Social cleavages and electoral support in Turkey -- toward convergence?

Studies on Western democracies have shown that deep-seated social cleavages stabilize the electoral behavior and thus reduce electoral volatility. But how do social cleavages affect a party system that is undergoing democratic consolidation, such as in Turkey? In this study, investigations were carried out on long- and short-term relationships between social cleavages (religiosity, ethnicity, and sectarism) and electoral volatility in Turkey during the 1961-2002 period. Cross-sectional multiple regressions were applied to electoral and demographic data at the provincial level. The results showed that in the long-term, social cleavages on the whole have increased volatility rather than reduced it. The cleavage-volatility relationship, however, has changed over time. Repeated elections have mitigated the volatile effect of social cleavages on the voting behavior, as political parties have become more representative of the existent social cleavages.

Economic voting and electoral volatility in Turkish provinces

Two groups of questions were addressed in this paper: (1) Is voter punishment of the incumbent the primary factor in electoral volatility? Are there any other types of vote swings that underlie volatility? (2) In general, does a decline in economic growth destabilize voter behavior? If so, what kinds of vote swings does an economic downturn tend to generate? Provincial-level panel data analysis yielded the following results: (1) Changes in volatility is primarily due to vote swings from the incumbent to the opposition and also to and from left-wing and right-wing parties. (2) Lower economic growth increases electoral volatility. Economic decline induces vote swings not only from the government to the opposition but also from left-wing to right-wing parties. This is probably because right-wing parties seem more concerned with economic issues and are thus more popular than left-wing parties with lower-income voters.

Establishing electoral administration systems in new democracies

The difficulty of holding fair elections continues to be a critical problem in many newly democratized countries. The core of the problem is the electoral administration's lack of political autonomy and capability to regulate fraud. This paper seeks to identify the conditions for establishing an autonomous and capable electoral administration system. An electoral administration system has two main functions: to disclose the nature of elections and to prevent fraud. We argue in this paper that an autonomous and capable electoral administration system exists if the major political players have the incentive to disclose the information on the elections and to secure the ruler's credible commitment to fair elections. We examine this argument through comparative case studies of Korea and the Philippines. Despite similar historical and institutional settings, their election commissions exhibit contrasting features. The difference in the incentive structures of the major political players seems to have caused the divergence in the institutional evolution of the election commissions in the two countries.

The stakes of politics and electoral administration : a comparative study of Southeast Asian democracies

Elections play a crucial role in political stability in post-democratization, and electoral administrations are the key to the electoral process. However, not all newly democratized countries have established reliable electoral administration. New democracies in Southeast Asia, such as the Philippines, Indonesia and Thailand, have independent election commissions which have different characteristics, especially in terms of neutrality. Based on three cases, this paper claims that the stakes of politics are the major determinant of the variations in neutrality. The high stakes of politics in Thailand brought about the partisan election commission, while the low stakes in Indonesia made the electoral system relatively neutral. Like Thailand, the high stakes of politics in the Philippines also cause political intervention in the electoral administration.

Retrospective Voting in Turkey: Macro and Micro Perspectives

Recent studies have shown that party systems in emerging democracies do not always adequately reflect the various cleavages of society. Under such circumstances, retrospective voting may play a more important role than cleavage voting in determining electoral outcomes. For studies of retrospective voting, the choice between macro and micro level as the independent variable is a major methodological issue. Using individual-level data on Turkey, this paper addresses two major questions: (1) Are voters' decisions based on household economic conditions or national economic conditions? Do sociopolitical conditions also count? (2) Does the future evaluation of the economy affect voting decisions apart from past evaluation? Logit models are used in this research to answer these questions.

The First Universal Suffrage Election, at County (Gewog) Level, in Bhutan

Following a Royal Edict to adopt universal suffrage in election for local government institutions, maiden elections were held in 199 gewogs (counties) in Bhutan in 2002 to elect their chief executives. This paper gives an account of this first time event in a country where most villagers had never seen secret ballots and poll booths. It synthesizes detailed data, mostly qualitative, collected soon after the election was over, and assesses aspects of electoral participation that His Majesty the King of Bhutan has introduced steadily to deepen democracy. Beginning with a glance at the territorial organization of the Bhutanese state within which the counties are embedded, the paper compares the electoral results with the relevant election rules.

