Establishing electoral administration systems in new democracies

The difficulty of holding fair elections continues to be a critical problem in many newly democratized countries. The core of the problem is the electoral administration's lack of political autonomy and capability to regulate fraud. This paper seeks to identify the conditions for establishing an autonomous and capable electoral administration system. An electoral administration system has two main functions: to disclose the nature of elections and to prevent fraud. We argue in this paper that an autonomous and capable electoral administration system exists if the major political players have the incentive to disclose the information on the elections and to secure the ruler's credible commitment to fair elections. We examine this argument through comparative case studies of Korea and the Philippines. Despite similar historical and institutional settings, their election commissions exhibit contrasting features. The difference in the incentive structures of the major political players seems to have caused the divergence in the institutional evolution of the election commissions in the two countries.

Boundaries of firms and catching up by latecomers in global production networks : the case of a Mexican auto-parts manufacturer

For manufacturing firms in developing countries, there are high barriers to entry and to catching up with competitors in their global production networks (GPNs). This paper examines the case of a Mexican auto-parts manufacturer that succeeded in catching up in the automotive GPN. The author proposes that the door to GPNs is open thanks to frequent changes in the boundaries of firms, and also stresses the importance of the necessary conditions that generate opportunities, including institutional settings that facilitate market entry and catching up, and capability building by firms hopeful of entry.