Exposing market mechanism design trade-offs via multi-objective evolutionary search

Market mechanisms are a means by which resources in contention can be allocated between contending parties, both in human economies and those populated by software agents. Designing such mechanisms has traditionally been carried out by hand, and more recently by automation. Assessing these mechanisms typically involves them being evaluated with respect to multiple conflicting objectives, which can often be nonlinear, noisy, and expensive to compute. For typical performance objectives, it is known that designed mechanisms often fall short on being optimal across all objectives simultaneously. However, in all previous automated approaches, either only a single objective is considered, or else the multiple performance objectives are combined into a single objective. In this paper we do not aggregate objectives, instead considering a direct, novel application of multi-objective evolutionary algorithms (MOEAs) to the problem of automated mechanism design. This allows the automatic discovery of trade-offs that such objectives impose on mechanisms. We pose the problem of mechanism design, specifically for the class of linear redistribution mechanisms, as a naturally existing multi-objective optimisation problem. We apply a modified version of NSGA-II in order to design mechanisms within this class, given economically relevant objectives such as welfare and fairness. This application of NSGA-II exposes tradeoffs between objectives, revealing relationships between them that were otherwise unknown for this mechanism class. The understanding of the trade-off gained from the application of MOEAs can thus help practitioners with an insightful application of discovered mechanisms in their respective real/artificial markets.

Resource allocation in decentralised computational systems:an evolutionary market-based approach

We present a novel market-based method, inspired by retail markets, for resource allocation in fully decentralised systems where agents are self-interested. Our market mechanism requires no coordinating node or complex negotiation. The stability of outcome allocations, those at equilibrium, is analysed and compared for three buyer behaviour models. In order to capture the interaction between self-interested agents, we propose the use of competitive coevolution. Our approach is both highly scalable and may be tuned to achieve specified outcome resource allocations. We demonstrate the behaviour of our approach in simulation, where evolutionary market agents act on behalf of service providing nodes to adaptively price their resources over time, in response to market conditions. We show that this leads the system to the predicted outcome resource allocation. Furthermore, the system remains stable in the presence of small changes in price, when buyers' decision functions degrade gracefully. © 2009 The Author(s).

A socio-economic approach to online vision graph generation and handover in distributed smart camera networks

In this paper we propose an approach based on self-interested autonomous cameras, which exchange responsibility for tracking objects in a market mechanism, in order to maximise their own utility. A novel ant-colony inspired mechanism is used to grow the vision graph during runtime, which may then be used to optimise communication between cameras. The key benefits of our completely decentralised approach are on the one hand generating the vision graph online which permits the addition and removal cameras to the network during runtime and on the other hand relying only on local information, increasing the robustness of the system. Since our market-based approach does not rely on a priori topology information, the need for any multi-camera calibration can be avoided. © 2011 IEEE.

Socio-economic vision graph generation and handover in distributed smart camera networks

In this article we present an approach to object tracking handover in a network of smart cameras, based on self-interested autonomous agents, which exchange responsibility for tracking objects in a market mechanism, in order to maximise their own utility. A novel ant-colony inspired mechanism is used to learn the vision graph, that is, the camera neighbourhood relations, during runtime, which may then be used to optimise communication between cameras. The key benefits of our completely decentralised approach are on the one hand generating the vision graph online, enabling efficient deployment in unknown scenarios and camera network topologies, and on the other hand relying only on local information, increasing the robustness of the system. Since our market-based approach does not rely on a priori topology information, the need for any multicamera calibration can be avoided. We have evaluated our approach both in a simulation study and in network of real distributed smart cameras.

Momentum profits in alternative stock market structures

The aim of this study is to examine the relationship between momentum profitability and the stock market trading mechanism and is motivated by recent changes to the trading systems that have taken place on the London Stock Exchange. Since 1975 the London stock market has employed three different trading systems: a floor based system, a computerized dealer system called SEAQ and the automated auction system SETS. Since each new trading system has reduced the level of execution costs, one might expect, a priori, the magnitude of momentum profits to decline with each amendment to the trading system. However, the opposite empirical result is found showing that shares trading on the automated system generate higher momentum profits than those trading on the floor system and companies trading on the SETS system display greater momentum profitability than those trading on SEAQ. Our empirical results concur with the theoretical findings of the trader’s hesitation model of Du [Du, J., 2002. Heterogeneity in investor confidence and asset market under- and overreaction. Working paper] and the empirical findings of Arena et al. [Arena, M., Haggard, S., Yan, X., Price momentum and idiosyncratic volatility. Financial Review, in press].

