Exchange Rate Stabilization and IMF High Interest Rate Policy: A Critical Reconsideration Using a Dynamic Model

This paper examines whether the IMF high interest rate policy was suitable for crisis-ridden East Asian economies. Using an "overshoot" model similar to that of Dornbusch's (1976), it shows that this sort of policy might cause an unnecessary deflationary adjusting process and have no effect on containing the real depreciation of exchange rates in the long run. The study also demonstrates that Thai economic data coincides quite well with the model presented here. Finally, it points out that the high interest policy itself might provoke high risk-premium, the existence of which, in turn, justifies the policy. This means that the policy has a self-fulfilling property. In conclusion, a "one-size-fits-all" adaptation of high interest rate policy in a currency crisis is very dangerous in general, and was inappropriate for East Asia. The desirable policy would have been to let currencies depreciate and keep interest rates stable.

Bank restructuring and financial institution reform in Indonesia

The banking sector underwent drastic reform in post-crisis Indonesia. Bank restructuring, driven by IMF conditionalities, resulted in the exit of insolvent banks and ownership changes of major private banks. Through recapitalization and sales of government-held shares, foreign-owned banks emerged as leading actors in the place of business-group-affiliated banks. As part of the restructuring process, an exit rule was created. The central bank, which up to that time had been given only partial authority under the jurisdiction of the Minister of Finance, now gained a full range of authority over banks. The central bank's supervision system on banks, risk management systems at individual banks, and their efforts to build risk management capacities, began to function. This is totally different from the old financial institution under the Soeharto regime, where banks had no incentive to control risks, as the regime tacitly ensured their survival.

Financial Cooperation in East Asia

This paper addresses the rationale for financial cooperation in East Asia. It begins by giving a brief review of developments after the Asian currency crisis, and argues that enhancing regional financial cooperation both quantitatively and qualitatively will require: (1) upgrading surveillance capabilities in the region, and (2) creating a clear division of labor between regional institutions and the IMF. It also mentions the issue of membership and the background forces that have led to the duplication of similar forums in East Asia. Although the concern over crisis management is the central issue in East Asian financial cooperation, other issues such as exchange rate policy coordination and fostering regional capital markets are discussed as well.

Forestry Sector Reform and Distributional Change of Natural Resource Rent in Indonesia

After the collapse of the centralized Soeharto regime, deforestation caused by over-logging accelerated. To tackle this problem, an IMF/World Bank-led forestry sector reform program adopted a market-friendly approach involving the resumption of round wood exports and raising of the resource rent fee, with the aim to stop rent accumulation by plywood companies, which had enjoyed a supply of round wood at privileged prices. The Indonesian government, for its part, decentralized the forest concession management system to provide incentives for local governments and communities to carry out sustainable forest management. However, neither policy reform worked effectively. The round wood export ban was reimposed and the forest management system centralized again with cooperation from a newly funded industry-led institution. In the midst of the confusion surrounding the policy reversal, the gap between the price of round wood in international and domestic markets failed to contract, although rent allocations to plywood industries were reduced during 1998-2003. The rents were not collected properly by the government, but accumulated unexpectedly in the hands of players in the black market for round wood.

韓国のソーシャル・セーフティネット

アジア通貨危機後、韓国はIMFの構造調整を受け入れた。不況とマクロ緊縮政策があいまって、失業率が急激に上昇した。その対策として、政府はソーシャル・セーフティネットの整備に力を入れた。雇用保険の適用者拡大などの政策は、IMFのコンディショナリティに従ったものである。しかし、実際に実施された政策はIMFの勧告を超え、広く社会保障の整備につながるものであった。

Post-Crisis Economic Reform in Indonesia:Policy for Intervening in Ownership in Historical Perspective