Political conditions for fair elections

Democracy is not necessarily consolidated simply by the introduction of formal democratic institutions. It is often observed in new democracies that democratic institutions are neglected and eroded in actual practice. Particularly, electoral fraud committed by a ruler is one of the main problems in this regard. This paper deals with two questions, (1) under what conditions does a ruler have an incentive to hold fair elections (or to rig elections), and (2) what makes a ruler prefer to establish an independent election governing institution? Assuming that a ruler prefers to maintain her power, basically she has an incentive to rig elections in order to be victorious in the political competition. A ruler, however, faces the risk of losing power if the opposition stages successful protests on a sufficiently large scale. If opponents are able to pose a credible threat to a ruler, she will have an incentive to hold fair elections. The problem is that information on electoral fraud is not shared by every player in the game. For the opposition, imperfect information deepens their coordination problems. Imperfect information, on the other hand, in some cases causes a problem for a ruler. If the opposition is sufficiently cohesive and have little tolerance of cheating, even unverified suspicions of fraud may trigger menacing protests. In such a case, a ruler has an incentive to establish an independent election commission to avoid unnecessary collisions by revealing the nature of the elections.

Kenya's 2007 election crisis

On 27 December 2007, the Republic of Kenya held its tenth general election since independence. The ballot-related proceedings went as planned up to and including the vote count, providing grounds for optimism for a largely peaceful transfer of power. However, after the official declaration by the Electoral Commission of Kenya late in the afternoon of 30 December that the presidential election had been won by the incumbent, Mwai Kibaki (from Central Province and a Kikuyu), Kenya entered into a period of deep crisis. How might we best understand this great turbulence, which was unprecedented in post-independence Kenya? Perhaps the answer lies in the sudden defeat of the opposition's presidential candidate, Raila Odinga from Nyanza Province and a Luo, who had been widely expected to win. With the post-election upheaval as the context, and looking at the situation from the standpoint of political history, this paper will offer an analysis of trends in Kenya's politics since 2002.

Non-economic voting and incumbent strength in Turkey

Evidence suggests that incumbent parties find it harder to be re-elected in emerging than in advanced democracies because of more serious economic problems in the former. Yet the pro-Islamic Justice and Development Party (AKP) has ruled Turkey since 2002. Does economic performance sufficiently account for the electoral strength of the AKP government? Reliance on economic performance alone to gain public support makes a government vulnerable to economic fluctuations. This study includes time-series regressions for the period 1950-2011 in Turkey and demonstrates that even among Turkey's long-lasting governments, the AKP has particular electoral strength that cannot be adequately explained by economic performance.

The misconception of political lessons : how UMNO perceives the fall of LDP in Japan

2012 marks the thirtieth anniversary of Malaysia’s Look East Policy (LEP). This article argues that the strong relationship between Malaysia and Japan is stimulated by symbiotic ties binding together both countries’ respective major political parties, viz. the United Malays National Organisation (UMNO) and the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP). UMNO, especially under the leadership of Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad (1981-2003), derived political lessons from developments affecting LDP in Japan. Two forms of lessons may be discerned. First, emulation of Japan’s success in economic development, which become the basis of LEP launched in 1981. Second, on which our article focuses, lessons from the failure of LDP to retain power twice in 1993 and 2009. Since 1993, DP’s defeat has been a poignant reminder for UMNO to be in alert mode in facing any electoral possibility. When LDP was again ousted from power in 2009, UMNO was a most psychologically affected party owing to the unprecedented setback it suffered at Malaysia’s Twelfth General Elections (GE) of 2008. Yet, although LDP’s reversal of fortunes served as a landmark for UMNO in situating changes to its trajectory since 1999, the analogical reasoning and political lessons applied by UMNO leaders were, to a large extent, flawed. Arguably, politicians frequently do misjudge in analogising between different situations which at a glance seem to be comparable.