An examination of the relationship of governance structure and performance: Evidence from banking companies in Bangladesh

Corporate governance has become increasingly important in developed and developing countries just after a series of corporate scandals and failures in a number of countries. Corporate governance structure is often viewed as a means of corporate success despite prior studies reveal mixed, somewhere conflicting and ambiguous, and somewhere no relationship between governance structure and performance. This study empirically investigates the relationship between corporate governance mechanisms and financial performance of listed banking companies in Bangladesh by using two multiple regression models. The study reveals that a good number of companies do not comply with the regulatory requirements indicating remarkable shortfall in corporate governance practice. The companies are run by the professional managers having no duality and no ownership interest for which they are compensated by high remuneration to curb agency conflict. Apart from some inconsistent relationship between some corporate variables, the corporate governance mechanisms do not appear to have significant relationship with financial performances. The findings reveal an insignificant negative impact or somewhere no impact of independent directors and non-independent non-executive directors on the level of performance that strongly support the concept that the managers are essentially worthy of trust and earn returns for the owners as claimed by stewardship theory. The study provides support for the view that while much emphasis on corporate governance mechanisms is necessary to safeguard the interest of stakeholders; corporate governance on its own, as a set of codes or standards for corporate conformance, cannot make a company successful. Companies need to balance corporate governance mechanisms with performance by adopting strategic decision and risk management with the efficient utilization of the organization’s resources.

Banking Contagion under Different Exchange Rate Regimes in CEE

The global crisis of 2008 caused both liquidity shortage and increasing insolvency in the banking system. The study focuses on credit default contagion in the Central and Eastern European (CEE) region, which originated in bank runs generated by non-performing loans granted to non-financial clients. In terms of methodology, the paper relies on one hand on review of the literature, and on the other hand on a data survey with comparative and regression analysis. To uncover credit default contagion, the research focuses on the combined impact of foreign exchange rates and foreign private indebtedness.

Banking Contagion under Different Exchange Rate Regimes in CEE

The global crisis of 2008 caused both liquidity shortage and increasing insolvency in the banking system. The study focuses on credit default contagion in the Central and Eastern European (CEE) region, which originated in bank runs generated by non-performing loans granted to non-financial clients. In terms of methodology, the paper relies on one hand on review of the literature, and on the other hand on a data survey with comparative and regression analysis. To uncover credit default contagion, the research focuses on the combined impact of foreign exchange rates and foreign private indebtedness.

Should non-euro area countries join the single supervisory mechanism?

Highlights - Irrespective of the euro crisis, a European banking union makes sense, including for non-euro area countries, because of the extent of European Union financial integration. The Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM) is the first element of the banking union. - From the point of view of non-euro countries, the draft SSM regulation as amended by the EU Council includes strong safeguards relating to decision-making, accountability, attention to financial stability in small countries and the applicability of national macro-prudential measures. Non-euro countries will also have the right to leave the SSM and thereby exempt themselves from a supervisory decision. - The SSM by itself cannot bring the full benefits of the banking union, but would foster financial integration, improve the supervision of cross-border banks, ensure greater consistency of supervisory practices, increase the quality of supervision, avoid competitive distortions and provide ample supervisory information. - While the decision to join the SSM is made difficult by the uncertainty about other elements of the banking union, including the possible burden sharing, we conclude that non-euro EU members should stand ready to join the SSM and be prepared for the negotiations of the other elements of the banking union.