Trust and cooperation in buyer–seller relationships and networks. The co-evolution of structural balance and trust in iterated PD games

Our study has two aims: to elaborate theoretical frameworks and introduce social mechanisms of spontaneous co-operation in repeated buyer-seller relationships and to formulate hypotheses which can be empirically tested. The basis of our chain of ideas is the simple two-person Prisoner’s Dilemma game. On the one hand, its repeated variation can be applicable for the distinction of the analytical types of trust (iteration trust, strategy trust) in co-operations. On the other hand, it provides a chance to reveal those dyadic sympathy-antipathy relations, which make us understand the evolution of trust. Then we introduce the analysis of the more complicated (more than two-person) buyer-seller relationship. Firstly, we outline the possible role of the structural balancing mechanisms in forming trust in three-person buyer-seller relationships. Secondly, we put forward hypotheses to explain complex buyer-seller networks. In our research project we try to theoretically combine some of the simple concepts of game theory with certain ideas of the social-structural balance theory. Finally, it is followed by a short summary.

On Forchheimer's Model of Dominant Firm Price Leadership

We show that in a simple price-setting game with one large firm and many small firms the large firm does not accept the role of the price leader.

On the implementation of the L-Nash bargaining solution in two-person bargaining games

The “Nash program” initiated by Nash (Econometrica 21:128–140, 1953) is a research agenda aiming at representing every axiomatically determined cooperative solution to a game as a Nash outcome of a reasonable noncooperative bargaining game. The L-Nash solution first defined by Forgó (Interactive Decisions. Lecture Notes in Economics and Mathematical Systems, vol 229. Springer, Berlin, pp 1–15, 1983) is obtained as the limiting point of the Nash bargaining solution when the disagreement point goes to negative infinity in a fixed direction. In Forgó and Szidarovszky (Eur J Oper Res 147:108–116, 2003), the L-Nash solution was related to the solution of multiciteria decision making and two different axiomatizations of the L-Nash solution were also given in this context. In this paper, finite bounds are established for the penalty of disagreement in certain special two-person bargaining problems, making it possible to apply all the implementation models designed for Nash bargaining problems with a finite disagreement point to obtain the L-Nash solution as well. For another set of problems where this method does not work, a version of Rubinstein’s alternative offer game (Econometrica 50:97–109, 1982) is shown to asymptotically implement the L-Nash solution. If penalty is internalized as a decision variable of one of the players, then a modification of Howard’s game (J Econ Theory 56:142–159, 1992) also implements the L-Nash solution.

Type space on a purely measurable parameter space

Several game theoretical topics require the analysis of hierarchical beliefs, particularly in incomplete information situations. For the problem of incomplete information, Hars´anyi suggested the concept of the type space. Later Mertens & Zamir gave a construction of such a type space under topological assumptions imposed on the parameter space. The topological assumptions were weakened by Heifetz, and by Brandenburger & Dekel. In this paper we show that at very natural assumptions upon the structure of the beliefs, the universal type space does exist. We construct a universal type space, which employs purely a measurable parameter space structure.

Framing the Game: Objections to Bapat’s Game-Theoretic Modeling of the Afghan Surge

In a recently published article in the prestigious journal Foreign Policy Analysis, Navin A. Bapat uses a rationalist approach to explain key bargaining processes related to the Afghanistan conflict, concluding that “the Afghan mission may continue for political reasons until it is impossible to sustain militarily.” The article captures the essence of the strategic situation in Afghanistan: the losing dynamic involved. This brief commentary in response is an attempt to shed light on where the tenets of Bapat’s game-theoretic model may be erroneous, even while the model does produce conclusions that appear valid overall.

On axiomatizations of the Shapley value for assignment games

We consider the problem of axiomatizing the Shapley value on the class of assignment games. We first show that several axiomatizations of the Shapley value on the class of all TU-games do not characterize this solution on the class of assignment games by providing alternative solutions that satisfy these axioms. However, when considering an assignment game as a communication graph game where the game is simply the assignment game and the graph is a corresponding bipartite graph buyers are connected with sellers only, we show that Myerson's component efficiency and fairness axioms do characterize the Shapley value on the class of assignment games. Moreover, these two axioms have a natural interpretation for assignment games. Component efficiency yields submarket efficiency stating that the sum of the payoffs of all players in a submarket equals the worth of that submarket, where a submarket is a set of buyers and sellers such that all buyers in this set have zero valuation for the goods offered by the sellers outside the set, and all buyers outside the set have zero valuations for the goods offered by sellers inside the set. Fairness of the graph game solution boils down to valuation fairness stating that only changing the valuation of one particular buyer for the good offered by a particular seller changes the payoffs of this buyer and seller by the same amount.

On the completeness of the universal knowledge-belief space: A technical note

Meier (2008) shows that the universal knowledge-belief space exists. However, besides the universality there is an other important property might be imposed on knowledge- belief spaces, inherited also from type spaces, the completeness. In this paper we introduce the notion of complete knowledge-belief space, and demonstrate that the universal knowledge-belief space is not complete, that is, some subjective beliefs (probability measures) on the universal knowledge-belief space are not knowledge-belief types.

