized Generics?: Theoretical and Empirical Investigations Facing generic competition, the brand-name companies some-times launch generic versions themselves called authorized generics. This practice is puzzling. If it is cannibalization, it cannot be profitable. If it is divisionalization, it should be practiced always instead of sometimes. I explain this phenomenon in terms of switching costs in a model in which the incumbent first develops a customer base to ready itself against generic competition later. I show that only sufficiently low switching costs or large market size justifies launch of AGs. I then use prescription drug data to test those results and find support. Chapter 3: The Merger Paradox and R&D Oligopoly theory says that merger is unprofitable, unless a majority of firms in industry merge. Here, we introduce R&D opportunities to resolve this so-called merger paradox. We have three results. First, when there is one R&D firm, that firm can profitably merge with any number of non-R&D firms. Second, with multiple R&D firms and multiple non-R&D firms, all R&D firms can profitably merge. Third, with two R&D firms and two non-R&D firms, each R&D firms prefer to merge with a non-R&D firm. With three or more than non-R&D firms, however, the R&D firms prefer to merge with each other.

Essays on competition in the pharmaceutical industry

Chapter 1: Patents and Entry Competition in the Pharmaceutical Industry: The Role of Marketing Exclusivity. Effective patent length for innovation drugs is severely curtailed because of extensive efficacy and safety tests required for FDA approval, raising concern over adequacy of incentives for new drug development. The Hatch-Waxman Act extends patent length for new drugs by five years, but also promotes generic entry by simplifying approval procedures and granting 180-day marketing exclusivity to a first generic entrant before the patent expires. In this paper we present a dynamic model to examine the effect of marketing exclusivity. We find that marketing exclusivity may be redundant and its removal may increase generic firms' profits and social welfare. ^ Chapter 2: Why Authorized Generics?: Theoretical and Empirical Investigations Facing generic competition, the brand-name companies some-times launch generic versions themselves called authorized generics. This practice is puzzling. If it is cannibalization, it cannot be profitable. If it is divisionalization, it should be practiced always instead of sometimes. I explain this phenomenon in terms of switching costs in a model in which the incumbent first develops a customer base to ready itself against generic competition later. I show that only sufficiently low switching costs or large market size justifies launch of AGs. I then use prescription drug data to test those results and find support. ^ Chapter 3: The Merger Paradox and R&D Oligopoly theory says that merger is unprofitable, unless a majority of firms in industry merge. Here, we introduce R&D opportunities to resolve this so-called merger paradox. We have three results. First, when there is one R&D firm, that firm can profitably merge with any number of non-R&D firms. Second, with multiple R&D firms and multiple non-R&D firms, all R&D firms can profitably merge. Third, with two R&D firms and two non-R&D firms, each R&D firms prefer to merge with a non-R&D firm. With three or more than non-R&D firms, however, the R&D firms prefer to merge with each other.^