Secondary stakeholders as agents of influence: Three essays on political risk, reputation, and multinational performance

Organizational researchers have recently taken an interest in the ways in which social movements, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and other secondary stakeholders attempt to influence corporate behavior. Scholars, however, have yet to carefully probe the link between secondary stakeholder legal action and target firm stock market performance. This is puzzling given the sharp rise in NGO-initiated civil lawsuits against corporations in recent years for alleged overseas human rights abuses and environmental misconduct. Furthermore, few studies have considered how such lawsuits impact a target firm’s intangible assets, namely its image and reputation. Structured in the form of three essays, this dissertation examined the antecedents and consequences of secondary stakeholder legal activism in both conceptual and empirical settings. ^ Essay One argued that conventional approaches to understanding political risk fail to account for the reputational risks to multinational enterprises (MNEs) posed by transnational networks of human rights NGOs employing litigation-based strategies. It offered a new framework for understanding this emerging challenge to multinational corporate activity. Essay Two empirically tested the relationship between the filing of human rights-related civil lawsuits and corporate stock market performance using an event study methodology and regression analysis. The statistical analysis performed showed that target firms experience a significant decline in share price upon filing and that both industry and nature of the lawsuit are significantly and negatively related to shareholder wealth. Essay Three drew upon social movement and social identity theories to develop and test a set of hypotheses on how secondary stakeholder groups select their targets for human rights-related civil lawsuits. The results of a logistic regression model offered support for the proposition that MNE targets are chosen based on both interest and identity factors. The results of these essays suggest that legal action initiated by secondary stakeholder groups is a new and salient threat to multinational business and that firms doing business in countries with weak political institutions should factor this into corporate planning and take steps to mitigate their exposure to such risks.^

Planning Buy-Sell Agreements In The Hospitality Industry

In the article - Planning Buy-Sell Agreements In The Hospitality Industry - by John M. Tarras, Assistant Professor, School of Hotel, Restaurant and Institutional Management at Michigan State University, the author initially observes: “The vast majority of hospitality firms (restaurants, hotels, etc.) would be considered closely-held corporations. As such, they have unique planning problems compared to large, publicly-traded hospitality firms. One area of special concern to the closely-held hospitality firm is the planning and adoption of a buy-sell agreement.” The above thesis statement outlines the heart of the article; the buy-sell agreement in regard to smaller [closely held, as Tarras calls them] corporations. The theory is narrow and pro-active, spanning the gap between personal-to-corporate stock manipulations. “The primary purpose of a buy-sell agreement is to contribute to the orderly transfer of a shareholder's stock in a hospitality firm upon some future incident [typically retirement, withdrawal of a shareholder, disability, or death], as Tarras defines the concept. “The hospitality firm or the other shareholders would be committed to purchase the departing shareholder's stock at an agreed upon price and method, and to ensure that ample cash will be obtainable for such an impending sale. The buy-sell agreement provides a market for the shareholder or the shareholder's estate for the sale of otherwise illiquid stock,” the author further provides as canons of buy-sell agreements. In defining the buy-sell agreement with restrictive clauses, Tarras demonstrates, “…many closely-held hospitality firms desire to limit ownership to those individuals, either family or principal corporate employees, who are essential to the well-being of the firm.” Tarras says, another element of the buy-sell agreement is to furnish the departing shareholder with liquidity. “…there typically is some form of cash down payment with the remainder denoted by an interest-bearing promissory note [usually 5 to 15 years],” he informs. “The departing shareholders may require that the hospitality firm pledge the assets of the firm and that the remaining shareholders personally guarantee the promissory note.” “…the most frequent reason for establishing buy-sell agreements is for estate planning purposes,” Tarras says. There are tax advantages and liabilities for both the seller and buyer of stock via the buy-sell agreement, and the author enumerates many of these. One, big advantage of the buy-sell agreement is that it provides for the running of the company with a minimum of disruption through the stock-cash transition process, Tarras offers.

Strategic Planning: Implications and Applications for Line Managers

Strategic planning is the key to producing a realistic, attractive rate of growth and a respectable return on investment. The author analyzes the steps in the planning process and looks at the environmental and cultural values which influence the strategic planner in his/her work.