A marketingeszközök és –tevékenységek részvényesi értékre gyakorolt hatása (The effect of marketing assets and activities on shareholder value)

A vállalati marketing pénzügyi teljesítményre, különösen részvényesi értékre gyakorolt hatásának kimutatása mind fontosabbá válik a marketingráfordítások nagyságának növekedésével, valamint annak felismerésével, hogy a részvényesek számára vevői érték nélkül nem lehet hosszú távon értéket biztosítani, azonban kedvező piaci eredményekkel sem feltétlenül valósul meg a pénzügyi teljesítmény növekedése. A szerzők tanulmányukban a marketingeszközök és -tevékenységek részvényesi értékre gyakorolt hatását vizsgálják, rámutatnak arra, hogy milyen módon befolyásolhatják a részvényeseket megillető szabad pénzáramot, a tulajdonosi megtérülést, a stratégiai tervezési időhorizontot és a végértéket. A marketing néhány lehetséges negatív hatását is kiemelik. Ezt követően felvázolják a marketingjellegű beruházások reálopciós karakterisztikáit, valamint játékelméleti összefüggéseit dinamikusan változó környezetben. ________ Proving the effect of corporate marketing on financial performance, especially on shareholder value, becomes more and more important as marketing expenditures increase. Furthermore by the recognition that for shareholders without customer value it is not possible to provide value in the long run, however, neither good market results can assure the growth of financial performance. In this paper the authors examine the effect of marketing assets and activities on shareholder value, they point out how these can influence free cash flow to equity, shareholder return, strategic planning time period and terminal value. They emphasize also some possible negative effects of marketing. The authors outline the real optional characteristics of marketing investments and their game theoretical relations in dynamic environment.

A note on the axiomatization of the Nash equilibrium correspondence

A new axiomatization of the Nash equilibrium correspondence for n-person games based on independence of irrelevant strategies is given. Using a flexible general model, it is proved that the Nash equilibrium correspondence is the only solution to satisfy the axioms of non-emptiness, weak one-person rationality, independence of irrelevant strategies and converse independence of irrelevant strategies on the class of subgames of a fixed finite n-person game which admit at least one Nash equilibrium. It is also shown that these axioms are logically independent.

The Dialectics of Modernity - Recognizing Globalization. Studies on the Theoretical Perspectives of Globalization

The volume The Dialectics of Modernity - Recognizing Globalization. Studies on the Theoretical Perspectives of Globalization is the product of a work of that quarter of the century, which has been continuing, since 1989 up today, the true beginning of the globalization. Therefore, because that concept was not existing at that time, the work is not yet directed, in the first years, on the globalization itself. As it can be seen, this concept pushed through only in the second half of the nineties, when the concept could also be already statistically revealed in the world press. How a group of researchers from Hungary was enquirying during the nineties, according to partners of conversation at home and abroad, with whom one could talk about how the new world emerging with 1989 can actually be described, is a long story, the theory of which consists in the fact, that we apparently live in a world, where the most part of the people, even worse, even most of the intellectuals are hardly interested in how this one really looks like. On looking for partners, the circle of the authors of this volume was created. In Hungary, we quickly reached our limit (which much later did not prevent us from appearing, such as if we had always been living in the theoretically worked globalization). The French group around Jacques Poulain reacted the fastest way (and later around Francois de Bernard, with his particularly valuable homepage www.mondialisations.org), not much later the contact with the Russian colleagues around Alexandr Shumakov was created, in which Encyclopedia of the Globalization our contribution could already appear in 2003. On these traces, we came to the productive relationship with Leonid Grinin and Andrey Korotayev. Finally, we mention the Fürstenfeld's initiative, founded since 2009 with Melitta Becker's help in the framework of the Centre for the Interdisciplinary Research in this Austrian city. A relevant part of the author inside this book participated from the beginning in the work of the group. The individual contributions to this volume are linked together by a common interest in knowledge. This is the theoretical view of the phenomenon of the globalization. From the beginning, it was not further defined or limited to certain approaches, particularly an independent theory of the globalization was not intended. We started from the fact, that every legitimately revealed theoretical approach can contribute legitimately to a later theory of the globalization. In this way, the further contacts with Nico Stehr and the members of the Dresden group for the investigation of the security problems arose, mainly with Ernst Woit. Hegel defined the philosophy as the flight of the Owl of Minerva, which "begins its flight only with the falling twilight". Through the theoretical investigation of the globalization always becoming interdisciplinary, we wanted by no means to debate about this incomparable aphorism. We simply started from the conviction, that a new reality should not remain without any description.

Patterns in the lottery game

The present study is based on the analysis and results of a close to 5 years’ study in the frame which we used a “Lottery Game” in the "Decision Making Skills" subject taught at Corvinus Business School, Corvinus University of Budapest. In the frame of the "game", the students (Hungarians (n=231) and foreigners (n=267) alike) have to mark 6 numbers on a 7x7 lottery ticket. The winner is the student whose numbers differ the most from those of all the other students’. Upon analyzing the results (irrespectively of nationality) the authors have noted something notable: the winning combinations - rather than being located randomly on the ticket, characteristically resemble a geometric form. In our study we wanted to detect the relevance of geometry in this kind of choices. It is hypothesized that in such games (lottery type, related to numeric combination choice), where the players decide upon their strategy (choice of numbers) by also taking into consideration others’ expected choices, the winning strategy is characteristically some consciously chosen scheme or pattern as opposed to a random one. The study presents the results of the available samples (Hungarian students: n=231, foreign students: n=267), the winning combinations, the most often designated numbers, as well as the least “popular” numbers and their presentation on a "heat map". In the case of the majority of the winning tickets we found the use of conscious strategic choice to be more useful. These conscious strategic decisions were reflected in identifiable geometric forms. Based on the results, we hypothesize that in the "hidden lottery" game – in contrast with random choice – the most effective strategy of choice is the conscious ordered one in which the player marks the numbers on the lottery ticket in some modified geometric pattern. The goal of the paper is to propose further research on the field.