Social service provision, efficiency labor and economic development

This dissertation provides a theory of the effects and determinants of an economy's level of social services. The dissertation focuses on how the provision of social services will affect the effort decisions of workers, which will ultimately determine the economy's level of output. A worker decides on how much effort to contribute in relation to the level of social services he/she receives. The higher the level of social services received, the lower the cost—disutility—from providing effort will be. The government provides public infrastructure and social services (i.e. health services) in accordance with the economy's endowment of effort. In doing so, the government takes the aggregate effort endowment as given. Since, with higher individual work effort the higher the economy's total level of effort, failure by workers to coordinate effort levels will result in possible instances of low effort, low social services and low output; and, other instances of high effort, high social services and high output. Therefore, this dissertation predicts that in the context of social services, coordination failures in effort levels can lead to development traps. ^

Essays on the political economy of the Dominican reform process

This dissertation provides an analytical framework to study the political economy of policy reform in the Dominican Republic during the nineties. Based on a country study, I develop two theoretical models that replicate the mechanisms of policy approval in developing countries with weak democracies. The first model considers a pro-reform President who submits a tariff bill to an anti-reform Congress dominated by the opposition party. In between, two opposing lobbies try to get their favored policy approved. Lobbies act as Stackelberg leaders vis a vis a weak President. The behavior of the Congress is determined exogenously while the lobbies act strategically pursuing the approval of the reform bill and indirectly affecting the President's decision. I show that in such a setting external agents like the Press play an important role in the decision-making process of the political actors. ^ The second model presents a similar framework. However, the President, who is a Stackelberg leader, is allowed only two choices, total reform or status-quo. I show how a lobby reacts to an increase in its rival's or its own size. These reactions depend on the President's level of commitment to the reform. Finally, I discuss the effect of variations in the size of the lobbies on the President's choice. The model suitably explains real events that took place in the Dominican Republic in the mid-nineties. ^

Three essays on trade and investment

From H. G. Johnson's work (Review of Economic Studies, 1953–54) on tariff retaliation, the questions of whether a country can win a “tariff war” and how or even the broader question of what will affect a country's strategic position in setting bilateral tariff have been tackled in various situations. Although it is widely accepted that a country will have strategic advantages in winning the tariff war if its relative monopoly power is sufficiently large, it is unclear what are the forces behind such power formation. The goal of this research is to provide a unified framework and discuss various forces such as relative country size, absolute advantages and relative advantages simultaneously. In a two-country continuum-of-commodity neoclassical trade model, it is shown that sufficiently large relative country size is a sufficient condition for a country to choose a non-cooperative tariff Nash equilibrium over free trade. It is also shown that technology disparities such as absolute advantage, rate of technology disparity and the distribution of the technology disparity all contribute to a country's strategic position and interact with country size. ^ Leverage effect is usually used to explain the phenomenon of asymmetric volatility in equity returns. However, leverage itself can only account for parts of the asymmetry. In this research, it is shown that stock return volatility is related to firms’ financial status. Financially constrained firms tend to be more sensitive to the return changes. Financial constraint factor explains why some firms tend to be more volatile than others. I found that the financial constraint factor explains the stock return volatility independent of other factors such as firm size, industry affiliation and leverage. Firms’ industry affiliations are shown to be very weak in differentiating volatility. Firm size is proven to be a good factor in distinguishing the different levels of volatility and volatility-return sensitivity. Leverage hypothesis is also partly corroborated and the situation where leverage effect is not applicable is discussed. Finally, I examined the macroeconomic policy's effects on overall market volatility. ^

Essays on the determinants of private investment: The effects of relative price uncertainty and political instability

The objective of this study was to provide empirical evidence on the effects of relative price uncertainty and political instability on private investment. My effort is expressed in a single-equation model using macroeconomic and socio-political data from eight Latin American countries for the period 1970–1996. Relative price uncertainty is measured by the implied volatility of the exchange rate and political instability is measured by using indicators of social unrest and political violence. ^ I found that, after controlling for other variables, relative price uncertainty and political instability are negatively associated with private investment. Macroeconomic and political stability are key ingredients for the achievement of a strong investment response. This highlights the need to develop the state and build a civil society in which citizens can participate in decision-making and express consent without generating social turmoil. At the same time the government needs to implement structural policies along with relative price adjustments to eliminate excess volatility in price movements in order to provide a stable environment for investment. ^

