An Empirical Analysis of the Monetary Policy Reaction Function in India

This paper empirically analyzes India’s monetary policy reaction function by applying the Taylor (1993) rule and its open-economy version which employs dynamic OLS. The analysis uses monthly data from the period of April 1998 to December 2007. When the simple Taylor rule was estimated for India, the output gap coefficient was statistically significant, and its sign condition was found to be consistent with theoretical rationale; however, the same was not true of the inflation coefficient. When the Taylor rule with exchange rate was estimated, the coefficients of output gap and exchange rate had statistical significance with the expected signs, whereas the results of inflation remained the same as before. Therefore, the inflation rate has not played a role in the conduct of India’s monetary policy, and it is inappropriate for India to adopt an inflation-target type policy framework.

Financial Policies and Dynamic Game Simulation in Poland and Hungary

Recently, steady economic growth rates have been kept in Poland and Hungary. Money supplies are growing rather rapidly in these economies. In large, exchange rates have trends of depreciation. Then, exports and prices show the steady growth rates. It can be thought that per capita GDPs are in the same level and development stages are similar in these two countries. It is assumed that these two economies have the same export market and export goods are competing in it. If one country has an expansion of monetary policy, price increase and interest rate decrease. Then, exchange rate decrease. Exports and GDP will increase through this phenomenon. At the same time, this expanded monetary policy affects another country through the trade. This mutual relationship between two countries can be expressed by the Nash-equilibrium in the Game theory. In this paper, macro-econometric models of Polish and Hungarian economies are built and the Nash- equilibrium is introduced into them.

Strategic trade policy and non-linear subsidy : in the case of price competition

In a strategic trade policy, it is assumed, in this paper, that a government changes disbursement or levy method so that the reaction function of home firm approaches infinitely close to that of foreign firm. In the framework of Bertrand-Nash equilibrium, Eaton and Grossman[1986] showed that export tax is preferable to export subsidy. In this paper, it is shown that export subsidy is preferable to export tax in some cases in the framework of Bertrand-Nash equilibrium, considering the uncertainty in demand. Historically, many economists mentioned non-linear subsidy or tax. However, optimum solution of it has not yet been shown. The optimum solution is shown in this paper.