Existence of Pure Strategy Nash Equilibrium in Bertrand-Edgeworth Oligopolies

This article is searching for necessary and sufficient conditions which are to be imposed on the demand curve to guarantee the existence of pure strategy Nash equilibrium in a Bertrand-Edgeworth game with capacity constraints.

A generalization of correlated equilibrium: A new protocol

A new correlation scheme (leading to a special equilibrium called “soft” correlated equilibrium) is introduced for finite games. After randomization over the outcome space, players have the choice either to follow the recommendation of an umpire blindly or freely choose some other action except the one suggested. This scheme can lead to Pareto-better outcomes than the simple extension introduced by [Moulin, H., Vial, J.-P., 1978. Strategically zero-sum games: the class of games whose completely mixed equilibria cannot be improved upon. International Journal of Game Theory 7, 201–221]. The informational and interpretational aspects of soft correlated equilibria are also discussed in detail. The power of the generalization is illustrated in the prisoners’s dilemma and a congestion game.

Generalized correlated equilibrium for two-person games in extensive form with perfect information

A correlation scheme (leading to a special equilibrium called “soft” correlated equilibrium) is applied for two-person finite games in extensive form with perfect information. Randomization by an umpire takes place over the leaves of the game tree. At every decision point players have the choice either to follow the recommendation of the umpire blindly or freely choose any other action except the one suggested. This scheme can lead to Pareto-improved outcomes of other correlated equilibria. Computational issues of maximizing a linear function over the set of soft correlated equilibria are considered and a linear-time algorithm in terms of the number of edges in the game tree is given for a special procedure called “subgame perfect optimization”.

Az egyensúlyi ráták unicitása és a bérráta pozitivitása a Neumann-modell általánosításaiban (Uniqueness of equilibrium rates and the positive value of the wage rate in generalizations from the Neumann model)

Cikkünk arról a paradox jelenségről szól, hogy a fogyasztást explicit módon megjelenítő Neumann-modell egyensúlyi megoldásaiban a munkabért meghatározó létszükségleti termékek ára esetenként nulla lehet, és emiatt a reálbér egyensúlyi értéke is nulla lesz. Ez a jelenség mindig bekövetkezik az olyan dekomponálható gazdaságok esetén, amelyekben eltérő növekedési és profitrátájú, alternatív egyensúlyi megoldások léteznek. A jelenség sokkal áttekinthetőbb formában tárgyalható a modell Leontief-eljárásra épülő egyszerűbb változatában is, amit ki is használunk. Megmutatjuk, hogy a legnagyobbnál alacsonyabb szintű növekedési tényezőjű megoldások közgazdasági szempontból értelmetlenek, és így érdektelenek. Ezzel voltaképpen egyrészt azt mutatjuk meg, hogy Neumann kiváló intuíciója jól működött, amikor ragaszkodott modellje egyértelmű megoldásához, másrészt pedig azt is, hogy ehhez nincs szükség a gazdaság dekomponálhatóságának feltételezésére. A vizsgált téma szorosan kapcsolódik az általános profitráta meghatározásának - Sraffa által modern formába öntött - Ricardo-féle elemzéséhez, illetve a neoklasszikus növekedéselmélet nevezetes bér-profit, illetve felhalmozás-fogyasztás átváltási határgörbéihez, ami jelzi a téma elméleti és elmélettörténeti érdekességét is. / === / In the Marx-Neumann version of the Neumann model introduced by Morishima, the use of commodities is split between production and consumption, and wages are determined as the cost of necessary consumption. In such a version it may occur that the equilibrium prices of all goods necessary for consumption are zero, so that the equilibrium wage rate becomes zero too. In fact such a paradoxical case will always arise when the economy is decomposable and the equilibrium not unique in terms of growth and interest rate. It can be shown that a zero equilibrium wage rate will appear in all equilibrium solutions where growth and interest rate are less than maximal. This is another proof of Neumann's genius and intuition, for he arrived at the uniqueness of equilibrium via an assumption that implied that the economy was indecomposable, a condition relaxed later by Kemeny, Morgenstern and Thompson. This situation occurs also in similar models based on Leontief technology and such versions of the Marx-Neumann model make the roots of the problem more apparent. Analysis of them also yields an interesting corollary to Ricardo's corn rate of profit: the real cause of the awkwardness is bad specification of the model: luxury commodities are introduced without there being a final demand for them, and production of them becomes a waste of resources. Bad model specification shows up as a consumption coefficient incompatible with the given technology in the more general model with joint production and technological choice. For the paradoxical situation implies the level of consumption could be raised and/or the intensity of labour diminished without lowering the equilibrium rate of the growth and interest. This entails wasteful use of resources and indicates again that the equilibrium conditions are improperly specified. It is shown that the conditions for equilibrium can and should be redefined for the Marx-Neumann model without assuming an indecomposable economy, in a way that ensures the existence of an equilibrium unique in terms of the growth and interest rate coupled with a positive value for the wage rate, so confirming Neumann's intuition. The proposed solution relates closely to findings of Bromek in a paper correcting Morishima's generalization of wage/profit and consumption/investment frontiers.