Essays on international macroeconomics and conflict analysis

This dissertation addressed two broad problems in international macroeconomics and conflict analysis. The first problem in the first chapter looked at the behavior of exchange rate and its interaction with industry-level tradable goods prices for three countries, USA, UK and Japan. This question has important monetary policy implications. Here, I computed to what extent changes in exchange rate affected prices of consumer, producer, and export goods. I also studied the timing of these changes in these prices. My results, based on thirty-four industrial prices for USA, UK and Japan, supported the view that changes in exchange rates significantly affect prices of industrial and consumer goods. It also provided an insight to the underlying economic process that led to changes in relative prices. ^ In the second chapter, I explored the predictability of future inflation by incorporating shocks to exchange rates and clearly specified the transmission mechanisms that link exchange rates to industry-level consumer and producer prices. Employing a variety of linear and state-of-the-art nonlinear models, I also predicted growth rates of future prices. Comparing levels of inflation obtained from the above approaches showed superiority of the structural model incorporating the exchange rate pass-through effect. ^ The second broad issue addressed in the third chapter of the dissertation investigated the economic motives for conflict, manifested by rebellion and civil war for seventeen Latin American countries. Based on the analytical framework of Garfinkel, Skaperdas and Syropoulos (2004), I employed ordinal regressions and Markov switching for a panel of seventeen countries to identify trade and openness factors responsible for conflict occurrence and intensity. The results suggested that increased trade openness reduced high intensity domestic conflicts but overdependence on agricultural exports, along with a lack of income earning opportunities lead to more conflicts. Thereafter, using the Cox Proportional Hazard model I studied “conflict duration” and found that over-reliance on agricultural exports explained a major part of the length of conflicts in addition to various socio-political factors. ^

The effects of intellectual property rights on knowledge spillovers and innovation: An empirical investigation

FDI is believed to be a conduit of new technologies between countries. The first chapter of this dissertation studies the advantages of outward FDI for the home country of multinationals conducting research and development abroad. We use patent citations as a proxy for technology spillovers and we bring empirical evidence that supports the hypothesis that a U.S. subsidiary conducting research and development overseas facilitates the flow of knowledge between its host and home countries.^ The second chapter examines the impact of intellectual property rights (IPR) reforms on the technology flows between the U.S. and host countries of U.S. affiliates. We again use patent citations to examine whether the diffusion of new technology between the host countries and the U.S. is accelerated by the reforms. Our results suggest that the reforms favor innovative efforts of domestic firms in the reforming countries rather than U.S. affiliates efforts. In other words, reforms mediate the technology flows from the U.S. to the reforming countries.^ The third chapter deals with another form of IPR, open source (OS) licenses. These differ in the conditions under which licensors and OS contributors are allowed to modify and redistribute the source code. We measure OS project quality by the speed with which programming bugs are fixed and test whether the license chosen by project leaders influences bug resolution rates. In initial regressions, we find a strong correlation between the hazard of bug resolution and the use of highly restrictive licenses. However, license choices are likely to be endogenous. We instrument license choice using (i) the human language in which contributors operate and (ii) the license choice of the project leaders for a previous project. We then find weak evidence that restrictive licenses adversely affect project success.^

The political economy of poverty alleviation strategies. The initiative for heavily indebted poor countries in Bolivia: More of the same

In the year 2000, approximately 1.1 billion people lived in extreme poverty while developed countries spent US$600 billion a year on defense. The Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) Initiative is a recent component of a larger poverty reduction strategy supported by the International Financial Institutions, as well as many developed and developing countries. By implementing lessons of the past fifty years, this program attempts to diminish misery around the globe. As such, it provides debt relief while seeking to enable the poorest countries to simultaneously attain sustainable debt and promote human development. Interest in poverty reduction around the globe reemerged in the 1990s. This study contributes directly to this recent effort by presenting a nuanced approach that builds on the stepping-stones generated by other poverty scholars. To fulfill its goal, this investigation applies a political economy framework. Within this framework, the author conducts an actor-specific analysis. This dissertation addresses the following question: How do domestic and international actors respond to the implementation of poverty alleviation strategies? The author assumes actors desire to maximize their utility calculation and suggests these calculations are based on the player's motivations and external influences. Based on their motivations, the external influences, and the initiative's guidelines, each actor develops a set of expectations. To fulfill those expectations, stake holders utilize one or several strategies. Finally, the actors' ability to achieve their expectations determines each player's assessment of the initiative. The framework described is applied in an in-depth, actor-specific analysis of the HIPC in Bolivia. Bolivia's National Revolution represents the country's first attempt at reducing poverty. Since then, all governments have taken specific steps to combat poverty at the local and national levels. The Initiative for Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) is one of the most recent macro strategies of this kind. The case study demonstrated that three factors (national ownership, effective sponsorship and the local context) determine the success levels of poverty reduction strategies from abroad. In addition, the investigation clearly shows that poverty reduction is not the sole motivation in the implementation of poverty alleviation strategies. All actors, however, share the dream of poverty reduction.