Introduction : Economic reform in Indonesia after the Asian currency crisis is often discussed in parallel with Thailand and South Korea, which were alike hit by the crisis. It should however be noted that what happened in Indonesia was a change of political regime from authoritarianism to democracy, not just a change of government as seen in Thailand and South Korea. Indonesia’s post-crisis reform should be understood in the context of dismantling of the Soeharto regime to seek a new democratic state system. 　　　In the political sphere, dramatic institutional changes have occurred since the downfall of the Soeharto government in May 1998. In comparison, changes in the economic sphere are more complex than the political changes, as the former involve at least three aspects. The first is the continuity in the basic framework of capitalist system with policy orientation toward economic liberalization. In this framework, the policies to overcome the crisis are continued from the last period of the Soeharto rule, under the support system of IMF and CGI (Consultative Group on Indonesia). The second aspect is the impact of the political regime change on the economic structure. It is considered that the structure of economic vested interests of the Soeharto regime is being disintegrated as the regime breaks down. The third aspect is the impact of the political regime change on economic policy-making process. The process of formulating and implementing policies has changed drastically from the Soeharto time. With these three aspects simultaneously at work, it is not so easy to identify which of them is the main cause for a given specific economic phenomenon emerging in Indonesia today. 　　　Keeping this difficulty in mind, this paper attempts to situate the post-crisis economic reform in the broader context of the historical development of Indonesian economic policies and their achievements. We focus in particular on the reform policies for banking and corporate sectors and resulting structural changes in these sectors. This paper aims at understanding the significance of the changes in the economic ownership structure that are occurring in the post-Soeharto Indonesia. Economic policies here do not mean macro economic policies, such as fiscal, financial and trade policies, but refer to micro economic policies whereby the government intervenes in the economic ownership structure. In Section 1, we clarify why economic policies for intervening in the ownership structure are important in understanding Indonesia. Section 2 follows the historical development of Indonesia’s economic policies as specified above, throughout the four successive periods since Indonesia’s independence, namely, the parliamentary democracy period, the Guided Democracy period under Soekarno, the Soeharto-regime consolidation period, and the Soeharto-regime transfiguration period2. Then we observe what economic ownership structure was at work in the pre-crisis last days of the Soeharto rule as an outcome of the economic policies. In Section 3, we examine what structural changes have taken place in the banking and corporate sectors due to the reform policies in the post-crisis and post-Soeharto Indonesia. Lastly in Section 4, we interpret the current reorganization of the economic ownership in the context of the historical transition of the ownership structure, taking account of the changes in the policy-making processes under democratization.

The dynamics of spending and absorption of aid : panel data analysis

In September 1999, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) established the Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility (PRGF) to make the reduction of poverty and the enhancement of economic growth the fundamental objectives of lending operations in its poorest member countries. This paper studies the spending and absorption of aid in PRGF-supported programs, verifies whether the use of aid is programmed to be smoothed over time, and analyzes how considerations about macroeconomic stability influence the programmed use of aid. The paper shows that PRGF-supported programs permit countries to utilize all increases in aid within a few years, showing smoothed use of aid inflows over time. Our results reveal that spending is higher than absorption in both the long-run and short-run use of aid, which is a robust finding of the study. Furthermore, the paper demonstrates that the long-run spending exceeds the injected increase of aid inflows in the economy. In addition, the paper finds that the presence of a PRGF-supported program does not influence the actual absorption or spending of aid.

第2章 開発途上国と債務管理におけるガバナンス

「公的債務管理の概念」は18世紀から一部先進国で導入され、20世紀後半から租税制度や金融・財政政策との関連、先進国の事例も含めた財政・金融危機、あるいは民営化や地方分権化実施の試みに伴い、さまざまな議論が展開された。しかし、歳入基盤が不安定であったり、税制が未整備なために国内外で常に資金調達を行わねばならない開発途上国がどのように公的債務を管理すべきか、その行政システムや関連法、ガバナンスの構築に関する取組みは1990年代終盤から2000年代初にかけて本格的に始まったばかりである。債務問題と公的債務管理に関する先行研究のレビュー、IMF・世界銀行作成した公的債務管理に関するガイドラインや、これをもとに実施された試験的プログラムの報告書等をもとに債務管理上のガバナンス要件や途上国における現状を検討すると、(1)国際機関が定める「公的債務」の定義と実際、(2)組織としての「政府」におけるガバナンス問題、(3)公会計制度の整備(あるいは国際的な普遍化)が課題として挙げられる。