Endogenous timing of moves in an asymmetric price-setting duopoly
Data(s) |
2003
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Resumo |
This paper adds to the growing literature on endogenous timing of decisions in duopolies. We show for a price-setting duopoly game with sufficiently asymmetric and strictly convex cost functions that the less efficient firm moves first while the more efficient moves second with a higher price than the less efficient firm. |
Formato |
application/pdf |
Identificador |
http://unipub.lib.uni-corvinus.hu/899/1/PORTECON.PDF Tasnádi, Attila (2003) Endogenous timing of moves in an asymmetric price-setting duopoly. Portuguese Economic Journal, 2 (1). pp. 23-35. DOI 10.1007/s10258-002-0018-3 <http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10258-002-0018-3> |
Publicador |
Springer |
Relação |
http://unipub.lib.uni-corvinus.hu/899/ http://www.springerlink.com/content/p1npehvwrxmdv284/ 10.1007/s10258-002-0018-3 |
Palavras-Chave | #Mathematics, Econometrics |
Tipo |
Article PeerReviewed |
Idioma(s) |
en en |