Essays on firm behavior and firm performance

This dissertation comprises three individual chapters in an effort to examine different explanatory variables that affect firm performance. Chapter Two proposes an additional determinant of firm survival. Based on a detailed examination of firm survival in the British automobile industry between 1895 and 1970, we conclude that a firm's selection of submarket (defined by quality level) influenced survival. In contrast to findings for the US automobile industry, there is no evidence of first-mover advantage in the market as a whole. However, we do find evidence of first-mover advantage after conditioning on submarket choice. Chapter Three examines the effects of product line expansion on firm performance in terms of survival time. Based on a detailed examination of firm survival time in the British automobile industry between 1895 and 1970, we find that diversification exerts a positive effect on firm survival. Furthermore, our findings support the literature with respect to the impacts of submarket types, pre-entry experience, and timing of entry on firm survival time. Chapter Four examines corporate diversification in U.S. manufacturing and service firms. We develop measures of how related a firm's diverse activities are using input-output data and the NAILS classification to construct indexes of "vertical relatedness" and "complementarity". Strong relationships between these two measures are found. We utilize profitability and excess value as the measure for firm performance. Econometric analysis reveals that there is no relationship between the degree of relatedness of diversification and firm performance for the study period.

Essays on the selection of securities: Decision on acquisition and issuance perspectives and decision rules

This dissertation is a discourse on the capital market and its interactive framework of acquisition and issuance of financial assets that drive the economy from both sides—investors/lenders and issuers/users of capital assets. My work consists of four essays in financial economics that offer a spectrum of revisions to this significant area of study. The first essay is a delineation of the capital market over the past half a century and major developments on capital markets on issues that pertain to the investor's opportunity set and the corporation's capital-raising availability set. This chapter should have merits on two counts: (i) a comprehensive account of capital markets and return-generating assets and (ii) a backdrop against which I present my findings in Chapters 2 through 4. ^ In Chapter 2, I rework on the Markowitz-Roy-Tobin structure of the efficient frontier and of the Separation Theorem. Starting off with a 2-asset portfolio and extending the paradigm to an n-asset portfolio, I bring out the optimal choice of assets for an investor under constrained utility maximization. In this chapter, I analyze the selection and revision-theoretic construct and bring out optimum choices. The effect of a change in perceived risk or return in the mind of an investor is ascertained on the portfolio composition. ^ Chapter 3 takes a look into corporations that issue market securities. The question of how a corporation decides what kinds of securities it should issue in the marketplace to raise funds brings out the classic value invariance proposition of Modigliani and Miller and fills the gap that existed in the literature for almost half a century. I question the general validity in the classic results of Modigliani and Miller and modify the existing literature on the celebrated value invariance proposition. ^ Chapter 4 takes the Modigliani-Miller regime to its correct prescription in the presence of corporate and personal taxes. I show that Modigliani-Miller's age-old proposition needs corrections and extensions, which I derive. ^ My dissertation overall brings all of these corrections and extensions to the existing literature as my findings, showing that capital markets are in an ever-changing state of necessary revision. ^

The political economy of inequality and growth: Essays on sovereign debt, democracy and saving

This dissertation addresses three issues in the political economy of growth literature. The first study empirically tests the hypothesis that income inequality influences the size of a country's sovereign debt for a sample of developing countries for the period 1970–1990. The argument examined is that governments tend to yield to popular pressures to engage in redistributive policies, partially financed by foreign borrowing. Facing increased risk of default, international creditors limit the credit they extend, with the result that borrowing countries invest less and grow at a slower pace. The findings do not seem to support the negative relationship between inequality and sovereign debt, as there is evidence of increases in multilateral, countercyclical flows until the mid 1980s in Latin America. The hypothesis would hold for the period 1983–1990. Debt flows and levels seem to be positively correlated with growth as expected. ^ The second study empirically investigates the hypothesis that pronounced levels of inequality lead to unconsolidated democracies. We test the existence of a nonmonotonic relationship between inequality and democracy for a sample of Latin American countries for the period 1970–2000, where democracy appears to consolidate at some intermediate level of inequality. We find that the nonmonotonic relationship holds using instrumental variables methods. Bolivia seems to be a case of unconsolidated democracy. The positive relationship between per capita income and democracy disappears once fixed effects are introduced. ^ The third study explores the nonlinear relationship between per capita income and private saving levels in Latin America. Several estimation methods are presented; however, only the estimation of a dynamic specification through a state-of-the-art general method of moments estimator yields consistent estimates with increased efficiency. Results support the hypothesis that income positively affects private saving, while system GMM reveals nonlinear effects at income levels that exceed the ones included in this sample for the period 1960–1994. We also find that growth, government dissaving, and tightening of credit constraints have a highly significant and positive effect on private saving. ^

