Debt Restructuring in the Euro Area: a Necessary but Manageable Evil?

There are two possible responses to the Greek debt crisis: ‘Plan A’, continued official lending, for as long as needed, with possible voluntary private sector involvement, and ‘Plan B’, coercive preemptive or post-default restructuring with significant face value reduction in privately-held debt. Both options have risks, but it is necessary to move to Plan B sooner or later. The impact on Greece could be mitigated by foreign bank ownership and proper liquidity support measures. The direct spillover impact on the rest of the euro area seems small. But there is the risk of contagion, which is a serious concern. There is a cautious case for delaying somewhat Plan B in order to prepare for it.

A hazai kis- és közepes vállalatok szociokulturális beállítódása a hofstede-dimenziók mentén = The socio-cultural attitudes of the Hungarianc small and medium enterprises along the Hofstede dimensions

A kis- és közepes vállalkozások (KKV-k) kutatása viszonylag új, és emiatt meglehetősen feltáratlan terület, bár a megjelenő tudományos cikkek és eredmények száma és minősége évről évre jól érzékelhetően nő (Collinson – Shaw, 2001). A KKV-kutatások igen fontos sajátossága továbbá, hogy kifejezetten interdiszciplináris terület, megközelíthető a menedzsment, az innovációkutatás, a marketing, a szervezetszociológia, de akár a pszichológia felől is. Több kutatás is felveti a szociokulturális háttér jelentőségének kérdését KKV-k esetében. A szerzők kutatásuk során kvantitatív felmérést végeztek 200 vállalkozó körében a Hofstedeskála (Hofmeister et al., 2008) felhasználásával, melynek eredményeként kiderült, hogy a KKV-vezetők beállítódása jelentősen különbözik mind a hazai nagyvállalati vezetőktől, mind az általános lakosságtól. Jelen tanulmányunkban bemutatjuk azokat a Hofstede-dimenziókat, amelyek mentén karakteres különbségek jelentkeztek a vállalkozók és a nagyvállalati vezetők, valamint a társadalom összessége között. Az eredmények alapján határozottan kirajzolódnak olyan „vállalkozói” gondolkodásmódbeli sajátosságok, mint a nagyobb versenyszellem, a közvetlenebb, kevésbé hierarchikus működési stílus, a rendkívül erős, rövid távú orientáció, valamint a kockázatvállalás rendhagyóan alacsony foka. _____ Although there has been an increasing academic attention towards small and medium-sized enterprises, it is still a novel research area with a number of unanswered questions. It is also an especially interdisciplinary field as it can be approached from various viewpoints such as management, innovation, marketing, organization sociology or even psychology. Different academic disciplines have studied the influence of socio-cultural factors and concluded that they are relevant aspects of entrepreneurial activity. This paper presents the results of the authors’ quantitative research which aimed at finding patterns in the software of the minds of SME managers where they applied Hofstede’s cultural scale (Hofmeister et al., 2008). Drawing upon data from 200 Hungarian SMEs, the results indicate they have different attitude and way of thinking compared to large company managers and to the general Hungarian population. This paper points out the relevant Hofstede dimensions where significant differences have been revealed. The main finding of the study is that managers of small and medium businesses have a special mindset which can be characterized with higher level competitiveness, more direct and less hierarchic operation, extremely high level of short term orientation and low level of risk taking

The Euro Area's Tightrope Walk: Debt and Competitiveness in Italy and Spain

- Competitiveness adjustment in struggling southern euro-area members requires persistently lower inflation than in major trading partners, but low inflation worsens public debt sustainability. When average euro-area inflation undershoots the two percent target, the conflict between intra-euro relative price adjustment and debt sustainability is more severe. - In our baseline scenario, the projected public debt ratio reduction in Italy and Spain is too slow and does not meet the European fiscal rule. Debt projections are very sensitive to underlying assumptions and even small negative deviations from GDP growth, inflation and budget surplus assumptions can easily result in a runaway debt trajectory. - The case for a greater than five percent of GDP primary budget surplus is very weak. Beyond vitally important structural reforms, the top priority is to ensure that euro-area inflation does not undershoot the two percent target, which requires national policy actions and more accommodative monetary policy. The latter would weaken the euro exchange rate, thereby facilitating further intra-euro adjustment. More effective policies are needed to foster growth. But if all else fails, the European Central Bank’s Outright Monetary Transactions could reduce borrowing costs.

Should non-euro area countries join the single supervisory mechanism?

Highlights - Irrespective of the euro crisis, a European banking union makes sense, including for non-euro area countries, because of the extent of European Union financial integration. The Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM) is the first element of the banking union. - From the point of view of non-euro countries, the draft SSM regulation as amended by the EU Council includes strong safeguards relating to decision-making, accountability, attention to financial stability in small countries and the applicability of national macro-prudential measures. Non-euro countries will also have the right to leave the SSM and thereby exempt themselves from a supervisory decision. - The SSM by itself cannot bring the full benefits of the banking union, but would foster financial integration, improve the supervision of cross-border banks, ensure greater consistency of supervisory practices, increase the quality of supervision, avoid competitive distortions and provide ample supervisory information. - While the decision to join the SSM is made difficult by the uncertainty about other elements of the banking union, including the possible burden sharing, we conclude that non-euro EU members should stand ready to join the SSM and be prepared for the negotiations of the other elements of the banking union.