A comprehensive approach to the euro-area debt crisis

The euro area‘s sovereign debt crisis continues though significant steps have been taken to resolve it. This paper proposes a comprehensive solution to the crisis based on three pillars: a plan to restore banking sector soundness in the whole euro area, a resolution of sovereign debt crisis -including a revision of EU assistance facilities and a reduction of the Greek public debt- and a strategy to foster growth and competitiveness. The paper provides novel estimates and analysis focusing on the current situation of Greece, Ireland, Portugal and Spain.

The Case for Reforming Euro Area Entry Criteria

The global economic and financial crisis has raised further concerns about the euro-entry criteria, in addition to other factors, such as the effective tightening of the criteria due to the enlargement of the EU from 12 to 27 members, the highly unfavourable property of business cycle dependence, the internal inconsistency of the criteria due to the structural price level convergence of Central and Eastern European countries, and the continuous violation of the criteria by euro-area members. The interest rate criterion became a highly volatile measure. Many US metropolitan areas would fail to qualify to be members of the US monetary union by applying the currently used inflation criterion to the US. It is time to reform the criteria and to strengthen their economic rationale within the legal framework of the EU treaty. A good solution would be to relate all criteria to the average of the euro area and simultaneously to extend the compliance period from the currently considered one year to a longer period.

Az euróövezet bővítése és euróbevezetési stratégiák (Euro-area enlargement and euro adoption strategies)

Tanulmányunk azokat a kockázatokat és kihívásokat vizsgálja, amelyekkel az új EU tagállamok szembesülnek az euróhoz vezető úton, valamint elemzi az euró bevezetésével és a bevezetés időzítésével kapcsolatos stratégiákat is. Megvizsgáljuk a reál- és nominálkonvergencia kapcsolatát az euróövezetbe csatlakozás szemszögéből. Véleményünk szerint a gazdaság egy főre jutó jövedelemben mért kezdeti fejlettségi szintje, valamint a reálkonvergencia sebessége kihatnak a követendő stratégiákra és a belépés időzítésére. Minél alacsonyabb ugyanis egy ország egy főre jutó jövedelme, annál nagyobb az árszínvonalbeli lemaradása (amit be kell hoznia), és az új tagok jelenlegi helyzetét figyelembe véve annál nagyobb a veszélye annak, hogy a hitelek növekedése túlzottá, a gazdaság túlfűtötté válik. Úgy gondoljuk, hogy az inflációkövetés lebegő árfolyam mellett megfelelőbb az árszínvonal felzárkózási folyamatának kezelésére, mint valamilyen merev árfolyamrögzítés. Elemezzük a maastrichti kritériumokat az új EU-tagállamok gazdasági jellemzőinek szempontjából, és az inflációs kritérium módosítását javasoljuk, amely jelenlegi formájában elvesztette közgazdasági értelmét. JEL kód: E31, E52, E60, F30. /===/ This paper commissioned by DG ECFIN from the EU Commission as part of the EMU@10 project and published in Hungarian by the permission of the EU Commission. The origi-nal English version is available at http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/publications/ publication_summary12103_en.htm. The paper discusses the risks and challenges faced by new members on the road to the euro and the strategies and timing of euro adoption. It investigates the real/nominal convergence nexus from the perspective of euro-area entry, arguing that the initial level of economic development, as measured by per capita income, and the speed of real convergence have a bearing on the strategies to follow and the timing of entry into the euro area, for the lower per capita income is, the larger is the price-level gap to close and the greater the danger of credit booms and overheating. It is argued argue that inflation targeting with floating rates is better suited than hard pegs to managing the price-level catch-up process. A suggestion is made for modifying the Maastricht inflation criterion, which as currently defined has lost its economic logic.

Az európai (euro-)iszlám vagy iszlám Európában (részlet)

A Köz-Gazdaság fontosnak tartja, hogy a multidiszciplináris megközelítés jegyében bemutassa más társadalomtudományok kutatásait és eredményeit. Ennek jegyében közlünk néhány részletet Rostoványi Zsolt Európai (euro-)iszlám vagy iszlám Európában című, a közelmúltban megjelent könyvéből.

Debt Restructuring in the Euro Area: a Necessary but Manageable Evil?

There are two possible responses to the Greek debt crisis: ‘Plan A’, continued official lending, for as long as needed, with possible voluntary private sector involvement, and ‘Plan B’, coercive preemptive or post-default restructuring with significant face value reduction in privately-held debt. Both options have risks, but it is necessary to move to Plan B sooner or later. The impact on Greece could be mitigated by foreign bank ownership and proper liquidity support measures. The direct spillover impact on the rest of the euro area seems small. But there is the risk of contagion, which is a serious concern. There is a cautious case for delaying somewhat Plan B in order to prepare for it.

The Reverse Balassa–Samuelson Effect in the Euro Zone

The debt crisis of the eurozone revealed a structural problem of the single market. The single currency created a pegged foreign exchange system among the euro member states. Thus, the less competitive countries can not improve their wage competitiveness through devaluation, but are motivated to extend the current consumption as the single central bank rate and the zone stability created cheap debt financing. The paper overviews the process of Reverse Balassa-Samuelson effect to explain the importance of external imbalance in the debt crisis.

The Euro Area's Tightrope Walk: Debt and Competitiveness in Italy and Spain

- Competitiveness adjustment in struggling southern euro-area members requires persistently lower inflation than in major trading partners, but low inflation worsens public debt sustainability. When average euro-area inflation undershoots the two percent target, the conflict between intra-euro relative price adjustment and debt sustainability is more severe. - In our baseline scenario, the projected public debt ratio reduction in Italy and Spain is too slow and does not meet the European fiscal rule. Debt projections are very sensitive to underlying assumptions and even small negative deviations from GDP growth, inflation and budget surplus assumptions can easily result in a runaway debt trajectory. - The case for a greater than five percent of GDP primary budget surplus is very weak. Beyond vitally important structural reforms, the top priority is to ensure that euro-area inflation does not undershoot the two percent target, which requires national policy actions and more accommodative monetary policy. The latter would weaken the euro exchange rate, thereby facilitating further intra-euro adjustment. More effective policies are needed to foster growth. But if all else fails, the European Central Bank’s Outright Monetary Transactions could reduce borrowing costs.

Should non-euro area countries join the single supervisory mechanism?

Highlights - Irrespective of the euro crisis, a European banking union makes sense, including for non-euro area countries, because of the extent of European Union financial integration. The Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM) is the first element of the banking union. - From the point of view of non-euro countries, the draft SSM regulation as amended by the EU Council includes strong safeguards relating to decision-making, accountability, attention to financial stability in small countries and the applicability of national macro-prudential measures. Non-euro countries will also have the right to leave the SSM and thereby exempt themselves from a supervisory decision. - The SSM by itself cannot bring the full benefits of the banking union, but would foster financial integration, improve the supervision of cross-border banks, ensure greater consistency of supervisory practices, increase the quality of supervision, avoid competitive distortions and provide ample supervisory information. - While the decision to join the SSM is made difficult by the uncertainty about other elements of the banking union, including the possible burden sharing, we conclude that non-euro EU members should stand ready to join the SSM and be prepared for the negotiations of the other elements of the banking union.