Essays in environmental economic valuation and decision making in the presence of an environmental disaster

The first essay developed a respondent model of Bayesian updating for a double-bound dichotomous choice (DB-DC) contingent valuation methodology. I demonstrated by way of data simulations that current DB-DC identifications of true willingness-to-pay (WTP) may often fail given this respondent Bayesian updating context. Further simulations demonstrated that a simple extension of current DB-DC identifications derived explicitly from the Bayesian updating behavioral model can correct for much of the WTP bias. Additional results provided caution to viewing respondents as acting strategically toward the second bid. Finally, an empirical application confirmed the simulation outcomes. The second essay applied a hedonic property value model to a unique water quality (WQ) dataset for a year-round, urban, and coastal housing market in South Florida, and found evidence that various WQ measures affect waterfront housing prices in this setting. However, the results indicated that this relationship is not consistent across any of the six particular WQ variables used, and is furthermore dependent upon the specific descriptive statistic employed to represent the WQ measure in the empirical analysis. These results continue to underscore the need to better understand both the WQ measure and its statistical form homebuyers use in making their purchase decision. The third essay addressed a limitation to existing hurricane evacuation modeling aspects by developing a dynamic model of hurricane evacuation behavior. A household's evacuation decision was framed as an optimal stopping problem where every potential evacuation time period prior to the actual hurricane landfall, the household's optimal choice is to either evacuate, or to wait one more time period for a revised hurricane forecast. A hypothetical two-period model of evacuation and a realistic multi-period model of evacuation that incorporates actual forecast and evacuation cost data for my designated Gulf of Mexico region were developed for the dynamic analysis. Results from the multi-period model were calibrated with existing evacuation timing data from a number of hurricanes. Given the calibrated dynamic framework, a number of policy questions that plausibly affect the timing of household evacuations were analyzed, and a deeper understanding of existing empirical outcomes in regard to the timing of the evacuation decision was achieved.

Essays in open economy macroeconomics

Research macroeconomists have witnessed remarkable methodological developments in mathematical, statistical, and computational tools during the last two decades. The three essays in this dissertation took advantage of these advances to analyze important macroeconomic issues. ^ The first essay, “ Habit Formation, Adjustments Costs, and International Business Cycle Puzzles” analyzes the extent to which incorporating habit formation and adjustment costs in investment in a one-good two-country general equilibrium model would help overcome some of the international business cycle puzzles. Unlike standard results in the literature, the model generates persistent, cyclical adjustment paths in response to shocks. It also yields positive cross-country correlations in consumption, employment, investment, and output. Cross-country correlations in output are higher than the ones in consumption. This is qualitatively consistent with the stylized facts. These results are particularly striking given the predicted negative correlations in investment, employment, and output that are typically found in the literature. ^ The second essay, “Comparison Utility, Endogenous Time Preference, and Economic Growth,” uses World War II as a natural experiment to analyze the degree to which a model where consumers' preferences exhibit comparison-based utility and endogenous discounting is able to improve upon existing models in mimicking the transitional dynamics of an economy after a shock that destroys part of its capital stock. The model outperforms existing ones in replicating the behavior of the saving rate (both on impact and along the transient paths) after this historical event. This result brings additional support to the endogenous rate of time preference being a crucial element in growth models. ^ The last essay, “Monetary Policy under Fear of Floating: Modeling the Dominican Economy,” presents a small scale macroeconomic model for a country (Dominican Republic) characterized by a strong presence of fear of floating (reluctance to have a flexible exchange rate regime) in the conduct of monetary policy. The dynamic responses of this economy to external shocks that are of interest for monetary policy purposes are analyzed under two alternative interest rate policy rules: One being the standard Taylor rule and another that responds explicitly to deviations of the exchange rate with respect to its long-term trend. ^

