A comprehensive approach to the euro-area debt crisis

The euro area‘s sovereign debt crisis continues though significant steps have been taken to resolve it. This paper proposes a comprehensive solution to the crisis based on three pillars: a plan to restore banking sector soundness in the whole euro area, a resolution of sovereign debt crisis -including a revision of EU assistance facilities and a reduction of the Greek public debt- and a strategy to foster growth and competitiveness. The paper provides novel estimates and analysis focusing on the current situation of Greece, Ireland, Portugal and Spain.

The Case for Reforming Euro Area Entry Criteria

The global economic and financial crisis has raised further concerns about the euro-entry criteria, in addition to other factors, such as the effective tightening of the criteria due to the enlargement of the EU from 12 to 27 members, the highly unfavourable property of business cycle dependence, the internal inconsistency of the criteria due to the structural price level convergence of Central and Eastern European countries, and the continuous violation of the criteria by euro-area members. The interest rate criterion became a highly volatile measure. Many US metropolitan areas would fail to qualify to be members of the US monetary union by applying the currently used inflation criterion to the US. It is time to reform the criteria and to strengthen their economic rationale within the legal framework of the EU treaty. A good solution would be to relate all criteria to the average of the euro area and simultaneously to extend the compliance period from the currently considered one year to a longer period.

Az euróövezet bővítése és euróbevezetési stratégiák (Euro-area enlargement and euro adoption strategies)

Tanulmányunk azokat a kockázatokat és kihívásokat vizsgálja, amelyekkel az új EU tagállamok szembesülnek az euróhoz vezető úton, valamint elemzi az euró bevezetésével és a bevezetés időzítésével kapcsolatos stratégiákat is. Megvizsgáljuk a reál- és nominálkonvergencia kapcsolatát az euróövezetbe csatlakozás szemszögéből. Véleményünk szerint a gazdaság egy főre jutó jövedelemben mért kezdeti fejlettségi szintje, valamint a reálkonvergencia sebessége kihatnak a követendő stratégiákra és a belépés időzítésére. Minél alacsonyabb ugyanis egy ország egy főre jutó jövedelme, annál nagyobb az árszínvonalbeli lemaradása (amit be kell hoznia), és az új tagok jelenlegi helyzetét figyelembe véve annál nagyobb a veszélye annak, hogy a hitelek növekedése túlzottá, a gazdaság túlfűtötté válik. Úgy gondoljuk, hogy az inflációkövetés lebegő árfolyam mellett megfelelőbb az árszínvonal felzárkózási folyamatának kezelésére, mint valamilyen merev árfolyamrögzítés. Elemezzük a maastrichti kritériumokat az új EU-tagállamok gazdasági jellemzőinek szempontjából, és az inflációs kritérium módosítását javasoljuk, amely jelenlegi formájában elvesztette közgazdasági értelmét. JEL kód: E31, E52, E60, F30. /===/ This paper commissioned by DG ECFIN from the EU Commission as part of the EMU@10 project and published in Hungarian by the permission of the EU Commission. The origi-nal English version is available at http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/publications/ publication_summary12103_en.htm. The paper discusses the risks and challenges faced by new members on the road to the euro and the strategies and timing of euro adoption. It investigates the real/nominal convergence nexus from the perspective of euro-area entry, arguing that the initial level of economic development, as measured by per capita income, and the speed of real convergence have a bearing on the strategies to follow and the timing of entry into the euro area, for the lower per capita income is, the larger is the price-level gap to close and the greater the danger of credit booms and overheating. It is argued argue that inflation targeting with floating rates is better suited than hard pegs to managing the price-level catch-up process. A suggestion is made for modifying the Maastricht inflation criterion, which as currently defined has lost its economic logic.

Debt Restructuring in the Euro Area: a Necessary but Manageable Evil?

There are two possible responses to the Greek debt crisis: ‘Plan A’, continued official lending, for as long as needed, with possible voluntary private sector involvement, and ‘Plan B’, coercive preemptive or post-default restructuring with significant face value reduction in privately-held debt. Both options have risks, but it is necessary to move to Plan B sooner or later. The impact on Greece could be mitigated by foreign bank ownership and proper liquidity support measures. The direct spillover impact on the rest of the euro area seems small. But there is the risk of contagion, which is a serious concern. There is a cautious case for delaying somewhat Plan B in order to prepare for it.

