The Future of EU Cohesion Policy. Endogenous Development – Added Value of Intervention – Regulatory Frameworks

The successful operation of the regional development – or cohesion – policy of the European Union has a strategic importance from the point of view of the whole integration process. Strengthening economic, social and territorial cohesion and decreasing disparities between member states and regions are not only one of the main priorities of the integration, but at the same time these are justified expectations of the people living in the member states of the union. The cohesion transfers should be spent on those factors which have the biggest contribution to the improvement of development prospects and competitiveness in the given regions. Theories on regional development have controversial conclusions about the long-term formation of development disparities. However, it has become evident that successful development policies are based on endogenous factors, innovation and well-functioning institutions. After examining theoretical considerations and regional disparities the study analyses the impacts of EU regional policy and evaluates the main elements of the proposed regulatory frameworks for the period 2014-2020.

Endogenous choice of decision variables

In this paper we allow the firms to choose their prices and quantities simultaneously. Quantities are produced in advance and their common sales price is determined by the market. Firms offer their “residual capacities” at their announced prices and the corresponding demand will be served to order. If all firms have small capacities, we obtain the Bertrand solution; while if at least one firm has a sufficiently large capacity, the Cournot outcome and a model of price leadership could emerge.

Endogenous timing of moves in an asymmetric price-setting duopoly

This paper adds to the growing literature on endogenous timing of decisions in duopolies. We show for a price-setting duopoly game with sufficiently asymmetric and strictly convex cost functions that the less efficient firm moves first while the more efficient moves second with a higher price than the less efficient firm.

Reciprocally Exclusive Contracts and Endogenous Quality

Our paper investigates exclusive dealing and purchasing in successive duopolies. First we show that using a limited set of feasible contracts, exclusive dealing and purchasing is going to be preferred, regardless of the level of product differentiation. In the next step, we make the choice of quality endogenous and derive the equilibrium conditions for qualities under the aforementioned contractual arrangement. Our final proposition shows that in this case the choice of quality depends exclusively on the valuation of the median consumer.

Endogenous Timing of Moves in Bertrand-Edgeworth Triopolies

We determine the endogenous order of moves in which the firms set their prices in the framework of a capacity-constrained Bertrand-Edgeworth triopoly. A three-period timing game that determines the period in which the firms announce their prices precedes the price-setting stage. We show for the non-trivial case (in which the Bertrand-Edgeworth triopoly has only an equilibrium in non-degenerated mixed-strategies) that the firm with the largest capacity sets its price first, while the two other firms set their prices later. Our result extends a finding by Deneckere and Kovenock (1992) from duopolies to triopolies. This extension was made possible by Hirata's (2009) recent advancements on the mixed-strategy equilibria of Bertrand-Edgeworth games.