AstonCAT-plus:an efficient specialist for the TAC market design tournament

This paper describes the strategies used by AstonCAT-Plus, the post-tournament version of the specialist designed for the TAC Market Design Tournament 2010. It details how AstonCATPlus accepts shouts, clears market, sets transaction prices and charges fees. Through empirical evaluation, we show that AstonCAT-Plus not only outperforms AstonCAT (tournament version) significantly but also achieves the second best overall score against some top entrants of the competition. In particular, it achieves the highest allocative efficiency, transaction success rate and average trader profit among all the specialists in our controlled experiments.

Designing a successful adaptive agent for TAC Ad auction

This paper describes the design and evaluation of Aston-TAC, the runner-up in the Ad Auction Game of 2009 International Trading Agent Competition. In particular, we focus on how Aston-TAC generates adaptive bid prices according to the Market-based Value Per Click and how it selects a set of keyword queries to bid on to maximise the expected profit under limited conversion capacity. Through evaluation experiments, we show that AstonTAC performs well and stably not only in the competition but also across a broad range of environments. © 2010 The authors and IOS Press. All rights reserved.

Agent-orientated auction mechanism and strategy design

Agent-based technology is playing an increasingly important role in today’s economy. Usually a multi-agent system is needed to model an economic system such as a market system, in which heterogeneous trading agents interact with each other autonomously. Two questions often need to be answered regarding such systems: 1) How to design an interacting mechanism that facilitates efficient resource allocation among usually self-interested trading agents? 2) How to design an effective strategy in some specific market mechanisms for an agent to maximise its economic returns? For automated market systems, auction is the most popular mechanism to solve resource allocation problems among their participants. However, auction comes in hundreds of different formats, in which some are better than others in terms of not only the allocative efficiency but also other properties e.g., whether it generates high revenue for the auctioneer, whether it induces stable behaviour of the bidders. In addition, different strategies result in very different performance under the same auction rules. With this background, we are inevitably intrigued to investigate auction mechanism and strategy designs for agent-based economics. The international Trading Agent Competition (TAC) Ad Auction (AA) competition provides a very useful platform to develop and test agent strategies in Generalised Second Price auction (GSP). AstonTAC, the runner-up of TAC AA 2009, is a successful advertiser agent designed for GSP-based keyword auction. In particular, AstonTAC generates adaptive bid prices according to the Market-based Value Per Click and selects a set of keyword queries with highest expected profit to bid on to maximise its expected profit under the limit of conversion capacity. Through evaluation experiments, we show that AstonTAC performs well and stably not only in the competition but also across a broad range of environments. The TAC CAT tournament provides an environment for investigating the optimal design of mechanisms for double auction markets. AstonCAT-Plus is the post-tournament version of the specialist developed for CAT 2010. In our experiments, AstonCAT-Plus not only outperforms most specialist agents designed by other institutions but also achieves high allocative efficiencies, transaction success rates and average trader profits. Moreover, we reveal some insights of the CAT: 1) successful markets should maintain a stable and high market share of intra-marginal traders; 2) a specialist’s performance is dependent on the distribution of trading strategies. However, typical double auction models assume trading agents have a fixed trading direction of either buy or sell. With this limitation they cannot directly reflect the fact that traders in financial markets (the most popular application of double auction) decide their trading directions dynamically. To address this issue, we introduce the Bi-directional Double Auction (BDA) market which is populated by two-way traders. Experiments are conducted under both dynamic and static settings of the continuous BDA market. We find that the allocative efficiency of a continuous BDA market mainly comes from rational selection of trading directions. Furthermore, we introduce a high-performance Kernel trading strategy in the BDA market which uses kernel probability density estimator built on historical transaction data to decide optimal order prices. Kernel trading strategy outperforms some popular intelligent double auction trading strategies including ZIP, GD and RE in the continuous BDA market by making the highest profit in static games and obtaining the best wealth in dynamic games.

An efficient knowledge transfer solution to a novel SMDP formalization of a broker's decision problem

This paper introduces a new technique for optimizing the trading strategy of brokers that autonomously trade in re- tail and wholesale markets. Simultaneous optimization of re- tail and wholesale strategies has been considered by existing studies as intractable. Therefore, each of these strategies is optimized separately and their interdependence is generally ignored, with resulting broker agents not aiming for a glob- ally optimal retail and wholesale strategy. In this paper, we propose a novel formalization, based on a semi-Markov deci- sion process (SMDP), which globally and simultaneously op- timizes retail and wholesale strategies. The SMDP is solved using hierarchical reinforcement learning (HRL) in multi- agent environments. To address the curse of dimensionality, which arises when applying SMDP and HRL to complex de- cision problems, we propose an ecient knowledge transfer approach. This enables the reuse of learned trading skills in order to speed up the learning in new markets, at the same time as making the broker transportable across market envi- ronments. The proposed SMDP-broker has been thoroughly evaluated in two well-established multi-agent simulation en- vironments within the Trading Agent Competition (TAC) community. Analysis of controlled experiments shows that this broker can outperform the top TAC-brokers. More- over, our broker is able to perform well in a wide range of environments by re-using knowledge acquired in previously experienced settings.

Optimising market share and profit margin:SMDP-based tariff pricing under the smart grid paradigm

Smart grid technologies have given rise to a liberalised and decentralised electricity market, enabling energy providers and retailers to have a better understanding of the demand side and its response to pricing signals. This paper puts forward a reinforcement-learning-powered tool aiding an electricity retailer to define the tariff prices it offers, in a bid to optimise its retail strategy. In a competitive market, an energy retailer aims to simultaneously increase the number of contracted customers and its profit margin. We have abstracted the problem of deciding on a tariff price as faced by a retailer, as a semi-Markov decision problem (SMDP). A hierarchical reinforcement learning approach, MaxQ value function decomposition, is applied to solve the SMDP through interactions with the market. To evaluate our trading strategy, we developed a retailer agent (termed AstonTAC) that uses the proposed SMDP framework to act in an open multi-agent simulation environment, the Power Trading Agent Competition (Power TAC). An evaluation and analysis of the 2013 Power TAC finals show that AstonTAC successfully selects sell prices that attract as many customers as necessary to maximise the profit margin. Moreover, during the competition, AstonTAC was the only retailer agent performing well across all retail market settings.

An intelligent broker agent for energy trading:an MDP approach

This paper details the development and evaluation of AstonTAC, an energy broker that successfully participated in the 2012 Power Trading Agent Competition (Power TAC). AstonTAC buys electrical energy from the wholesale market and sells it in the retail market. The main focus of the paper is on the broker’s bidding strategy in the wholesale market. In particular, it employs Markov Decision Processes (MDP) to purchase energy at low prices in a day-ahead power wholesale market, and keeps energy supply and demand balanced. Moreover, we explain how the agent uses Non-Homogeneous Hidden Markov Model (NHHMM) to forecast energy demand and price. An evaluation and analysis of the 2012 Power TAC finals show that AstonTAC is the only agent that can buy energy at low price in the wholesale market and keep energy imbalance low.