An incentivized auction based group-selling approach for demand response management in V2G systems

Vehicle-to-Grid (V2G) system with efficient Demand Response Management (DRM) is critical to solve the problem of supplying electricity by utilizing surplus electricity available at EVs. An incentivilized DRM approach is studied to reduce the system cost and maintain the system stability. EVs are motivated with dynamic pricing determined by the group-selling based auction. In the proposed approach, a number of aggregators sit on the first level auction responsible to communicate with a group of EVs. EVs as bidders consider Quality of Energy (QoE) requirements and report interests and decisions on the bidding process coordinated by the associated aggregator. Auction winners are determined based on the bidding prices and the amount of electricity sold by the EV bidders. We investigate the impact of the proposed mechanism on the system performance with maximum feedback power constraints of aggregators. The designed mechanism is proven to have essential economic properties. Simulation results indicate the proposed mechanism can reduce the system cost and offer EVs significant incentives to participate in the V2G DRM operation.

Studies on the nutrition and metabolism of turbot (Scophthalmus maximus L) with reference to fish farming

This thesis provides the first detailed study of maximal oxygen consumption of turbot on a fish farm over a range of fish sizes and temperatures. Also provided is a study of the diets used in turbot farming and the development of a diet that contains no fresh fish. A detailed study of previous research on flatfish nutrition, identified fresh fish, sprat in particular, as the optimum diet for turbot farming. A series of experiments was undertaken that confirmed this and also identified one possible explanation for the optimum performance of sprat, as a function of high non-protein energy ratios in sprat. This factor was exploited in the production of a diet containing no fresh fish and which produced superior results to diets containing fresh fish; the optimum level of lipid in the diet was determined as 18%. The study of oxygen consumption was on fully-fed fish so that maximum demand could be quantified. Continuous monitoring of tank water oxygen levels enabled the calculation of the Specific Dynamic Action (SDA) effect in turbot and the relation of it to dietary energy. Variation of SDA with the dietary energy profile was identified as a contributing factor to differential fish growth on various diets. Finally, the implications of this work to fish farming were considered. Economic appraisal and comparison of the diets routinely used in turbot farming identified that the diet developed as a result of this work, ie the diet containing no fresh fish protein, was more cost effective on the basis of the production of one tonne of turbot. The study of oxygen consumption enables water supply to be calculated for any fish size between 1g and 1000g between the temperatures of 7® C and 16® C. The quantification of SDA enables correct adjustment of oxygen flows according to the feeding status of the fish.

Egg quality and fecundity in rainbow trout: the determining factors and mechanisms of control

This thesis considers the factors involved in the determination of egg quality and fecundity in farmed stocks of rainbow trout ( Salmo gairdneri R) • Measurements of egg quality, ie. percentage survivals of eggs and fry, from the production batches of eggs of seven fish farms, showed mean survivals of 70% to eying but levels of only 35% to 4.5g fry (approx. 130 days post-fertilisation). Under optimum conditions survivals may reach 85% suggesting that husbandry methods exert significant influences on egg quality. Chemical analyses of the protein, fat, vitellogenin, ash, amino acids, free fatty acid and mineral levels of eggs of varying quality and from parents of different strains showed compositional differences even between individuals of the same stock. However, none of these differences were correlated with egg quality. Egg size showed similar variations but, again under hatchery conditions there was no correlation with differences in egg quality. The only factor which has been shown to exert a significant influence on egg quality is the time of stripping after ovulation. At 1 0°C eggs should be removed from gravid females within ten days of ovulation to achieve optimum egg and fry survival. Studies of egg production from approximately 10,000 broodstock revealed that total fecundity and egg size increased and relative fecundity decreased with increasing fish size. In general, most fish appeared to produce a constant volume of eggs. This is consistent with a hypothesis that egg size can only be increased by parallel reductions in fecundity. Feeding broodstock at half-ration (0.35% body weight day- 1 ) did not affect egg quality but reduced total fecundity and egg size and increased relative fecundity when compared with eggs produced by fish on full-ration. Comparisons of regressions of total fecundity against fish weight for three strains using ANOCO revealed that one strain was significantly more fecund than two other strains considered. Trout of the same strain maintained on different farms behaved similarly suggesting there was some reproducibility of strain characteristics.

