Incentives Embedded in Institutions: The Case of Share Contracts in Ghanaian Cocoa Production

Providing price incentives to farmers is usually considered essential for agricultural development. Although such incentives are important, regarding price as the sole explanatory factor is far from satisfactory in understanding the complex realities of agricultural production in Africa. By analyzing the share contracts widely practiced in Ghana, this article argues that local institutions such as land tenure systems and agrarian contracts provide strong incentives and disincentives for agricultural production. Based on data derived from fieldwork in the 1990s, the study analyzes two types of share contracts and the incentive structures embedded in them. The analysis reveals that farmers' investment behavior needs to be understood in terms of both short-term incentive to increase yield and long-term incentive to strengthen land rights. The study concludes that the role of price incentives in agricultural production needs to be reconsidered by placing it in wider incentive structures embedded in local institutions.

The role of Preferential Trade Agreements (PTAs) in facilitating global production networks

This paper examines the effects of preferential trade agreements (PTAs) in facilitating international trade flows connecting production networks. We consider over 250 PTAs with trade flows distinguished into parts and components and final goods for the period 1979-2008. The gravity equation estimates suggest that the concurrent year effects of PTA formation on trade in parts and components are unseen, whereas PTAs have positive and pervasive effects on both types of trade flows 6 and 9 years after the PTA formation.

Regional differences regarding land tenancy in rural Rwanda, with special reference to sharecropping in a coffee production area

This paper examines land tenancy systems and tenant contracts in Rwanda, with respect to socioeconomic contexts. Our research in southern and eastern Rwanda produced data suggesting that land borrowing with fixed rents has been generally practiced, and that rent levels have been low in comparison to expected revenues from field production. In the western areas of coffee production, however, the practice of sharecropping has recently appeared. This system is advantageous to landowners, as they are able to acquire half of the harvests; in addition, the fixed rent levels in this region are much higher than those of other regions. In the southern and eastern regions, because land borrowing with fixed rents has been the only tenancy pattern and rent levels have remained low, the economic situation should be interpreted in the context of a continuing traditional Rwandan land tenure system. In contrast, in the western coffee production area, the soaring of fixed rents and the emergence of sharecropping have been brought about by high pressures for land use, which were caused not only by a population increase but also by the development of cash crop production and the existence of a labor exchange system. The increase in rent levels has therefore been offset by a corresponding increase in agricultural productivity.

Boundaries of firms and catching up by latecomers in global production networks : the case of a Mexican auto-parts manufacturer

For manufacturing firms in developing countries, there are high barriers to entry and to catching up with competitors in their global production networks (GPNs). This paper examines the case of a Mexican auto-parts manufacturer that succeeded in catching up in the automotive GPN. The author proposes that the door to GPNs is open thanks to frequent changes in the boundaries of firms, and also stresses the importance of the necessary conditions that generate opportunities, including institutional settings that facilitate market entry and catching up, and capability building by firms hopeful of entry.