The microstructure of the Irish stock market

This is the first paper to examine the microstructure of the Irish Stock Market empirically and is motivated by the adoption, on June 7th of Xetra the modern pan European auction trading system. Prior to this the exchange utilized an antiquated floor based system. This change was an important event for the market as a rich literature exists to suggest that the trading system exerts a strong influence over the behavior of security returns. We apply the ICSS algorithm of Inclan and Tiao (1994) to discover whether the change to the trading system caused a shift in unconditional volatility at the time Xetra was introduced. Because the trading mechanism can influence volatility in a number of ways we also estimate the partial adjustment coefficients of the Amihud and Mendelson (1987) model prior and subsequent to the introduction of Xetra. Although we find no evidence of volatility changes associated with the introduction of Xetra we do find evidence of an increase in the speed of adjustment (JEL: G15).

The trading mechanism, cross listed stocks:A comparison of the Paris Bourse and SEAQ-International

This paper studies the behaviour of returns for a sample of cross-listed stocks, listed on both the Paris Bourse and SEAQ-International in London. The aim of the paper is to discover which market adjusts to fundamental news more quickly, the home market of Paris or SEAQ-International. We find that prices in London adjust to changes in their fundamental value more slowly than Paris prices, despite the ability to quickly arbitrage between the two markets. We suggest that this finding may reflect the type of trading, which takes place in the two markets and differences associated with the reporting of large trades. We also estimate the amount of noise present in the two markets and show that the Paris market is more noisy than London. © 2003 Published by Elsevier B.V.

A multi-agent system using iterative bidding mechanism to enhance manufacturing agility

The global market has become increasingly dynamic, unpredictable and customer-driven. This has led to rising rates of new product introduction and turbulent demand patterns across product mixes. As a result, manufacturing enterprises were facing mounting challenges to be agile and responsive to cope with market changes, so as to achieve the competitiveness of producing and delivering products to the market timely and cost-effectively. This paper introduces a currency-based iterative agent bidding mechanism to effectively and cost-efficiently integrate the activities associated with production planning and control, so as to achieve an optimised process plan and schedule. The aim is to enhance the agility of manufacturing systems to accommodate dynamic changes in the market and production. The iterative bidding mechanism is executed based on currency-like metrics; each operation to be performed is assigned with a virtual currency value and agents bid for the operation if they make a virtual profit based on this value. These currency values are optimised iteratively and so does the bidding process based on new sets of values. This is aimed at obtaining better and better production plans, leading to near-optimality. A genetic algorithm is proposed to optimise the currency values at each iteration. In this paper, the implementation of the mechanism and the test case simulation results are also discussed. © 2012 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

Internal market orientation:construct, measurement and consequences

This thesis contributes to the paucity of marketing research into the area of internal marketing. Drawing from knowledge developed in a diverse range of marketing and management literatures, the domaill of internal marketing is clarified Gild a new concept, internal market orientation is developed. A new instrument, measuring the internal market orientation, is developed and subjected to standard scale development procedures. Six dimensions of the construct are confirmed; collegial interaction, group interaction, jorlllal interaction, external envirollment, wage flexibility and job flexibility. A sample of 766 UK retail store managers are surveyed to identify levels of internal market orientation and external market orientation in large UK multi-product, multi-site retailers and the structural relationships between internal market orientation, extemal market orientation alld company performance are examined. The external market orientation construct is applied to the local retail market and established measurement instruments adapted to this pwpose. Three measures of performance are employed ill this study. The structural relationships between the six dimensions of internal market orientation and the three dimensions of external market orientation are examined employing structural equations methodology, using LISREL 8.3. alld the impact of internal market orientation Oil external market orientation and company performance is measured. The study finds no direct link between internal market orientation and financial performance but does identify the moderated role of internal market orientation on financial performance. Significant relationships between three of the six dimensions of internal market orientation and the three dimensions of external market orientation are identified and the impact of internal market orientation on the retention of employees and their behaviour is also identified. The research findings contribute to marketing theory by providing empirical evidence to support the long held assumption that internal marketing has an impact on marketing success and offers an explanation of the mechanism by which this influence operates. For marketing practitioners, the research findings offer additional information on which services marketing strategies may be formulated.

