A note on the axiomatization of the Nash equilibrium correspondence

A new axiomatization of the Nash equilibrium correspondence for n-person games based on independence of irrelevant strategies is given. Using a flexible general model, it is proved that the Nash equilibrium correspondence is the only solution to satisfy the axioms of non-emptiness, weak one-person rationality, independence of irrelevant strategies and converse independence of irrelevant strategies on the class of subgames of a fixed finite n-person game which admit at least one Nash equilibrium. It is also shown that these axioms are logically independent.

The migration crisis: representation of a border conflict in Hungarian, German and Pan-European television new coverage

In this article we review the methods used by television news channels in their reporting of the clashes between the Hungarian police and refugees at the Serbian-Hungarian border on 16th of September 2015. With the help of content analysis we examine the techniques used by each editorial board to portray events differently,resulting in dissimilar effects on recipients. During the analysis we examine news coverage for one specific day as presented by Hungarian, German and pan-European broadcasters. German news programs were chosen for comparison with Hungarian ones due to the fact that most of the refugees were heading towards Germany. We conclude that there are significant differences between the information that was broadcast according to television channels; owner expectations presumably play an important role in this.