1 resultado para Missing Persons
em Blue Tiger Commons - Lincoln University - USA
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Resumo:
Most theodicy responses to the problem of evil have in common the claim that God legitimately allows some evil such that greater good may come. This response is puzzling because the seemingly overwhelming consensus (at least amongst Christian apologists) is that 1) morality is deontological in nature (e.g. our duty of obedience to God’s commands, or acting in accordance with God’s purpose), and 2) relatedly, that humans are made in God’s image (i. e. are rational beings) and thus are worthy of respect. I shall argue that theodicy defenses that claim that God allows some evil such that greater good may come are untenable because they either unnecessarily bifurcate Christian morality in an ad hoc manner, or entail that God cannot have respect for persons.