Democratization and Financial Reform in Taiwan: The Political Economy of Bad-Loan Creation

This study shows that many bad loans now burdening Taiwan's financial institutions are interrelated with the society's democratization which started in the late 1980s. Democratization made the local factions and business groups more independent from the Kuomintang government. They acquired more political influence than under the authoritarian regime. These changes induced them to manage their owned financial institutions more arbitrarily and to intervene more frequently in the state-affiliated financial institutions. Moreover they interfered in financial reform and compelled the government to allow many more new banks than it had originally planned. As a result the financial system became more competitive and the qualities of loans deteriorated. Some local factions and business groups exacerbated the situation by establishing banks in order to funnel funds to themselves, sometimes illegally. Thus many bad loans were created as the side effect of democratization.

The Political Economy of Growth: A Review

This cursory literature review discusses the direct and indirect effects of institutions, governance, and democracy on economic growth, and the following conclusions are drawn. First, institutions and governance have a positive effect on growth. Even reforms that are less than comprehensive can stimulate, though not sustain, growth. Second, democracy neither promotes nor hampers growth directly. It secures stability and resilience in growth. It also exerts impacts on sources of growth but its net effect remains inconclusive. There remains unanswered the question of why institutions and governance matter but not democracy does not. The difference may be partly due to negative effects on investment and labor supply as well as the low credibility of young or partial democracies.

Critical connections : Islamic politics and political economy in Indonesia and Malaysia

This article explores Islamic politics in two Muslim-majority countries in Southeast Asia, Indonesia and Malaysia, by linking their trajectories, from late colonial emergence to recent upsurge, to broad concerns of political economy, including changing social bases, capitalist transformation, state policies, and economic crises. The Indonesian and Malaysian trajectories of Islamic politics are tracked in a comparative exercise that goes beyond the case studies to suggest that much of contemporary Islamic politics cannot be explained by reference to Islam alone, but to how Islamic identities and agendas are forged in contexts of modern and profane social contestation.

From authoritarianism to upheaval : the political economy of the Syrian uprising and regime persistence

The ensuing bloodshed and deteriorating humanitarian crisis in Syria, the failure of the United Nations Security Council to reach a consensus on what action to take, and the involvement of contending external actors partially reflect the complexity of the current impasse. Despite the importance of regional and international factors, however, this papers attempts to argue that the domestic dynamics of the Syrian crisis have been vitally important in determining the course of the popular uprising and the regime’s response. In this, Syria’s crisis belongs with the Arab Spring the trajectories and prospects of which have been shaped by dynamics within regimes. It will be seen that the formal and informal institutional structure of the Ba‘thist regime in Syria has been critical to its resilience and ability to stay united so far while attempting to crush a peaceful popular uprising that turned into insurgency in the face of the regime’s violent crackdown.

Political economy of low sulfurization and air pollution control policy in Japan : SOx emission reduction by fuel conversion

In the early stages of the development of Japan’s environmental policy, sulfur oxide (SOx) emissions, which seriously damage health, was the most important air pollution problem. In the second half of the 1960s and the first half of the 1970s, the measures against SOx emissions progressed quickly, and these emissions were reduced drastically. The most important factor of the reduction was the conversion to a low-sulfur fuel for large-scale fuel users, such as the electric power industry. However, industries started conversion to low-sulfur fuel not due to environmental concerns, but simply to reduce costs. Furthermore, the interaction among the various interests of the electric power industry, oil refineries, the central government, local governments, and citizens over the energy and environmental policies led to the measures against SOx emissions by fuel conversion.

Political influence in commercial and financial oil trading : the evidence from US firms

International politics affects oil trade. But do financial and commercial traders who participate in spot oil trading also respond to changes in international politics? We construct a firm-level dataset for all U.S. oil-importing companies over 1986-2008 to examine how these firms respond to increases in "political distance" between the U.S. and her trading partners, measured by divergence in their UN General Assembly voting patterns. Consistent with previous macro evidence, we first show that individual firms diversify their oil imports politically, even after controlling for unobserved firm heterogeneity. However, the political pattern of oil imports is not entirely driven by the concerns of hold-up risks, which exist when oil transactions via term contracts are associated with backward vertical FDI that is subject to expropriation. In particular, our results indicate that even financial and commercial traders significantly reduce their oil imports from U.S. political enemies. Interestingly, while these traders diversify their oil imports politically immediately after changes in international politics, other oil companies reduce their oil imports with a significant time lag. Our findings suggest that in designing regulations to avoid harmful repercussions on commodity and financial assets, policymakers need to understand the nature of political risk.

Explaining the Persistence of State-ownership in China

In the recent decade China witnessed an upsurge of privatization of small and medium state-owned enterprises (SOEs). In contrast to the consequent sharp reduction in the number of firms, however, the estimated share of broadly-defined SOEs that includes limited liabilities companies controlled by the State has shown virtually no sign of decline. We explain the backgrounds of this seemingly paradoxical persistence of state-ownership by looking into two distinctive types of large SOEs: traditional SOEs that remain dominant in oligopolistic industries and manager-controlled SOEs surviving in competitive industries. The two types exemplify several factors constraining further progress of SOE reform such as, financing the costs of restructuring, redefining the role of the State as the single dominant shareholder, and balancing the interests of the State and managers as entrepreneurs. Sorting these issues out will take time, which means that instabilities associated with state corporate ownership will remain in place in the foreseeable future in China.

An Asian Triangle of Growth and Cluster-to-Cluster Linkages

It is expected that an Asian triangle of growth will be formed in the coming few decades. China, India and ASEAN surround the Asian triangle, which is home to many industrial clusters. Multinational corporations will link these clusters together. Regional integration will help them in this task by lowering the barriers of national borders. This paper explains the necessity of regional integration for cluster-to-cluster linkages in the Asian triangle of growth.

Integration under 'One Country, Two Systems' - The Case of Mainland China and Hong Kong-

Ever since the handover of the territory in 1997, Hong Kong has had its own unique law and its own economic system and international legal personality, and has not been integrated with Mainland China. The Basic Law guarantees the uniqueness of the Hong Kong SAR until 2047. But close economic ties between Hong Kong and the Mainland will promote closer economic integration. The Basic Law limits only a customs union and the introduction of a single currency, but not the formation of a Free Trade Agreement (hereafter FTA) and monetary union. FTA has already been realized in the form of the Closer Economic Partnership Arrangement (hereafter CEPA). The Hong Kong SAR government, including the bureaucrat as well as the Chief Executive Tung Chee Hwa, was opposed to, and hesitant towards, the formation of a regional trade agreement with the Mainland, but the business community made them to adopt a positive attitude towards the CEPA. It is unclear how much integration can been deepened, but it can be argued that the current policy of the Hong Kong SAR is too supportive of business, and an excessive degree of economic integration may threaten the uniqueness of Hong Kong. But if Hong Kong achieves democracy and enjoys complete autonomy, it will be easy for economic integration to co-exist with the 'One Country, Two Systems' approach, in the interests of the business community and of the citizens of the SAR.

台湾WTO加盟後の対中政策手段とFTA外交

WTO加盟は台湾にとって、初めての国連組織への加盟となる。また、FTAへの参加資格を得た点において大きな外交得点であった。しかし、中国との経済関係の自由化を迫られるデメリットがあるが、中国との政治的な緊張関係を利用して台湾は自由化を遅らせることもできる。一方、他のWTOメンバーとのFTA締結は法的障害を除去しても、中国の反対がネックとなっている。