The Voice in the Whirlwind: Lessons for Job -- Randomness and Natural Evil

The innocent Job suffers, friends are no help, and then Job screams at Yahweh, demanding justice. The first surprise is that Yehweh responds to Job, does not criticize him but tells him he is ignorant, and then gives him a science lesson. The content of that lesson is the second surprise.

Affect and the Problem of Evil

A central aspect of the problem of evil or the argument from evil is the intensity or quantity of suffering. This quantity is conceived of as something objective and fixed. But because our experience is in part constituted and interpreted by our effectual orientation, there is no such objective quantum of suffering. But where there is no objective quantum of suffering, the argument from evil collapses. Here we begin by examining the connection between the philosophical and existential dimensions of the problem of and argument from evil as suffering. Next we consider the role of the affect in the constitution and interpretation of experience generally, together with implications for the argument from suffering. Third, we look at how a key affectual element of the argument from evil might undercut that argument. And finally, we consider a proposal to categorize suffering as a species of moral or spiritual failure, as affectually wrong.

A Mea Culpa for The Felix Culpa? A Greater Goods Response to the Problems of Evil and Hell

In this paper I want to develop a particular kind of greater-good response to the problems of evil and hell, one which hence can serve as a backup plan should the free will defense not satisfy. Ultimately, this response will appear to belong to several traditions in theodicy. Like all greater-goods views, this one relies on explaining the existence of evil in terms of the greater goods that come out of it. Among these goods are the greater goods of Incarnation and Atonement, their respective goodness consisting in large part in the higher-order divine good of glorifying God through the display of divine virtue.

God: Savior, Butcher, Or Oblivious Artist? The Theodicy Of Alfred North Whitehead

This paper is a critical examination of Alfred North Whitehead's attempt to solve the traditional problem of evil. Whitehead's conception of evil is crucial to his process cosmology because it is integral to his process cosmology because it is integral to his notion of creation in which evil is understood in relationship to the larger dynamic of God’s creative activity. While Whitehead’s process theodicy is interesting, he fails to successfully escape between the horns of the traditional dilemma. Whitehead is often criticized for treating evil as merely apparent. While some process philosophers, notably Maurice Barineau, have defended Whitehead from this charge, it can be shown that this is an implication of Whitehead’s approach. Moreover, Whitehead’s theodicy fails to address radical moral evil in its concrete dimension in respect to real human suffering. As a result, Whitehead’s theodicy is not relevant to Christian theology. My paper is divided into two parts. I will first briefly discuss the traditional problem of evil and some of the traditional problem of evil and some of the traditional solutions proposed to resolve it. The reminder of the paper will demonstrate why Whitehead’s theodicy addresses the traditional problem of evil only at the expense of theological irrelevancy.

Theodicies, Utilitarianism, and Respect for Persons

Most theodicy responses to the problem of evil have in common the claim that God legitimately allows some evil such that greater good may come. This response is puzzling because the seemingly overwhelming consensus (at least amongst Christian apologists) is that 1) morality is deontological in nature (e.g. our duty of obedience to God’s commands, or acting in accordance with God’s purpose), and 2) relatedly, that humans are made in God’s image (i. e. are rational beings) and thus are worthy of respect. I shall argue that theodicy defenses that claim that God allows some evil such that greater good may come are untenable because they either unnecessarily bifurcate Christian morality in an ad hoc manner, or entail that God cannot have respect for persons.