A származtatott termékek árazása és annak problémái az egyensúlyelmélet szempontjából (Pricing of derived products and problems with it in terms of equilibrium theory)

A szerző röviden összefoglalja a származtatott termékek árazásával kapcsolatos legfontosabb ismereteket és problémákat. A derivatív árazás elmélete a piacon levő termékek közötti redundanciát kihasználva próbálja meghatározni az egyes termékek relatív árát. Ezt azonban csak teljes piacon lehet megtenni, és így csak teljes piac esetén lehetséges a hasznossági függvények fogalmát az elméletből és a ráépülő gyakorlatból elhagyni, ezért a kockázatsemleges árazás elve félrevezető. Másképpen fogalmazva: a származtatott termékek elmélete csak azon az áron képes a hasznossági függvény fogalmától megszabadulni, ha a piac szerkezetére a valóságban nem teljesülő megkötéseket tesz. Ennek hangsúlyozása mind a piaci gyakorlatban, mind az oktatásban elengedhetetlen. / === / The author sums up briefly the main aspects and problems to do with the pricing of derived products. The theory of derivative pricing uses the redundancy among products on the market to arrive at relative product prices. But this can be done only on a complete market, so that only with a complete market does it become possible to omit from the theory and the practice built upon it the concept of utility functions, and for that reason the principle of risk-neutral pricing is misleading. To put it another way, the theory of derived products is capable of freeing itself from the concept of utility functions only at a price where in practice it places impossible restrictions on the market structure. This it is essential to emphasize in market practice and in teaching.

Invariance under type morphisms: the bayesian Nash equilibrium

Ely and Peski (2006) and Friedenberg and Meier (2010) provide examples when changing the type space behind a game, taking a "bigger" type space, induces changes of Bayesian Nash Equilibria, in other words, the Bayesian Nash Equilibrium is not invariant under type morphisms. In this paper we introduce the notion of strong type morphism. Strong type morphisms are stronger than ordinary and conditional type morphisms (Ely and Peski, 2006), and we show that Bayesian Nash Equilibria are not invariant under strong type morphisms either. We present our results in a very simple, finite setting, and conclude that there is no chance to get reasonable assumptions for Bayesian Nash Equilibria to be invariant under any kind of reasonable type morphisms.

Általános egyensúlyi modellek alkalmazása gazdaságpolitikai elemzésekre (Application of general equilibrium models to economic policy analyses)

A szerző az alkalmazott többszektoros modellezés területén a lineáris programozási modellektől a számszerűsített általános egyensúlyi modellekig végbement változásokat tekinti át. Egy rövid történeti visszapillantás után a lineáris programozás módszereire épülő nemzetgazdasági szintű modellekkel összevetve mutatja be az általános egyensúlyi modellek közös, illetve eltérő jellemzőit. Egyidejűleg azt is érzékelteti, hogyan lehet az általános egyensúlyi modelleket a gazdaságpolitikai célok konzisztenciájának, a célok közötti átváltási lehetőségek elemzésére és általában a gazdaságpolitikai elképzelések érzékenységi vizsgálatára felhasználni. A szerző az elméleti-módszertani kérdések taglalását számszerűsített általános egyensúlyi modell segítségével illusztrálja. _______ The author surveys the changes having taken place in the field of multi-sector modeling, from the linear programming models to the quantified general equilibrium models. After a brief historical retrospection he presents the common and different characteristic features of the general equilibrium models by comparing them with the national economic level models based on the methods of linear programming. He also makes clear how the general equilibrium models can be used for analysing the consistency of economic policy targets, for the investigation of trade-off possibilities among the targets and, in general, for sensitivity analyses of economic policy targets. The discussion of theoretical and methodological quuestions is illustrated by the author with the aid of a quantified general equilibrium model.

From Anti-equilibrium to The Socialist System and Beyond

This essay attempts to understand János Kornai’s works from a political economy perspective. It argues that Kornai has significantly contributed to the formation of a new paradigm of political economy. The main endeavor of Kornai has been the combination of analytical concepts of economics with the empirical description of real economies. After a certain period of theoretical experimentation János Kornai formulated his research program that can be called the shortage economy explanation of the socialist system. The Economics of Shortage and The Socialist System have created a new theoretical paradigm in a framework in which it has become possible to establish a connection between the analytical and empirical, universal and historical aspects of the theory studying the socialist system as a real economic entity. János Kornai has built his analysis of the socialist system on the primary role of politics in the creation of economic institutions. In his present work on capitalism he has extended this thesis to the capitalist system. This seems to be an important contribution of his to a new political economy paradigm that is just in the process of formation.

Kornai’s DRSE Theory Versus General Equilibrium Theory

János Kornai’s DRSE theory (Kornai, 2014) follows the ex post model philosophy which radically rejects the ex ante set of conditions laid down by the dominant neoclassical school and the stringent limits of equilibrium, and defines its own premises for the functioning of capitalist economy. In other words, the DRSE theory represents an extremely novel trend among the various schools of economics. The theory is still only a verbal model with the following supporting pillars as the immanent features of the capitalist system: dynamism, rivalry and the surplus economy. (The English name of the theory uses the initial letters of the terms Dynamism, Rivalry, Surplus Economy). The dominance of the surplus economy, that is, oversupply is replaced by monopolistic competition, uncertainty over the volume of demand, Schumpeterian innovation, dynamism, technological progress, creative destruction and increasing return to scale with rivalry between producers and service providers for markets. This paper aims to examine whether the DRSE theory can be formulated as a formal mathematical model. We have chosen a special route to do this: first we explore the unreal ex ante assumptions of general equilibrium theory (Walras, 1874; Neumann, 1945), and then we establish some of the possible connections between the premises of DRSE, which include the crucial condition that just like in biological evolution, there is no fixed steady state in the evolutionary processes of market economy, not even as a point of reference. General equilibrium theory and DRSE theory are compared in the focus of Schumpeterian evolutionary economics.

A note on the axiomatization of the Nash equilibrium correspondence

A new axiomatization of the Nash equilibrium correspondence for n-person games based on independence of irrelevant strategies is given. Using a flexible general model, it is proved that the Nash equilibrium correspondence is the only solution to satisfy the axioms of non-emptiness, weak one-person rationality, independence of irrelevant strategies and converse independence of irrelevant strategies on the class of subgames of a fixed finite n-person game which admit at least one Nash equilibrium. It is also shown that these axioms are logically independent.