Does timing of decisions in a mixed duopoly matter?

We determine the endogenous order of moves in a mixed pricesetting duopoly. In contrast to the existing literature on mixed oligopolies we establish the payo equivalence of the games with an exogenously given order of moves if the most plausible equilibrium is realized in the market. Hence, in this case it does not matter whether one becomes a leader or a follower. We also establish that replacing a private firm by a public firm in the standard Bertrand-Edgeworth game with capacity constraints increases social welfare and that a pure-strategy equilibrium always exists.

Endogenous timing of moves in an asymmetric price-setting duopoly

This paper adds to the growing literature on endogenous timing of decisions in duopolies. We show for a price-setting duopoly game with sufficiently asymmetric and strictly convex cost functions that the less efficient firm moves first while the more efficient moves second with a higher price than the less efficient firm.

Endogenous Timing of Moves in Bertrand-Edgeworth Triopolies

We determine the endogenous order of moves in which the firms set their prices in the framework of a capacity-constrained Bertrand-Edgeworth triopoly. A three-period timing game that determines the period in which the firms announce their prices precedes the price-setting stage. We show for the non-trivial case (in which the Bertrand-Edgeworth triopoly has only an equilibrium in non-degenerated mixed-strategies) that the firm with the largest capacity sets its price first, while the two other firms set their prices later. Our result extends a finding by Deneckere and Kovenock (1992) from duopolies to triopolies. This extension was made possible by Hirata's (2009) recent advancements on the mixed-strategy equilibria of Bertrand-Edgeworth games.

The Timing of Motherhood While Earning a PhD in Engineering

In spite of tremendous efforts, women are still under-represented in the field of science. Post-graduate education and early tenure track employment are part of the academic career establish-ment in research and development during periods that usually overlap with family formation. Though women tend to leave science mainly after obtaining their PhD, and the timing of mother-hood plays a vital role in a successful research career, qualitative data on this life period are scarce. Our paper focuses on how the normative and institutional contexts shape female PhD engineering students’ family plans. The research was based on intersections of life course and risk and uncertainty theories. Using qualitative interviews we explored how contradicting social norms of childbearing cause tensions in postgraduate students’ lives, and how the different uncer-tainties and risks permeate young researchers’ decisions on early life events. We concluded that, despite the general pattern of delaying motherhood among higher educated women, these students struggle against this postponement, and they hardly have any good options to avoid risk stem-ming from uncertainties and from some characteris-tics of studying and working in engineering. Find-ings of this research may call the attention of stake-holders to possible intervention points.