Essays on political economy

The first chapter analizes conditional assistance programs. They generate conflicting relationships between international financial institutions (IFIs) and member countries. The experience of IFIs with conditionality in the 1990s led them to allow countries more latitude in the design of their reform programs. A reformist government does not need conditionality and it is useless if it does not want to reform. A government that faces opposition may use conditionality and the help of pro-reform lobbies as a lever to counteract anti-reform groups and succeed in implementing reforms.^ The second chapter analizes economies saddled with taxes and regulations. I consider an economy in which many taxes, subsidies, and other distortionary restrictions are in place simultaneously. If I start from an inefficient laissez-faire equilibrium because of some domestic distortion, a small trade tax or subsidy can yield a first-order welfare improvement, even if the instrument itself creates distortions of its own. This may result in "welfare paradoxes". The purpose of the chapter is to quantify the welfare effects of changes in tax rates in a small open economy. I conduct the simulation in the context of an intertemporal utility maximization framework. I apply numerical methods to the model developed by Karayalcin. I introduce changes in the tax rates and quantify both the impact on welfare, consumption and foreign assets, and the path to the new steady-state values.^ The third chapter studies the role of stock markets and adjustment costs in the international transmission of supply shocks. The analysis of the transmission of a positive supply shock that originates in one of the countries shows that on impact the shock leads to an inmediate stock market boom enjoying the technological advance, while the other country suffers from depress stock market prices as demand for its equity declines. A period of adjustment begins culminating in a steady state capital and output level that is identical to the one before the shock. The the capital stock of one country undergoes a non-monotonic adjustment. The model is tested with plausible values of the variables and the numeric results confirm the predictions of the theory.^

Three essays on labor liberalization and its effects on world economy

This dissertation consists of three theoretical essays on immigration, international trade and political economy. The first two essays analyze the political economy of immigration in developed countries. The third essay explores new ground on the effects of labor liberalization in developing countries. Trade economists have witnessed remarkable methodological developments in mathematical and game theoretical models during the last seventy years. This dissertation benefits from these advances to analyze economic issues related to immigration. The first essay applies a long run general equilibrium trade model similar to Krugman (1980), and blends it with the median voter ala-Mayer (1984) framework. The second essay uses a short run general equilibrium specific factor trade model similar to Jones (1975) and incorporates it with the median voter model similar to Benhabib (1997). The third essay employs a five stage game theoretical approach similar to Vogel (2007) and solves it by the method of backward induction. The first essay shows that labor liberalization is more likely to come about in societies that have more taste for varieties, and that workers and capital owners could share the same positive stance toward labor liberalization. In a dynamic model, it demonstrates that the median voter is willing to accept fewer immigrants in the first period in order to preserve her domestic political influence in the second period threatened by the naturalization of these immigrants. The second essay shows that the liberalization of labor depends on the host country's stock and distribution of capital, and the number of groups of skilled workers within each country. I demonstrate that the more types of goods both countries produce, the more liberal the host country is toward immigration. The third essay proposes a theory of free movement of goods and labor between two economies with imperfect labor contracts. The heart of my analysis lies in the determinants of talent development where individuals' decisions to emigrate are related to the fixed costs of emigration. Finally, free trade and labor affect income via an indirect effect on individuals' incentives to invest in the skill levels and a direct effect on the prices of goods.

Structure of international cooperation in trade, investment and environment

This dissertation analyzes the obstacles against further cooperation in international economic relations. The first essay explains the gradual nature of trade liberalization. I show that existence of asymmetric information between governments provides a sufficient reason for gradualism to exist. Governments prefer starting small to reduce the cost of partner’s betrayal when there is sufficient degree of information asymmetry regarding the partner’s type. Learning about partner’s incentive structure enhances expectations, encouraging governments to increase their current level of cooperation. Specifically, the uninformed government’s subjective belief for the trading partner being good is improved as the partner acts cooperatively. This updated belief, in turn, lowers the subjective probability of future betrayal, enabling further progress in cooperation. The second essay analyzes the relationship between two countries facing two policy dilemmas in an environment with two way goods and capital flows. When issues are independent and countries are symmetric, signing separate agreements for tariffs (Free Trade Agreements-FTA) and for taxes (Tax Treaties-TT) provides the identical level of enforcement as signing a linked agreement. However, linkage can still improve the joint welfare by transferring the slack enforcement power in a case of asymmetric issues or countries. I report non-results in two cases where the policy issues are interconnected due to technological spillover effect of FDI. Moreover, I show that linking the agreements actually reduces enforcement when agreements are linked under a limited punishment rule and policy variables are strategic substitutes. The third essay investigates the welfare/enforcement consequences of linking trade and environmental agreements. In the standard literature, linking the agreements generate non-trivial results only when there is structural relation between the issues. I focus on institutional design of the linkage and show that even if environmental aspects of international trade are negligible linking the agreements might still have some interesting welfare implications under current GATT Rules. Specifically, when traded goods are substitutes in consumption, linking the environmental agreement with trade agreement under the Withdrawal of Equivalent Concession Rule (Article XXVIII) will reduce the enforcement. However, enforcement in environmental issue increases when the same rule is implemented in the absence of linkage.