The Euro Area's Tightrope Walk: Debt and Competitiveness in Italy and Spain

- Competitiveness adjustment in struggling southern euro-area members requires persistently lower inflation than in major trading partners, but low inflation worsens public debt sustainability. When average euro-area inflation undershoots the two percent target, the conflict between intra-euro relative price adjustment and debt sustainability is more severe. - In our baseline scenario, the projected public debt ratio reduction in Italy and Spain is too slow and does not meet the European fiscal rule. Debt projections are very sensitive to underlying assumptions and even small negative deviations from GDP growth, inflation and budget surplus assumptions can easily result in a runaway debt trajectory. - The case for a greater than five percent of GDP primary budget surplus is very weak. Beyond vitally important structural reforms, the top priority is to ensure that euro-area inflation does not undershoot the two percent target, which requires national policy actions and more accommodative monetary policy. The latter would weaken the euro exchange rate, thereby facilitating further intra-euro adjustment. More effective policies are needed to foster growth. But if all else fails, the European Central Bank’s Outright Monetary Transactions could reduce borrowing costs.

Should non-euro area countries join the single supervisory mechanism?

Highlights - Irrespective of the euro crisis, a European banking union makes sense, including for non-euro area countries, because of the extent of European Union financial integration. The Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM) is the first element of the banking union. - From the point of view of non-euro countries, the draft SSM regulation as amended by the EU Council includes strong safeguards relating to decision-making, accountability, attention to financial stability in small countries and the applicability of national macro-prudential measures. Non-euro countries will also have the right to leave the SSM and thereby exempt themselves from a supervisory decision. - The SSM by itself cannot bring the full benefits of the banking union, but would foster financial integration, improve the supervision of cross-border banks, ensure greater consistency of supervisory practices, increase the quality of supervision, avoid competitive distortions and provide ample supervisory information. - While the decision to join the SSM is made difficult by the uncertainty about other elements of the banking union, including the possible burden sharing, we conclude that non-euro EU members should stand ready to join the SSM and be prepared for the negotiations of the other elements of the banking union.

A New Method For Combining Detrending Techniques with Application to Business Cycle Synchronization of the New EU Members

Decomposing output into trend and cyclical components is an uncertain exercise and depends on the method applied. It is an especially dubious task for countries undergoing large structural changes, such as transition countries. Despite their deficiencies, however, univariate detrending methods are frequently adopted for both policy oriented and academic research. This paper proposes a new procedure for combining univariate detrending techniques which is based on revisions of the estimated output gaps adjusted by the variance of and the correlation among output gaps. The procedure is applied to the study of the similarity of business cycles between the euro area and new EU Member States.

Fiscal Federalism in Crisis: Lessons for Europe from the US

The euro area is facing crisis, while the US is not, though the overall fiscal situation and outlook is better in the euro area than in the US, and though the US faces serious state-level fiscal crises. A higher level of fiscal federalism would strengthen the euro area, but is not inevitable. Current fiscal reform proposals (strengthening of current rules, more policy coordination and an emergency financing mechanism) will if implemented result in some improvements. But implementation might be deficient or lack credibility, and could lead to disputes and carry a significant political risk. Introduction of a Eurobond covering up to 60 percent of member states’ GDP would bring about much greater levels of fiscal discipline than any other proposal, would create an attractive Eurobond market, and would deliver a strong message about the irreversible nature of European integration.

Real effective exchange rates for 178 countries: A new database

We use data on exchange rates and consumer price indices and the weighting matrix derived by Bayoumi, Lee and Jaewoo (2006) to calculate consumer price index-based REER. The main novelties of our database are that (1) it includes data for 178 countries –many more than in any other publicly available database– plus an external REER for the euro area, using a consistent methodology; (2) it includes up-to-date REER values, such as data for January 2012; and (3) it is relatively easy to calculate REER against any arbitrary group of countries. The annual database is complete for 172 countries and the euro area for 1992-2011 and data is available for six other countries for a shorter period. For several countries annual data is available for earlier years as well, eg data is available for 67 countries from 1960. The monthly database is complete for 138 countries for January 1995-January 2012, and data is also available for 15 other countries for a shorter period. The indicators calculated by us are freely downloadable and will be irregularly updated.