Bile-salt-induced aggregation of poly(N-isopropylacrylamide) and lowering of the lower critical solution temperature in aqueous solutions

The effect of sodium cholate (NaC; concentration 1-16 mM), a biological surfactant, on the aggregation behavior of 1% (w/v, 2.2 × 10(-3) M) poly(N-isopropylacrylamide) (PNIPAM) aqueous solutions was studied as a function of temperature. From turbidity, dynamic light scattering, viscosity, and fluorescence measurements, it was observed that (i) there is NaC-induced nanoscale aggregation of PNIPAM in its sol state and (ii) the lower critical solution temperature corresponding to sol-gel transition shifts to a lower temperature by about 2 °C.

A statistical method for the identification and aggregation of regional linguistic variation

This paper introduces a method for the analysis of regional linguistic variation. The method identifies individual and common patterns of spatial clustering in a set of linguistic variables measured over a set of locations based on a combination of three statistical techniques: spatial autocorrelation, factor analysis, and cluster analysis. To demonstrate how to apply this method, it is used to analyze regional variation in the values of 40 continuously measured, high-frequency lexical alternation variables in a 26-million-word corpus of letters to the editor representing 206 cities from across the United States.

Gold nanoparticles decorated with oligo(ethylene glycol) thiols:kinetics of colloid aggregation driven by depletion forces

We have studied the kinetics of the phase-separation process of mixtures of colloid and protein in solutions by real-time UV-vis spectroscopy. Complementary small-angle X-ray scattering (SAXS) was employed to determine the structures involved. The colloids used are gold nanoparticles functionalized with protein resistant oligo(ethylene glycol) (OEG) thiol, HS(CH(2))(11)(OCH(2)CH(2))(6)OMe (EG6OMe). After mixing with protein solution above a critical concentration, c*, SAXS measurements show that a scattering maximum appears after a short induction time at q = 0.0322 angstrom(-1) stop, which increases its intensity with time but the peak position does not change with time, protein concentration and salt addition. The peak corresponds to the distance of the nearest neighbor in the aggregates. The upturn of scattering intensities in the low q-range developed with time indicating the formation of aggregates. No Bragg peaks corresponding to the formation of colloidal crystallites could be observed before the clusters dropped out from the solution. The growth kinetics of aggregates is followed in detail by real-time UV-vis spectroscopy, using the flocculation parameter defined as the integral of the absorption in the range of 600-800 nm wavelengths. At low salt addition (<0.5 M), a kinetic crossover from reaction-limited cluster aggregation (RLCA) to diffusion-limited cluster aggregation (DLCA) growth model is observed, and interpreted as being due to the effective repulsive interaction barrier between colloids within the depletion potential. Above 0.5 M NaCl, the surface charge of proteins is screened significantly, and the repulsive potential barrier disappeared, thus the growth kinetics can be described by a DLCA model only.

Agent-orientated auction mechanism and strategy design

Agent-based technology is playing an increasingly important role in today’s economy. Usually a multi-agent system is needed to model an economic system such as a market system, in which heterogeneous trading agents interact with each other autonomously. Two questions often need to be answered regarding such systems: 1) How to design an interacting mechanism that facilitates efficient resource allocation among usually self-interested trading agents? 2) How to design an effective strategy in some specific market mechanisms for an agent to maximise its economic returns? For automated market systems, auction is the most popular mechanism to solve resource allocation problems among their participants. However, auction comes in hundreds of different formats, in which some are better than others in terms of not only the allocative efficiency but also other properties e.g., whether it generates high revenue for the auctioneer, whether it induces stable behaviour of the bidders. In addition, different strategies result in very different performance under the same auction rules. With this background, we are inevitably intrigued to investigate auction mechanism and strategy designs for agent-based economics. The international Trading Agent Competition (TAC) Ad Auction (AA) competition provides a very useful platform to develop and test agent strategies in Generalised Second Price auction (GSP). AstonTAC, the runner-up of TAC AA 2009, is a successful advertiser agent designed for GSP-based keyword auction. In particular, AstonTAC generates adaptive bid prices according to the Market-based Value Per Click and selects a set of keyword queries with highest expected profit to bid on to maximise its expected profit under the limit of conversion capacity. Through evaluation experiments, we show that AstonTAC performs well and stably not only in the competition but also across a broad range of environments. The TAC CAT tournament provides an environment for investigating the optimal design of mechanisms for double auction markets. AstonCAT-Plus is the post-tournament version of the specialist developed for CAT 2010. In our experiments, AstonCAT-Plus not only outperforms most specialist agents designed by other institutions but also achieves high allocative efficiencies, transaction success rates and average trader profits. Moreover, we reveal some insights of the CAT: 1) successful markets should maintain a stable and high market share of intra-marginal traders; 2) a specialist’s performance is dependent on the distribution of trading strategies. However, typical double auction models assume trading agents have a fixed trading direction of either buy or sell. With this limitation they cannot directly reflect the fact that traders in financial markets (the most popular application of double auction) decide their trading directions dynamically. To address this issue, we introduce the Bi-directional Double Auction (BDA) market which is populated by two-way traders. Experiments are conducted under both dynamic and static settings of the continuous BDA market. We find that the allocative efficiency of a continuous BDA market mainly comes from rational selection of trading directions. Furthermore, we introduce a high-performance Kernel trading strategy in the BDA market which uses kernel probability density estimator built on historical transaction data to decide optimal order prices. Kernel trading strategy outperforms some popular intelligent double auction trading strategies including ZIP, GD and RE in the continuous BDA market by making the highest profit in static games and obtaining the best wealth in dynamic games.

