Why (and When) are Preferences Convex? Threshold Effects and Uncertain Quality

It is often assumed (for analytical convenience, but also in accordance with common intuition) that consumer preferences are convex. In this paper, we consider circumstances under which such preferences are (or are not) optimal. In particular, we investigate a setting in which goods possess some hidden quality with known distribution, and the consumer chooses a bundle of goods that maximizes the probability that he receives some threshold level of this quality. We show that if the threshold is small relative to consumption levels, preferences will tend to be convex; whereas the opposite holds if the threshold is large. Our theory helps explain a broad spectrum of economic behavior (including, in particular, certain common commercial advertising strategies), suggesting that sensitivity to information about thresholds is deeply rooted in human psychology.

Convex and exact games with non-transferable utility

We generalize exactness to games with non-transferable utility (NTU). A game is exact if for each coalition there is a core allocation on the boundary of its payoff set. Convex games with transferable utility are well-known to be exact. We consider ve generalizations of convexity in the NTU setting. We show that each of ordinal, coalition merge, individual merge and marginal convexity can be uni¯ed under NTU exactness. We provide an example of a cardinally convex game which is not NTU exact. Finally, we relate the classes of Π-balanced, totally Π-balanced, NTU exact, totally NTU exact, ordinally convex, cardinally convex, coalition merge convex, individual merge convex and marginal convex games to one another.

A Kullback-Leibler relatív entrópia függvény alkalmazása páros összehasonlítás mátrix egy prioritásvektora meghatározására (Applying the Kullback-Leibler relative entropy function for determining priorities for the pairwise comparison matrix)

A dolgozatban a döntéselméletben fontos szerepet játszó páros összehasonlítás mátrix prioritásvektorának meghatározására új megközelítést alkalmazunk. Az A páros összehasonlítás mátrix és a prioritásvektor által definiált B konzisztens mátrix közötti eltérést a Kullback-Leibler relatív entrópia-függvény segítségével mérjük. Ezen eltérés minimalizálása teljesen kitöltött mátrix esetében konvex programozási feladathoz vezet, nem teljesen kitöltött mátrix esetében pedig egy fixpont problémához. Az eltérésfüggvényt minimalizáló prioritásvektor egyben azzal a tulajdonsággal is rendelkezik, hogy az A mátrix elemeinek összege és a B mátrix elemeinek összege közötti különbség éppen az eltérésfüggvény minimumának az n-szerese, ahol n a feladat mérete. Így az eltérésfüggvény minimumának értéke két szempontból is lehet alkalmas az A mátrix inkonzisztenciájának a mérésére. _____ In this paper we apply a new approach for determining a priority vector for the pairwise comparison matrix which plays an important role in Decision Theory. The divergence between the pairwise comparison matrix A and the consistent matrix B defined by the priority vector is measured with the help of the Kullback-Leibler relative entropy function. The minimization of this divergence leads to a convex program in case of a complete matrix, leads to a fixed-point problem in case of an incomplete matrix. The priority vector minimizing the divergence also has the property that the difference of the sums of elements of the matrix A and the matrix B is n times the minimum of the divergence function where n is the dimension of the problem. Thus we developed two reasons for considering the value of the minimum of the divergence as a measure of inconsistency of the matrix A.

A cardinally convex game with empty core

In this note we present a cardinally convex game (Sharkey, 1981) with empty core. Sharkey assumes that V (N) is convex, we do not do so, hence we do not contradict Sharkey's result.