An iterative agent bidding mechanism for responsive manufacturing

In today's market, the global competition has put manufacturing businesses in great pressures to respond rapidly to dynamic variations in demand patterns across products and changing product mixes. To achieve substantial responsiveness, the manufacturing activities associated with production planning and control must be integrated dynamically, efficiently and cost-effectively. This paper presents an iterative agent bidding mechanism, which performs dynamic integration of process planning and production scheduling to generate optimised process plans and schedules in response to dynamic changes in the market and production environment. The iterative bidding procedure is carried out based on currency-like metrics in which all operations (e.g. machining processes) to be performed are assigned with virtual currency values, and resource agents bid for the operations if the costs incurred for performing them are lower than the currency values. The currency values are adjusted iteratively and resource agents re-bid for the operations based on the new set of currency values until the total production cost is minimised. A simulated annealing optimisation technique is employed to optimise the currency values iteratively. The feasibility of the proposed methodology has been validated using a test case and results obtained have proven the method outperforming non-agent-based methods.

Agent-orientated auction mechanism and strategy design

Agent-based technology is playing an increasingly important role in today’s economy. Usually a multi-agent system is needed to model an economic system such as a market system, in which heterogeneous trading agents interact with each other autonomously. Two questions often need to be answered regarding such systems: 1) How to design an interacting mechanism that facilitates efficient resource allocation among usually self-interested trading agents? 2) How to design an effective strategy in some specific market mechanisms for an agent to maximise its economic returns? For automated market systems, auction is the most popular mechanism to solve resource allocation problems among their participants. However, auction comes in hundreds of different formats, in which some are better than others in terms of not only the allocative efficiency but also other properties e.g., whether it generates high revenue for the auctioneer, whether it induces stable behaviour of the bidders. In addition, different strategies result in very different performance under the same auction rules. With this background, we are inevitably intrigued to investigate auction mechanism and strategy designs for agent-based economics. The international Trading Agent Competition (TAC) Ad Auction (AA) competition provides a very useful platform to develop and test agent strategies in Generalised Second Price auction (GSP). AstonTAC, the runner-up of TAC AA 2009, is a successful advertiser agent designed for GSP-based keyword auction. In particular, AstonTAC generates adaptive bid prices according to the Market-based Value Per Click and selects a set of keyword queries with highest expected profit to bid on to maximise its expected profit under the limit of conversion capacity. Through evaluation experiments, we show that AstonTAC performs well and stably not only in the competition but also across a broad range of environments. The TAC CAT tournament provides an environment for investigating the optimal design of mechanisms for double auction markets. AstonCAT-Plus is the post-tournament version of the specialist developed for CAT 2010. In our experiments, AstonCAT-Plus not only outperforms most specialist agents designed by other institutions but also achieves high allocative efficiencies, transaction success rates and average trader profits. Moreover, we reveal some insights of the CAT: 1) successful markets should maintain a stable and high market share of intra-marginal traders; 2) a specialist’s performance is dependent on the distribution of trading strategies. However, typical double auction models assume trading agents have a fixed trading direction of either buy or sell. With this limitation they cannot directly reflect the fact that traders in financial markets (the most popular application of double auction) decide their trading directions dynamically. To address this issue, we introduce the Bi-directional Double Auction (BDA) market which is populated by two-way traders. Experiments are conducted under both dynamic and static settings of the continuous BDA market. We find that the allocative efficiency of a continuous BDA market mainly comes from rational selection of trading directions. Furthermore, we introduce a high-performance Kernel trading strategy in the BDA market which uses kernel probability density estimator built on historical transaction data to decide optimal order prices. Kernel trading strategy outperforms some popular intelligent double auction trading strategies including ZIP, GD and RE in the continuous BDA market by making the highest profit in static games and obtaining the best wealth in dynamic games.