Agent-orientated auction mechanism and strategy design

Agent-based technology is playing an increasingly important role in today’s economy. Usually a multi-agent system is needed to model an economic system such as a market system, in which heterogeneous trading agents interact with each other autonomously. Two questions often need to be answered regarding such systems: 1) How to design an interacting mechanism that facilitates efficient resource allocation among usually self-interested trading agents? 2) How to design an effective strategy in some specific market mechanisms for an agent to maximise its economic returns? For automated market systems, auction is the most popular mechanism to solve resource allocation problems among their participants. However, auction comes in hundreds of different formats, in which some are better than others in terms of not only the allocative efficiency but also other properties e.g., whether it generates high revenue for the auctioneer, whether it induces stable behaviour of the bidders. In addition, different strategies result in very different performance under the same auction rules. With this background, we are inevitably intrigued to investigate auction mechanism and strategy designs for agent-based economics. The international Trading Agent Competition (TAC) Ad Auction (AA) competition provides a very useful platform to develop and test agent strategies in Generalised Second Price auction (GSP). AstonTAC, the runner-up of TAC AA 2009, is a successful advertiser agent designed for GSP-based keyword auction. In particular, AstonTAC generates adaptive bid prices according to the Market-based Value Per Click and selects a set of keyword queries with highest expected profit to bid on to maximise its expected profit under the limit of conversion capacity. Through evaluation experiments, we show that AstonTAC performs well and stably not only in the competition but also across a broad range of environments. The TAC CAT tournament provides an environment for investigating the optimal design of mechanisms for double auction markets. AstonCAT-Plus is the post-tournament version of the specialist developed for CAT 2010. In our experiments, AstonCAT-Plus not only outperforms most specialist agents designed by other institutions but also achieves high allocative efficiencies, transaction success rates and average trader profits. Moreover, we reveal some insights of the CAT: 1) successful markets should maintain a stable and high market share of intra-marginal traders; 2) a specialist’s performance is dependent on the distribution of trading strategies. However, typical double auction models assume trading agents have a fixed trading direction of either buy or sell. With this limitation they cannot directly reflect the fact that traders in financial markets (the most popular application of double auction) decide their trading directions dynamically. To address this issue, we introduce the Bi-directional Double Auction (BDA) market which is populated by two-way traders. Experiments are conducted under both dynamic and static settings of the continuous BDA market. We find that the allocative efficiency of a continuous BDA market mainly comes from rational selection of trading directions. Furthermore, we introduce a high-performance Kernel trading strategy in the BDA market which uses kernel probability density estimator built on historical transaction data to decide optimal order prices. Kernel trading strategy outperforms some popular intelligent double auction trading strategies including ZIP, GD and RE in the continuous BDA market by making the highest profit in static games and obtaining the best wealth in dynamic games.

Designing a successful adaptive agent for TAC Ad auction

This paper describes the design and evaluation of Aston-TAC, the runner-up in the Ad Auction Game of 2009 International Trading Agent Competition. In particular, we focus on how Aston-TAC generates adaptive bid prices according to the Market-based Value Per Click and how it selects a set of keyword queries to bid on to maximise the expected profit under limited conversion capacity. Through evaluation experiments, we show that AstonTAC performs well and stably not only in the competition but also across a broad range of environments. © 2010 The authors and IOS Press. All rights reserved.

Congestion pricing by priority auction

This paper analyzes a communication network facing users with a continuous distribution of delay cost per unit time. Priority queueing is often used as a way to provide differential services for users with different delay sensitivities. Delay is a key dimension of network service quality, so priority is a valuable resource which is limited and should to be optimally allocated. We investigate the allocation of priority in queues via a simple bidding mechanism. In our mechanism, arriving users can decide not to enter the network at all or submit an announced delay sensitive value. User entering the network obtains priority over all users who make lower bids, and is charged by a payment function which is designed following an exclusion compensation principle. The payment function is proved to be incentive compatible, so the equilibrium bidding behavior leads to the implementation of "cµ-rule". Social warfare or revenue maximizing by appropriately setting the reserve payment is also analyzed.