Material and efficient cause interpretations of the formative model:resolving misunderstandings and clarifying conceptual language

This paper presents a causal explanation of formative variables that unpacks and clarifies the generally accepted idea that formative indicators are ‘causes’ of the focal formative variable. In doing this, we explore the recent paper by Diamantopoulos and Temme (AMS Review, 3(3), 160-171, 2013) and show that the latter misunderstand the stance of Lee, Cadogan, and Chamberlain (AMS Review, 3(1), 3-17, 2013; see also Cadogan, Lee, and Chamberlain, AMS Review, 3(1), 38-49, 2013). By drawing on the multiple ways that one can interpret the idea of causality within the MIMIC model, we then demonstrate how the continued defense of the MIMIC model as a tool to validate formative indicators and to identify formative variables in structural models is misguided. We also present unambiguous recommendations on how formative variables can be modelled in lieu of the formative MIMIC model.

The Gilles de la Tourette Syndrome-Quality of Life Scale for children and adolescents (C&A-GTS-QOL):development and validation of the Italian version

BACKGROUND: Gilles de la Tourette syndrome (GTS) is a chronic childhood-onset neuropsychiatric disorder with a significant impact on patients' health-related quality of life (HR-QOL). Cavanna et al. (Neurology 2008; 71: 1410-1416) developed and validated the first disease-specific HR-QOL assessment tool for adults with GTS (Gilles de la Tourette Syndrome-Quality of Life Scale, GTS-QOL). This paper presents the translation, adaptation and validation of the GTS-QOL for young Italian patients with GTS. METHODS: A three-stage process involving 75 patients with GTS recruited through three Departments of Child and Adolescent Neuropsychiatry in Italy led to the development of a 27-item instrument (Gilles de la Tourette Syndrome-Quality of Life Scale in children and adolescents, C&A-GTS-QOL) for the assessment of HR-QOL through a clinician-rated interview for 6-12 year-olds and a self-report questionnaire for 13-18 year-olds. RESULTS: The C&A-GTS-QOL demonstrated satisfactory scaling assumptions and acceptability. Internal consistency reliability was high (Cronbach's alpha > 0.7) and validity was supported by interscale correlations (range 0.4-0.7), principal-component factor analysis and correlations with other rating scales and clinical variables. CONCLUSIONS: The present version of the C&A-GTS-QOL is the first disease-specific HR-QOL tool for Italian young patients with GTS, satisfying criteria for acceptability, reliability and validity. © 2013 - IOS Press and the authors. All rights reserved.

Biologising parenting:neuroscience discourse, English social and public health policy and understandings of the child

In recent years, claims about children's developing brains have become central to the formation of child health and welfare policies in England. While these policies assert that they are based on neuro-scientific discoveries, their relationship to neuroscience itself has been debated. However, what is clear is that they portray a particular understanding of children and childhood, one that is marked by a lack of acknowledgment of child personhood. Using an analysis of key government-commissioned reports and additional advocacy documents, this article illustrates the ways that the mind of the child is reduced to the brain, and this brain comes to represent the child. It is argued that a highly reductionist and limiting construction of the child is produced, alongside the idea that parenting is the main factor in child development. It is concluded that this focus on children's brains, with its accompanying deterministic perspective on parenting, overlooks children's embodied lives and this has implications for the design of children's health and welfare services.

Biologising parenting:neuroscience discourse, English social and public health policy and understandings of the child

In recent years, claims about children's developing brains have become central to the formation of child health and welfare policies in England. While these policies assert that they are based on neuro-scientific discoveries, their relationship to neuroscience itself has been debated. However what is clear is that they portray a particular understanding of children and childhood, one that is marked by a lack of acknowledgment of child personhood. Using an analysis of key government-commissioned reports and additional advocacy documents, this chapter illustrates the ways that the mind of the child is reduced to the brain, and this brain comes to represent the child. It is argued that a highly reductionist and limiting construction of the child is produced, alongside the idea that parenting is the main factor in child development. It is concluded that this focus on children's brains, with its accompanying deterministic perspective on parenting, overlooks children's embodied lives and this has implications for the design of children's health and welfare services.