A priori prediction of aggregation efficiency and rate constant for fluidized bed melt granulation

This paper presents a predictive aggregation rate model for spray fluidized bed melt granulation. The aggregation rate constant was derived from probability analysis of particle–droplet contact combined with time scale analysis of droplet solidification and granule–granule collision rates. The latter was obtained using the principles of kinetic theory of granular flow (KTGF). The predicted aggregation rate constants were validated by comparison with reported experimental data for a range of binder spray rate, binder droplet size and operating granulator temperature. The developed model is particularly useful for predicting particle size distributions and growth using population balance equations (PBEs).

Designing a successful adaptive agent for TAC Ad auction

This paper describes the design and evaluation of Aston-TAC, the runner-up in the Ad Auction Game of 2009 International Trading Agent Competition. In particular, we focus on how Aston-TAC generates adaptive bid prices according to the Market-based Value Per Click and how it selects a set of keyword queries to bid on to maximise the expected profit under limited conversion capacity. Through evaluation experiments, we show that AstonTAC performs well and stably not only in the competition but also across a broad range of environments. © 2010 The authors and IOS Press. All rights reserved.

Spectrum redistribution for cognitive radios using discriminatory spectrum double auction

With the reformation of spectrum policy and the development of cognitive radio, secondary users will be allowed to access spectrums licensed to primary users. Spectrum auctions can facilitate this secondary spectrum access in a market-driven way. To design an efficient auction framework, we first study the supply and demand pressures and the competitive equilibrium of the secondary spectrum market, considering the spectrum reusability. In well-designed auctions, competition among participants should lead to the competitive equilibrium according to the traditional economic point of view. Then, a discriminatory price spectrum double auction framework is proposed for this market. In this framework, rational participants compete with each other by using bidding prices, and their profits are guaranteed to be non-negative. A near-optimal heuristic algorithm is also proposed to solve the auction clearing problem of the proposed framework efficiently. Experimental results verify the efficiency of the proposed auction clearing algorithm and demonstrate that competition among secondary users and primary users can lead to the competitive equilibrium during auction iterations using the proposed auction framework. Copyright © 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

Congestion pricing by priority auction

This paper analyzes a communication network facing users with a continuous distribution of delay cost per unit time. Priority queueing is often used as a way to provide differential services for users with different delay sensitivities. Delay is a key dimension of network service quality, so priority is a valuable resource which is limited and should to be optimally allocated. We investigate the allocation of priority in queues via a simple bidding mechanism. In our mechanism, arriving users can decide not to enter the network at all or submit an announced delay sensitive value. User entering the network obtains priority over all users who make lower bids, and is charged by a payment function which is designed following an exclusion compensation principle. The payment function is proved to be incentive compatible, so the equilibrium bidding behavior leads to the implementation of "cµ-rule". Social warfare or revenue maximizing by appropriately setting the reserve payment is also analyzed.

Price synchronicity:the closing call auction and the London Stock Market

In this paper, we consider the impact of the introduction of a closing call auction on market quality of the London Stock Exchange. We employ the market model, RDD and MEC metrics of market quality. These signify substantial improvements to market quality at both the close and open for migrating stocks.We note that these improvements are larger at the open than the close. An important contribution of our paper is that we show that changes to market quality are stronger in those securities that have the lowest liquidity in the pre-call period. In contrast, market quality changes following the introduction of a closing call auction are approximately neutral for high-liquidity securities. We conclude that the implementation of a closing call auction, for high-liquidity securities may not enhance market quality.

Parametric aggregation in ordered weighted averaging

Incorporating further information into the ordered weighted averaging (OWA) operator weights is investigated in this paper. We first prove that for a constant orness the minimax disparity model [13] has unique optimal solution while the modified minimax disparity model [16] has alternative optimal OWA weights. Multiple optimal solutions in modified minimax disparity model provide us opportunity to define a parametric aggregation OWA which gives flexibility to decision makers in the process of aggregation and selecting the best alternative. Finally, the usefulness of the proposed parametric aggregation method is illustrated with an application in metasearch engine. © 2011 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

Aggregation and caking processes of granular materials:continuum model and simulation with application to sugar

Aggregation and caking of particles are common severe problems in many operations and processing of granular materials, where granulated sugar is an important example. Prevention of aggregation and caking of granular materials requires a good understanding of moisture migration and caking mechanisms. In this paper, the modeling of solid bridge formation between particles is introduced, based on moisture migration of atmospheric moisture into containers packed with granular materials through vapor evaporation and condensation. A model for the caking process is then developed, based on the growth of liquid bridges (during condensation), and their hardening and subsequent creation of solid bridges (during evaporation). The predicted caking strengths agree well with some available experimental data on granulated sugar under storage conditions.

The impact of the closing call auction:an examination of effects in London

This article examines the impact on market quality that the introduction of a closing call auction had at the London Stock Exchange (LSE). Using the market model approach of Cohen et al. (1983a, b) OpenURL Aston University, b) we show that opening and closing market quality improved for those Financial Times and Stock Exchange 100 (FTSE 100) securities participating in the closing call. A control sample of stocks is not characterized by discernable changes to market quality.

How many contracts in an auction sale

Making sense of auction sales, in terms of English contract law, is no easy task. Despite the common perception of hammers hitting blocks, signifying the creation of the basic sale contract,1 a typical auction sale necessarily involves the making of several forms of contract other than the obvious primary sale agreement. The purpose of this article, therefore, is threefold, namely, to (1) examine these various forms of contractual relationship2 which may come into existence as a result of a traditional (face to face) auction sale; (2) consider specifically the selling of land at public auction with a view to advocating a change in the law requiring the formality of writing for sales contracts of land for both private and public auctions, and (3) compare briefly the contractual elements of an online ascending model of auction sale typified by the eBay phenomenon.