A kiskereskedelmi stratégiai szövetségek hatása a kiskereskedelmi marketing tevékenységére és teljesítményére = Effects of the retail strategic alliances to the retailers' marketing activity and performance

A kilencvenes évek második felétől egyre jelentősebb szerepet játszanak a vállalatközi együttműködések, hosszabb távú kooperációk a hazai élelmiszer- és napi cikk kiskereskedelemben. A társulások szintjén a piaci siker egyértelmű, amely jól nyomon követhető az évente megjelenő kiskereskedői rangsorokban. A cikk viszont a tagkereskedők szemszögéből vizsgálja a kérdést, vajon a társuláshoz való csatlakozás ténylegesen javítja-e a kiskereskedő teljesítményét és milyen dimenziókon keresztül. _____________ From the second half of the ’90s the strategic alliances, the long term cooperations have been increasingly role in the domestic food and FMCG retail. On the level of the alliances the market success has been obvious, which has well presented in the annual retail rankings. The article examines the issue from the retailers’ point of view: whether the accession to the alliance has effectively improved the retalier’s performance and which dimensions through.

The Role of Price Floor in a Differentiated Product Retail Market

The ability of a manufacturer to enhance competition among its retailers by imposing a price floor was recently introduced in the literature. The purpose of this article is to revisit this anti-collusive explanation of the retail price maintenance in a more general model in which we introduce asymmetric retailers. We find that a manufacturer can amplify the retail market’s competition by imposing a price foor when retailers sell differentiated products. This result contradicts the prevailing concept of retail price maintenance.

Exclusive contracts in bilaterally duopolistic industries

The purpose of this article is to analyze the incentives of manufacturers to deal exclusively with retailers in bilaterally duopolistic industries with brand differentiation by manufacturers. With highly differentiated products exclusive contracts are shown to generate higher profits for manufacturers and retailers, who thus have an incentive to insist on exclusive contracting. However, if the products are close substitutes no exclusivity will emerge in equilibrium.

Strategic options of firms considering private label production

Private labels are a growing phenomenon globaly. Retailers become stronger and stronger by offering their own quality private label product for customers in all segments. Certainly they do not open factories to produce these items but rather search for dedicated private label producers or pressure branded goods manufacturers to produce it for them. The article deals with the strategic choices manufacturers can have and suggest the necessary factors that need to be evaluated to decide on the winning business model- in considering wether or not to enter in private label production- through literature and a case study on the ice cream market in Hungary.

Exclusive contracts with vertically differentiated products

In this paper we develop a simple model to analyze the effects of exclusive contracts in vertically integrated markets where both the upstream and the downstream market are characterized as oligopolies and manufacturers produce vertically differentiated products. We find that firms prefer to deal exclusively with retailers. If the extent of consumers' heterogeneity is small, manufacturers offer exclusive contracts unilaterally. On the other hand, if consumers' valuations differ significantly both manufacturers engage in exclusive contracting.

Értékteremtés e-kereskedelemmel – kitörési lehetőség a recesszió sújtotta magyar kiskereskedelemben? (Value creation of e-commerce – Chance to break out for the recession-hit Hungarian retail sector?)

Kimutatható-e az e-kereskedelem hatása a vállalati teljesítményre a recesszióval küzdő magyar kiskereskedelmi piacon? A hagyományos bolti értékesítés vagy on-line kereskedelem vezet hazánkban jobb pénzügyi teljesítményhez? Ezekre a kérdésekre a magyar IKT (infokommunikációs technológiai) kiskereskedők 187 elemű mintáján igyekeznek a szerzők választ keresni, az adatgyűjtést újszerű módon részben automatizált webpókokra bízva, következtetéseiket pedig elsősorban klaszterelemzési technikákra építve. Megállapítják, hogy bár a legjobb bolti kereskedők többnyire valamivel nagyobb és stabilabb profitrátákkal jellemezhetők a válság éveiben is, a piac megtartása és növelése terén már egyértelműen az e-kereskedők jeleskedtek. Eredményeik szerint az e-kereskedelem hozzásegítheti a kiskereskedőket a munkaerő-hatékonyság növeléséhez is, ám ha gyors rendelkezésre állással vagy alacsony árakkal csábítják vevőiket, akkor a profittöbblet egy részét felőrölheti a magasabb készlettartási igény vagy az árverseny. _____ The study examines whether e-commerce has a significant impact on corporate performance on the Hungarian retail market struggling with the effects of economic downturn. Is it brick-and-mortal retail or e-commerce that leads to a better financial performance? Using the innovative data gathering tools of automotive web crawlers the authors seek answers to these questions on a sample of 187 Hungarian ICT retailers. Based on cluster analysis they conclude that while the best traditional retailers have somewhat higher and more stable profitability ratios even during the years of recession, e-tailers are more successful in retaining and increasing their market share. E-commerce is also associated with higher human resource productivity, but the possible profit surplus originating from this advantage could be jeopardized in the long run as new electronic traders typically attract their customers by shorter service time or lower prices.

Exclusive contracts with private information in successive differentiated oligopolies

The purpose of this article is to analyze the incentives of manufacturers to deal exclusively with retailers in bilaterally duopolistic industries with brand differentiation by manufacturers. In contrast with the previous literature, exclusive contracts are shown to generate higher profits for manufacturers and retailers selling highly differentiated products, who thus have an incentive to insist on exclusive contracting. However, if the products are close substitutes no exclusivity will emerge in equilibrium. Furthermore, we show that exclusive contracts decrease both consumer and social welfare.