On Labor Complementarity, Cultural Frictions and Strategic Immigration Policies

In this paper we consider a model with two industrialized countries that face a flow of immigration from the "rest of the world." The countries differ in three characteristics: the labor complementarity between the "native" population and immigrants, the population size, and the magnitude of the cultural friction between the natives and immigrants. We consider a non-cooperative game between two countries' when their strategic instrument is the choice of an immigration quota and the world immigrant wages introduce the spill-over effect between two countries. We first show that the quota game admits unique pure strategies Nash equilibrium. We then compare the equilibrium choices of two countries and show that even though the larger country attracts more immigrants, it chooses lower quota than its smaller counterpart. It also turns out that higher degree of labor complementarity between natives and immigrants and a lower degree of cultural friction between two groups yield higher immigration quota. We also examine the welfare implications of countries choices' and argue that coordinated and harmonized immigration policies may improve the welfare of both countries.

A Mathematical Representation of "Excitement" in Games from the Viewpoint of a Neutral Audience

Researchers have long believed the concept of "excitement" in games to be subjective and difficult to measure. This paper presents the development of a mathematically computable index that measures this concept from the viewpoint of an audience. One of the key aspects of the index is the differential of the probability of "winning" before and after one specific "play" in a given game. If the probability of winning becomes very positive or negative by that play, then the audience will feel the game to be "exciting." The index makes a large contribution to the study of games and enables researchers to compare and analyze the "excitement" of various games. It may be applied to many fields especially the area of welfare economics, ranging from allocative efficiency to axioms of justice and equity.

A Mathematical Representation of "Excitement" in Games: A Contribution to the Theory of Game Systems

Researchers have long believed the concept of "excitement" in games to be subjective and difficult to measure. This paper presents the development of a mathematically computable index that measures the concept from the viewpoint of an audience and from that of a player. One of the key aspects of the index is the differential of the probability of "winning" before and after one specific "play" in a given game. The index makes a large contribution to the study of games and enables researchers to compare and analyze the “excitement” of various games. It may be applied in many fields, especially the area of welfare economics, and applications may range from those related to allocative efficiency to axioms of justice and equity.

Financial Policies and Dynamic Game Simulation in Poland and Hungary

Recently, steady economic growth rates have been kept in Poland and Hungary. Money supplies are growing rather rapidly in these economies. In large, exchange rates have trends of depreciation. Then, exports and prices show the steady growth rates. It can be thought that per capita GDPs are in the same level and development stages are similar in these two countries. It is assumed that these two economies have the same export market and export goods are competing in it. If one country has an expansion of monetary policy, price increase and interest rate decrease. Then, exchange rate decrease. Exports and GDP will increase through this phenomenon. At the same time, this expanded monetary policy affects another country through the trade. This mutual relationship between two countries can be expressed by the Nash-equilibrium in the Game theory. In this paper, macro-econometric models of Polish and Hungarian economies are built and the Nash- equilibrium is introduced into them.

Inferring the Effects of Vertical Integration from Entry Games : An Analysis of the Generic Pharmaceutical Industry

This paper introduces a novel method for examining the effects of vertical integration. The basic idea is to estimate the parameters of a vertical entry game. By carefully specifying firms' payoff equations and constructing appropriate tests, it is possible to use estimates on rival profit effects to make inferences about the existence of vertical foreclosure. I estimate the vertical entry model using data from the US generic pharmaceutical industry. The estimates indicate that vertical integration is unlikely to generate anticompetitive foreclosure effects. On the other hand, significant efficiency effects are found to arise from vertical integration. I use the parameter estimates to simulate a policy that bans vertically integrated entry. The simulation results suggest that such a ban is counterproductive; it is likely to reduce entry into smaller markets.

Strategic trade policy and non-linear subsidy : in the case of price competition

In a strategic trade policy, it is assumed, in this paper, that a government changes disbursement or levy method so that the reaction function of home firm approaches infinitely close to that of foreign firm. In the framework of Bertrand-Nash equilibrium, Eaton and Grossman[1986] showed that export tax is preferable to export subsidy. In this paper, it is shown that export subsidy is preferable to export tax in some cases in the framework of Bertrand-Nash equilibrium, considering the uncertainty in demand. Historically, many economists mentioned non-linear subsidy or tax. However, optimum solution of it has not yet been shown. The optimum solution is shown in this paper.